Financial market implications of firm operations in countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism by Felde, Moritz-Alexander
Financial Market Implications of Firm Operations in Countries
Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism
Von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der
Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften genehmigte Dissertation
vorgelegt von
Moritz-Alexander Felde, M.Sc.
Berichter: Univ.-Prof. Dr.rer.pol. Wolfgang Breuer
Univ.-Prof. Dr.rer.pol. Rüdiger von Nitzsch
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 07.11.2012
Diese Dissertation ist auf den Internetseiten der Hochschulbibliothek online verfügbar.
Table of Contents
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 1
REFERENCES INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 5
II. RELATED RESEARCH ................................................................................................. 6
1. THE THEORETICAL GROUNDWORK OF MERTON (1987) AND RELATED 
STUDIES .................................................................................................................. 6
2. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
(SRI) AND SIN STOCKS ....................................................................................... 16
3. TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS ........................... 24
4. FIRM WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH AFRICA .................................................. 34
5. OVERVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH .............................................................. 36
REFERENCES RELATED RESEARCH...................................................................... 39
III. STOCK MARKET REACTION TO FIRM WITHDRAWAL FROM STATE SPONSOR 
OF TERRORISM COUNTRIES – PUNISHMENT FOR FOREGONE BUSINESS 
OPPORTUNITIES OR REWARD FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR?............................. 43
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 44
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ..................... 47
3. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND....................................... 51
3.1. Legislation directed towards US firms.......................................................... 51
3.2. US extra-territorial legislation ...................................................................... 54
4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES .................................................................................. 55
5. DATA ..................................................................................................................... 57
6. CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CARs) UPON ANNOUNCEMENT ... 65
6.1. Testing for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement.......... 65
6.1.1. Methodology: testing for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon 
announcement .............................................................................................. 65
6.1.2. Results: testing for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement
..................................................................................................................... 68
6.2. Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions.................... 71
6.2.1. Methodology: cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions
..................................................................................................................... 71
6.2.2. Results: cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions ....... 76
7. LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE ............................................................................ 80
7.1. Data and methodology: long-term performance ............................................ 80
7.2. Results: long-term performance.................................................................... 82
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 85
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................. 88
Table of Contents
ii
IV. THE SEC’S PUBLICATION OF AN ONLINE TOOL FOR DETECTING FIRMS 
DOING BUSINESS IN COUNTRIES DESIGNATED AS STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM:  SHORT-TERM INVESTOR REACTION AND LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES ....................................................................................................... 93
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 94
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION............................................... 98
3. DATA ................................................................................................................... 102
4. SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF THE TOOL’S PUBLICATION ............................... 107
4.1. Short-term effect: methodology .................................................................. 107
4.2. Short-term effect: results ............................................................................ 112
4.2.1. Short-term effect: full sample of firms........................................................ 112
4.2.2. Short-term effect: US firms ........................................................................ 113
4.2.3. Short-term effect: firms with operations in Iran .......................................... 114
4.2.4. Short-term effect: summary of results and additional analyses .................... 115
4.3. Short-term effect: robustness checks........................................................... 118
4.3.1. Portfolio level analysis ............................................................................... 118
4.3.2. Additional robustness checks...................................................................... 121
5. LONG-TERM EFFECT OF THE TOOL’S PUBLICATION ................................. 125
5.1. Long-term effect: methodology .................................................................. 125
5.2. Long-term effect: results ............................................................................ 127
6. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 129
REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 131
V. FIRMS WITH TIES TO COUNTRIES DESIGNATED AS STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM: A NOTE ON OWNERSHIP................................................................ 134
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 135
2. DATA ................................................................................................................... 138
2.1. Background information on the Global Security Risk Monitor (GSRM) 
database and selection of sample firms ....................................................... 138
2.2. Selection of control firms ........................................................................... 140
2.3. Key sample and control sample characteristics ........................................... 141
3. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES......................................................................... 146
3.1. Dependent variables ................................................................................... 146
3.2. Independent variables................................................................................. 148
3.2.1. Firm specific independent variables............................................................ 148
3.2.2. Country specific independent variables....................................................... 152
4. RESULTS ............................................................................................................. 153
4.1. Pension fund and endowment fund ownership ............................................ 153
4.2. US investor ownership ............................................................................... 165
4.2.1. US investor ownership results .................................................................... 165
4.2.2. US investor ownership robustness check .................................................... 174
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................... 177
REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 180
Table of Contents
iii
VI. FINAL CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 182
REFERENCES FINAL CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 186
List of Figures
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure III-1: Number of events per year .............................................................................. 64
List of Tables
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table II-1: Literature overview ........................................................................................... 37
Table III-1: Distribution of withdrawal reasons across firms ............................................... 60
Table III-2: Distribution of firms and events across country of origin .................................. 61
Table III-3: Distribution of firms and events across country of operation............................. 63
Table III-4: Distribution of firms and events across industriesError! Bookmark not defined.
Table III-5: Event returns .................................................................................................... 69
Table III-6: Correlations of explanatory variables in cross-sectional regression ................... 75
Table III-7: Cross-sectional regression, dependent variable: CAR (−15 to −3)..................... 78
Table III-8: Buy and hold portfolio returns: FF-model......................................................... 83
Table III-9: Buy and hold portfolio returns: HKK-model..................................................... 84
Table IV-1: Size and market-to-book ratio of sample stocks.............................................. 104
Table IV-2: Trading volume of sample stocks ................................................................... 105
Table IV-3: Hypothesis testing: full sample stock returns .................................................. 113
Table IV-4: Hypothesis testing: US sample stock returns .................................................. 114
Table IV-5: Hypothesis testing: Iran operations sample stock returns ................................ 115
Table IV-6: Hypothesis testing: press release as event date................................................ 116
Table IV-7: Hypothesis testing: non-US sample stock returns ........................................... 117
Table IV-8: Hypothesis testing: non-Iran sample stock returns .......................................... 118
Table IV-9: Hypothesis testing: full sample portfolio returns............................................. 120
Table IV-10: Hypothesis testing: full sample stock returns (US market) ............................ 121
Table IV-11: Hypothesis testing: US sample stock returns (US market) ............................ 122
Table IV-12: Hypothesis testing: Iran operations sample stock returns (US market) .......... 122
Table IV-13: Hypothesis testing: involvement sample stock returns .................................. 123
Table IV-14: Hypothesis testing: material involvement sample stock returns..................... 123
List of Tables
vi
Table IV-15: Hypothesis testing: terror-free control sample .............................................. 124
Table IV-16: Hypothesis testing: GSRM control sample ................................................... 125
Table IV-17: Alpha study: portfolio returns....................................................................... 129
Table V-1: Distribution of GSRM sample firms by year.................................................... 140
Table V-2: Distribution of GSRM sample and control firms by country ............................ 142
Table V-3: Distribution of GSRM sample and control firms by industry ........................... 145
Table V-4: Distribution of dependent variables over GSRM sample and control sample.... 147
Table V-5: Correlation of independent variables used in pension and endowment fund 
ownership regression ...................................................................................... 156
Table V-6: Pension and endowment fund ownership: full sample...................................... 160
Table V-7: Pension and endowment fund ownership: subsamples ..................................... 164
Table V-8: Correlations of independent variables used in US ownership regression .......... 166
Table V-9: US investor ownership: full sample determinants ............................................ 169
Table V-10: US investor ownership: non-US sample determinants.................................... 172
Table V-11: US investor ownership: OLS estimates .......................................................... 173
Table V-12: US investor ownership: Beta estimates .......................................................... 176
List of Abbreviations
vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
9/11 September 11, 2011 terror attacks
ADR American Depositary Receipt
AIC Akaike Information Criterion
AR Abnormal Return
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V.
BMP Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen
BW Brown and Warner
CACRs Cuban Asset Control Regulations
CalPERS California Public Employees' Retirement System
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CISADA Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
CSAG Conflict Security Advisory Group
DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization
e.g. exempli gratia
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis
ESG Environmental, Social and corporate Governance
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FF Fama and French
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GLS Generalised Least Squares
GSRM Global Security Risk Monitor
List of Abbreviations
viii
HAC Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent
HC Heteroskedasticity Consistent
HKK Hou, Karolyi, and Kho
HML High Minus Low (book-to-market) factor return
ICBSC DataStream Industry Classification Benchmark Sector Code
ICBSSC DataStream Industry Classification Benchmark Super-Sector Code
i.e. id est
i.i.d. independently and identically distributed
ILSA Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
INPRS Indiana Public Retirement System
IR Investor Relation(s)
IRA Irish Republican Army
ISIN International Securities Identification Number
KLD Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini
lg large cap growth index return
lv large cap value index return
MOM (return) momentum factor return
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
NYSCRF New York State Common Retirement Fund
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
P/E Price-to-Earnings ratio
S&P 500 Standard & Poor’s 500
SAA Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act
List of Abbreviations
ix
SADA Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
sg small cap growth index return
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
SMB Small Minus Low (market capitalisation) factor return
SRI Socially Responsible Investing
SUR Seemingly Unrelated Regression
sv small cap value index return
UJCNJ United Jewish Communities of MetroWest NJ
UK United Kingdom
US United States of America
Introduction
1
I. INTRODUCTION
“It seems that socially activist shareholder pressure on corporations 
has become a fact of life.”                              (Teoh et al.; 1999, p. 35)
As the above stated quote implies, investors are increasingly caring about non-pecuniary 
motives when meeting investment decisions. Besides an asset’s risk and return characteristics, 
investors display mounting sensitivity to a firm’s social conduct. In this respect, they may be 
concerned about good environmental performance, or display reluctance to investing in in-
dustries such as the alcohol or tobacco industry. These preferences are not newly revealed. 
Aversion to investing in tobacco stocks found expression already in the 1990s, when Harvard 
and the City University of New York divested all their tobacco shares (New York Times, 
1990).
In recent years, yet another dimension of social conduct has aroused investor interest: ter-
ror-free investing. The term signifies that only stocks of firms not engaging in business in 
countries that the U.S. Department of State has designated State Sponsors of Terrorism are 
considered for investment. Investors expressing interest in terror-free investing include insti-
tutional investors as well as norm conscious individuals. Among institutional investors ab-
staining from such investments, many well-known pension funds are at the forefront. Refer-
ring to stocks of firms operating in specific segments of the economies in Iran and Sudan, 
Rob Feckner, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System’s (CalPERS) board presi-
dent, announced that “the cost of continuing to hold the stock of these eight companies is 
greater than the value of divesting them” (CalPERS press release, 2011). Motivated by corre-
sponding US state legislation (for an overview, see Hemphill and Cullari, 2010), other funds 
have initiated similar divestments. Examples include the New York State Common Retire-
ment Fund (NYSCRF; McDaniel, 2010) or the Indiana Public Retirement System (INPRS; 
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Vasan, 2011). Apart from institutional investors’ efforts to keep portfolios clean from morally 
questionable firms, private investors have also displayed the desire for terror-free investments. 
Hemphill and Cullari (2010) cite a study conducted by Luntz Maslansky Strategic Research 
for the Center for Security Policy, which in 2007 asked the following question to 800 US 
adults: “should US pension funds, mutual funds and individuals invest in companies that do 
business with terrorist sponsoring states such as Iran, Syria and Sudan?” – 75% of the re-
spondents said “definitely not” and 11% said “probably not.”
These considerations reveal reason to believe that firms with business activities in the des-
ignated countries are shunned at least by the norm conscious subset of the investor spectrum. 
As it is argued in this dissertation, such disregard makes stocks of affected firms match the 
definition of neglected stocks in the sense of Merton’s (1987) model. This is why the subse-
quent section on related research starts out by unveiling Merton’s (1987) departure from clas-
sical finance theory. As Merton’s (1987) seminal work on neglected stocks induced many 
fields of research, those adjacent paths will briefly be described. Most importantly, the field 
of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) borrows from Merton’s (1987) work. Since (i) SRI 
leaves stocks aside which are perceived as controversial and as (ii) a substantial amount of 
global equity capital is SRI filtered, SRI causes stocks not meeting its criteria to be neglected. 
In the first place, such neglected stocks are those belonging to the triumvirate of sin (alcohol, 
tobacco, and gaming). This is why the body of literature on so-called sin stocks is extensively 
reviewed in the subsequent section’s second part. As sin stocks are the reverse side of SRI, 
they should suffer from the same type of neglect as stocks of firms with operations in coun-
tries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. A further related field of research is the one 
on terrorism and its impact on financial markets. Hence, relevant literature in this field is out-
lined in the subsequent section’s third part. In this context, one study (Karolyi, 2008) is dis-
cussed more extensively. It is the sole study to contain an analysis of the risk and return char-
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acteristics of terror-related investing. Furthermore, in that Karolyi (2008) explicitly mentions 
the need for analysis of terror-related investing strategies in a global setting (his analysis is 
confined to the US equity market), the study unveils part of the research gap that this disser-
tation fills. Lastly, related literature on firm withdrawal from South Africa is reviewed. This 
body of literature investigates shareholder wealth effects of firms withdrawing in reaction to 
shareholder pressure and is therefore closely related to this dissertation.
Widespread investor interest in terror-free investing not accompanied by corresponding 
academic research clearly creates a research gap. This dissertation addresses this gap by in-
vestigating the impact of firm operations in the designated countries on short- and long-term 
financial performance and ownership.
The first out of three papers assesses the short- and long-term financial impact of firm an-
nouncements to withdraw from countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. In an 
event-study framework, announcement period abnormal returns are analysed. Moreover, 
long-term return performance in the period subsequent to the withdrawals is investigated. 
Evidence indicates investors rewarded firms for withdrawing from the designated countries. 
During the period prior to announcement, sample firms experience a substantial, statistically 
significant stock price increase. The positive effect is more pronounced for US firms, for 
firms in the bank and financial trading industry and for firms in the oil and gas industry. In 
contrast, the long-term performance analysis does not reveal return differences attributable to 
terror-related considerations. During the long-term period after withdrawal, a portfolio of 
withdrawing firms does not display return differences to a portfolio of carefully chosen con-
trol firms.
The second paper analyses the consequences of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission’s (SEC) publication of an online tool for detecting firms doing business in countries 
designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. Similar to the first paper, short-term announce-
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ment period abnormal return reactions are analysed before long-term performance is meas-
ured. Evidence indicates investors punished firms for being mentioned in the tool. In the pe-
riod subsequent to the tool’s publication, stock prices of mentioned firms declined. Further-
more, faint evidence consistent with the notion that the portfolio of mentioned firms delivers 
abnormally positive long-term returns is obtained.
The third paper is about ownership in such firms. As will become apparent, pension and 
endowment funds are substantially less likely to hold majority stakes in a firm if the firm has 
severe business ties in a country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. For the reason 
that such investors shun firms with operations in the designated countries, stocks of these 
firms match the definition of neglected stocks in the sense of Merton’s (1987) model. In this 
way, positive short-term stock price reactions upon withdrawal and negative short-term stock 
price reactions upon stigmatisation can be reconciled by means of Merton’s (1987) theoreti-
cal groundwork. Upon withdrawal, firms overcome neglect and profit from increasing stock 
prices. By the same token, firms receiving the terror-label due to them being mentioned in the 
online tool are instantly neglected and suffer from a decrease in stock prices.
After the three building papers of this dissertation are presented, the work at hand closes 
with an overall conclusion which synthesises the papers’ findings in that it emphasises de-
tected patterns and mutual support of the results.
Introduction
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II. RELATED RESEARCH
1. THE THEORETICAL GROUNDWORK OF MERTON (1987) AND RELATED 
STUDIES
Amongst others, classical finance theory is built upon the paradigms of the Efficient Mar-
ket Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1963, 1965a, 1965b, 1970) and Samuelson (1965) and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). 
In the same manner as it is common practice in general economic theory, EMH and CAPM 
both rely on counterfactual assumptions that render financial markets frictionless. Examples 
of such assumptions include the marketability of all assets (including human capital), the in-
finite divisibility of assets and rationality of all investors as well as complete and uniform 
information among all investors. As one of the consequences, every investor is assumed to 
hold a uniform portfolio including the same efficient set of assets. More precisely, each in-
vestor is assumed to hold a combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio (Ross 
et al., 2008).
During the past decades, researchers have presented mounting evidence running counter to 
the outcomes predicted by classical finance theory. Examples of such anomalies are manifold. 
They include the size premium as discovered by Banz (1981), the value premium as discov-
ered by Stattman (1980) as well as Rosenberg et al. (1985), and the apparent tendency of in-
vestors to overreact to unanticipated and severe news as discovered by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). The discovery of such anomalies was not without consequences. First, anomalies 
spawned the development of new asset pricing models as developed in Fama and French 
(1993) or Carhart (1997). Furthermore, they brought on a novel genre labelled behavioural 
finance. This discipline departs from classical finance theory in that it relaxes the assumption 
of full investor rationality. By borrowing from cognitive psychologists, researchers in the 
field of behavioural finance rely on assumptions based on knowledge about agents’ actual 
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decision making (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). This is in sharp contrast to classical finance 
theory, which assumes stylised pursuance of preferences by rational investors.
In a similar vein as it is practiced by researchers in the field of behavioural finance, Mer-
ton (1987) departs from classical finance theory in that he relaxes one of its fundamental as-
sumptions: complete and uniform information among all investors. In his model, each inves-
tor is informed only about a subset of the securities available in the market place. While one 
of the CAPM’s implications is that each investor will hold the market portfolio, Merton’s 
(1987) assumption results in a scenario in which investors’ portfolios contain less securities 
than the market portfolio. Hence, relaxing the complete information assumption yields a sce-
nario consistent with reality: most investors’ portfolios merely contain a tiny fraction of the 
many shares available in the market place. In this regard, incomplete information is only one 
among all the imaginable reasons for the empirical fact that not all investors are perfectly 
diversified. Other causes may include further transaction costs, liquidity problems, geograph-
ical market segmentation, imperfect divisibility of securities, or prudent-investing laws and 
traditions. Put another way, relaxing other building assumptions of classical finance theory 
could equally well induce the empirical fact of imperfect investor diversification. In the con-
text of this dissertation, the latter point is of tremendous importance. In that Merton (1987) 
deems a variety of impediments to perfect diversification appropriate to substantiate his theo-
ry, he paves the way for other studies to make use of his theoretical groundwork.
In reality, as Merton (1987) asserts, the scenario of incomplete information is likely to oc-
cur. In the real world, there are costs to gathering information which are neglected in the neo-
classical world. Consequentially, so-called shadow costs of incomplete information arise and 
lead to asset prices that deviate from those that would be observed in a world with complete 
information (the neo-classical case). As a result, prices of lesser known stocks are depressed 
and yield higher equilibrium expected returns than more widely known stocks do.
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The main practical implication of the model is the following: by broadening the accessible 
investor base, a firm can profit from higher stock prices and lower costs of equity. This is 
also why the model’s predictions have been widely acknowledged in the literature. Before 
Merton (1987) established the model, a series of papers empirically investigated the question 
of whether less well known, so-called shunned or neglected stocks yield higher expected re-
turns than other stocks do. Generally, researchers in this field must first measure the level of 
neglect. This is not trivial, as neglect is not directly observable in the market. The first two 
studies on the topic (Arbel and Strebel, 1982 and 1983) use analyst coverage as a proxy. Ac-
cording to this logic, analyst coverage facilitates information and therefore reduces the level 
of neglect for a certain stock. Since some securities receive more analyst attention than others, 
information generated by analysts is asymmetrically distributed over stocks. Results of Arbel 
and Strebel (1982, 1983) indicate that stocks which are less covered by analysts are associat-
ed with higher expected returns than stocks receiving more analyst attention. The authors 
posit a certainty premium to be the most likely cause for the observed effect. Because ex-ante 
uncertainty is higher for firms that attract less research concentration, investors demand a 
return premium as compensation. If investors wished to reduce ex-ante uncertainty, they
would have to pay a price in terms of time allocated to research about the respective stock’s 
ex-ante return distribution. In this sense, there is a direct relation between ex-ante uncertainty 
in Arbel and Strebel (1982, 1983) and the shadow cost of information in Merton (1987).
Evidence obtained in Arbel et al. (1983) lends further support on the notion that neglected 
stocks offer higher expected returns. In contrast to Arbel and Strebel (1982, 1983), the au-
thors measure neglect by means of institutional holdings. Like giraffes, as the authors posit, 
institutional investors display investment preferences for “tall trees in the investment forest” 
(Arbel et al.; 1983, p. 57), thereby leaving other investment opportunities aside. Empirical 
evidence confirms their hypothesis that stocks which are less held by institutions are associ-
Related Research
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ated with a return premium. An important side note to all of these empirical studies is that 
they show robustness of the neglect effect to a potential size effect. Less well known stocks 
are mostly small stocks. Small stocks are associated with higher returns (see e.g. Banz, 1981). 
Hence, if a researcher aims to credibly advocate the existence of a neglect effect, he/she must 
disentangle the effect from the size effect, which is what these studies do.
The strand of research on neglected stocks culminates in three further studies. Strebel 
(1983) reacts to the CAPM’s inability to account for the return premium of neglected stocks. 
He proposes a re-specified CAPM that incorporates the variance of analyst forecasts as a 
proxy for information about the stock. Arbel (1985) claims that all famous market anomalies 
(e.g. the small firm effect and the P/E anomaly) vanish once the relation to a variable labelled 
“information deficiency” is taken into account. When compared to this claim, the main intent 
of Carvell and Strebel (1987) appears rather cautious. The authors attempt to show that the 
neglected firm effect is statistically distinct from two other anomalies: the small firm and the 
January effect. As in previous studies, the neglected firm effect is measurable even after ac-
counting for the other anomalies.
Results consistent with the abovementioned work are also found in more recent studies. 
Grullon et al. (2004) verify that firms which are better known also have a larger shareholder 
base. By empirically establishing this positive relation between the level of information and 
the size of the shareholder base, the authors substantiate the suitability of institutional owner-
ship as a proxy for neglect as it was posited e.g. in Arbel and Strebel (1983). Lehavy and 
Sloan (2008) also use institutional ownership as a proxy for the level of information about a 
security. They confirm that stocks receiving less recognition by institutional investors are 
associated with higher expected returns. Based on an analysis of Swedish shareholdings, 
Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) also prove the predicted negative relationship between size of 
the shareholder base and expected returns.
Related Research
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Studies discussed so far focus on the long-term return premium of neglected stocks. An 
additional implication of Merton’s (1987) work is that of the positive relation between stock 
prices and investor recognition. Empirically, this prediction has been tested by means of an 
event-study methodology. Shleifer (1986) finds that when stocks become new constituents of 
the S&P 500, this event is associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. The author 
attributes this short-term increase in the stock’s price to an increase in demand for the stock: 
upon index inclusion, the respective stock is purchased by all funds mimicking the index. 
Although the observed effect is on first sight consistent with Merton’s (1987) prediction of a 
positive price change induced by an increase of awareness about the stock, Shleifer (1986) 
offers a different explanation. What he believes has caused the price increase, is the funds’ 
purchase of the securities as represented by an outward shift of a downward sloping demand 
curve for stocks. In that an increase in demand yields a rise in the stocks’ price, the posited 
mechanism constitutes a departure from neo-classical finance theory. Normally, investors are 
assumed to be price takers. This assumption implies that demand curves for stocks are flat. In 
this stylised world, an increase in demand for a certain stock has no effect on its price. Since 
inclusion of a stock into the S&P 500 does not reveal information relevant for the firm’s val-
ue, such an event would not induce stock prices to rise in the neo-classical world. Shleifer’s 
(1986) observation of a positive price reaction upon inclusion is reason for him to conclude 
that the neo-classical assumption of flat demand curves for stocks does not portray reality. He 
asserts that demand curves for stocks are downward sloping instead. As Armstrong et al. 
(2011) emphasise, Merton’s (1987) model does not rely on the assumption of downward 
sloping demand curves for stocks. In lieu of this, he works with the neo-classical assumption 
that each investor “acts as a price taker” (Merton; 1987, p. 487) and thus assumes the demand 
curve for stocks to be horizontal. The equilibrium price for a stock in Merton’s (1987) model 
is depressed by the shadow cost of incomplete information. Incomplete information, as Mer-
Related Research
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ton (1987, p. 493) explains, has an effect on the equilibrium price “similar to applying an 
additional discount rate”. An event like inclusion into the S&P 500 is likely to induce an in-
crease in the number of investors knowing about the stock accompanied by a decrease in the
shadow costs of incomplete information. As shadow costs of incomplete information are 
modelled in the form of a discount rate, a decrease of these shadow costs lets security prices 
rise.
What is important to note is that every study attempting to empirically test whether broad-
ening the investor base has a positive impact on stock prices, will find it difficult to distin-
guish between the two different underlying theories expressed by Merton (1987) and Shleifer 
(1986). Each detection of a positive price reaction after an enhancement of the accessible 
investor base will in principle be consistent with both explanations. In order to test which of 
the underlying theories applies, a researcher can empirically test one or the other explanation. 
Shleifer (1986) aims to reconcile the positive stock price reaction upon index inclusion by 
means of the magnitude in demand by index funds. He finds the demand increase to be of the 
required magnitude and therefore declares it to be the stock price increase’s cause. Hence, his 
empirical findings support the notion of downward sloping demand curves. In testing what he 
calls the “liquidity hypothesis”, he also aims to test the theory that an increase in the number 
of investors that are informed about the stock has led to the observed price increase upon in-
dex inclusion. Although he makes no reference to the work of Merton (1987) – Shleifer’s 
(1986) study was published one year before – it is essentially the logic applied in Merton 
(1987) that he tests. As Shleifer (1986) argues, a necessary condition for the increase in in-
formation based theory to apply in case of index inclusions is the following: index inclusion 
should have been accompanied by a relatively higher price increase for lesser well-known 
stocks as compared to stocks that were already more widely known. He therefore splits his 
sample in stocks of firms that were already part of the Fortune 500 and stocks of firms that 
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were not part of the Fortune 500 (Fortune 500 membership thus proxies for information about 
the firm). The logic is that if the short-term positive abnormal returns of stocks of firms al-
ready in the Fortune 500 were lower upon inclusion in the index as compared to stocks of 
other firms, the increase in information based theory would be equally applicable. In fact, 
Shleifer (1986) finds short-term price reactions not to differ among the two samples, i.e. be-
tween stocks of better known firms versus stocks of lesser known firms. He therefore rejects 
the alternative explanation that an increase in information about the respective stocks has 
caused their price to rise.
Kadlec and McConnell (1994) are concerned with a very similar research question as 
Shleifer (1986). Without reference to Shleifer’s (1986) work, the authors first aim to find out 
whether stocks that newly list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) experience abnor-
mal stock price increases. They find that the average NYSE listing announcement during the 
1980’s is associated with an increase in firm value of five to six percent. In a second step, 
Kadlec and Mc Connell (1994) aim to find out whether this result is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the Merton (1987) model. If it is, then the increase in stock prices must have been 
accompanied by an increase in the investor base of the respective stocks. Consistent with this 
explanation, the authors find the number of equity holders to have substantially increased 
after the event as compared to the time before the event. In order to further strengthen the 
connection to Merton’s (1987) work, they also regress a stock’s announcement day risk-
adjusted excess return on a proxy for investor recognition. Since results indicate investor 
recognition to be strongly positively related to abnormal returns during the NYSE listing an-
nouncement period, they can be interpreted by means of Merton’s (1987) model. On a related 
note, the authors also find evidence for their hypothesis that the stock price increase upon 
NYSE listing can be explained by an increase in liquidity (as measured by the bid-ask spread) 
for the respective stocks. This latter result is of particular importance when considered in 
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relation to findings of other studies. Research on mutual fund holdings (Falkenstein, 1996) 
and institutional investor holdings in general (Dahlquist and Robertson, 2001; Gompers and 
Metrick, 2001; Ferreira and Matos, 2008) reveals a preference for more liquid stocks by such 
investors. Although the mentioned studies do not similarly measure liquidity by means of the 
bid-ask spread as do Kadlec and Mc Connell (1994), the following line of reasoning is a valid 
alternative to the one posited by Kadlec and Mc Connell (1994): upon listing at an exchange 
like the NYSE, the associated increase in liquidity is likely to induce an increase in demand 
by institutional investors as these investors are known to prefer more liquid stocks. Hence, 
the abnormally positive price effect of NYSE listings as detected by Kadlec and Mc Connell 
(1994) is just as consistent with Merton’s (1987) theory as it is with Shleifer’s (1986) expla-
nation of downward sloping demand curves. Interestingly, Kadlec and Mc Connell (1994) do 
not empirically test the Shleifer (1986) theory. Although both studies investigate very similar 
events, they posit different explanations for why the observed effect has occurred. 
In an analysis of non-US firms deciding to list their equity at US exchanges in the form of 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), Foerster and Karolyi (1999) aim to find out whether 
such an event yields effects consistent with the Merton (1987) model. Principally, the authors 
conduct a study with considerable methodological proximity to Kadlec and Mc Connell 
(1994). After an initial assessment of risk-adjusted excess returns upon cross-listing, they aim 
to explain the cross-listing effect a firm experiences by the change in investor recognition as 
proxied by the change in the number of shareholders pre- versus post cross-listing. As in 
Kadlec and Mc Connell (1994), significantly positive abnormal stock returns upon cross-
listing are positively related to the change in the number of shareholders. Hence, Foerster and 
Karolyi (1999) interpret their findings as consistent with the predictions of the Merton (1987) 
model.
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Despite these discoveries of a positive relation between abnormal stock price effects and 
the change in the investor base, Amihud et al. (1999) claim that the abovementioned studies 
fail to fully isolate Merton’s (1987) theory from other possible explanations. Since Amihud et 
al. (1997) find positive stock price reactions to be related to changes in the market micro-
structure, Amihud et al. (1999, p. 1771) deem market microstructure as well as “inside infor-
mation that affected the listing decision” a plausible alternative explanation for positive stock 
price reactions of new listings. While the authors explicitly address their criticism to Kadlec 
and Mc Connell (1994), such considerations are equally valid regarding the work of Foerster 
and Karolyi (1999). In their study based on the Japanese market, Amihud et al. (1999) inves-
tigate the effect of firms reducing the minimum trading unit of their stocks. They find that 
such a reduction in the share price eases the burden for smaller investors to trade in the stock 
and thus expands the investor base. Since they also find the per share price reduction to cause 
a positive stock price reaction, the authors interpret their results as consistent with the work 
of Merton (1987). Methodologically, as they claim, their study is superior to the work of 
Kadlec and Mc Connell (1994) in that the mentioned side effects (market microstructure and 
inside information) can be ruled out as explanations for the positive stock price reaction.
While all of these studies on the effect of increased investor awareness yield results con-
sistent with one another, they differ with respect to the initial stimulus that caused the in-
crease in awareness. It is induced by newly listing on the NYSE (Kadlec and Mc Connell, 
1994), listing in foreign markets (Forester and Karolyi, 1999) and changes in the stock’s min-
imum trading unit (Amihud et al., 1999). A study by Gervais et al. (2001) offers yet another 
explanation for increased investor awareness, namely shocks of high trading volume. As the 
authors reason, shocks of trading volume arouse increased investor awareness and conse-
quentially cause stock prices to rise. Consistent with this line of argumentation, they discover 
the “high-volume return premium”: periods of abnormally high trading volume are followed 
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by positive, short to medium horizon abnormal returns. This effect is vice versa observed for 
stocks associated with abnormally low trading volume, as those stocks experience negative 
abnormal returns. Similarly, Zhou (2010) finds the effect to exist on the Chinese market. In 
addition to what is found by Gervais et al. (2001), he detects reversal tendencies after an ini-
tial increase in stock prices. In a recent study encompassing 41 countries, Kaniel et al. (2012) 
confirm the high-volume return premium’s pervasiveness by showing its existence in almost 
all developed and in many emerging markets.
Irvine (2003) investigates the effects of an initiation of analyst coverage. He compares two 
different classes of analyst recommendations: those released by analysts appraising the stock 
for the first time and those made by analysts who already covered the stock. His results indi-
cate that the incremental effect of analyst initiation versus a recommendation by an analyst 
already covering the stock is positive. In order to determine the price increase’s cause, he 
measures trading volume, quoted spreads and institutional ownership pre and post analyst 
coverage initiation. The change in all of these measures before versus after analyst initiation 
is a determinant of abnormal stock price reactions. In contrast to the other studies mentioned 
above, Irvine (2003) interprets institutional ownership as a proxy for liquidity. On these 
grounds, he does not draw on Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. Rather, he 
deems his results supportive of a purely liquidity based explanation as it was put forward e.g.
in Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1995). Needless to say, if liquidity and institutional owner-
ship were not equated, Irvine’s (2003) results would similarly be interpretable by means of 
Merton’s (1987) theory.
In a similar manner as initiation of analyst coverage induces institutional ownership, initia-
tion of investor relation (IR) programs is likely to cause institutional investors’ attention. This 
latter topic is covered by Bushee and Miller (2012), who investigate the impact of hiring an 
IR firm on the hiring firm’s stock price. From expert interviews, the authors learn that such 
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firms are indeed hired in order to attract institutional investors. Consistent with this aim, 
sample firms launching IR programs experience an increase in institutional investor owner-
ship. Furthermore, the authors confirm Merton’s (1987) prediction of a positive impact of 
increased investor awareness on stock prices: firms which initiated IR initiatives experienced 
higher short-term stock returns than the control sample of firms.
2. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
(SRI) AND SIN STOCKS
Most of the studies reviewed so far share their relatedness to the work of Merton (1987) in 
that they borrow from his model as a theoretical foundation. Moreover, they share the view 
that increased investor awareness is a stimulus for a positive stock price effect. Yet another 
strand of research that borrows from the work of Merton (1987) is Socially Responsible In-
vesting (SRI). SRI is defined as “an investment discipline that considers environmental, so-
cial and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to generate long-term competitive financial re-
turns and positive societal impact" (The U.S. Social Investment Forum, 2010). As outlined in 
Derwall et al. (2011), the Merton (1987) based “shunned-stock hypothesis” is one of two the-
ories researchers commonly refer to when explaining the relation between SRI and stock 
prices. By incorporating non-pecuniary motives into their investment decision, investors 
guided by SRI criteria create risk-adjusted excess demand for stocks of firms that meet these 
investors’ screening criteria. The reverse side of this reasoning is a decrease in demand for 
stocks of firms whose behaviour is regarded as inappropriate in the eyes of norm conscious 
investors. In this context, SRI strategies employ positive screening methods, negative screens 
or even both. While positive screening is about rating firms’ conduct on the basis of SRI cri-
teria (e.g. environmental or employee relations), negative screening excludes certain firms 
from the feasible set of SRI investment opportunities. This exclusion may be due to the firm’s 
operation in business areas that are perceived as controversial, for example a firm can be ex-
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cluded because it processes alcohol or tobacco (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007). Both screening 
methods favour certain firms over others and therefore create excess demand for “good” 
firms and a demand shortage for “bad” firms. What is different from the Merton (1987) theo-
ry, is that SRI guided investors deliberately decide not to invest in certain firms for reasons 
unrelated to economic motives. The Merton (1987) type investor is incompletely informed 
because he faces costs of being informed about the securities in the market place. The inves-
tor is believed to react rational in the sense that he/she incorporates the cost associated with 
information gathering into his/her decision making process. In contrast, the non-pecuniary 
motives considered by the SRI guided investor simply do not exist in neo-classical economic 
terms. From this point of view, the SRI guided investor acts irrationally, because his/her be-
haviour is incommensurable to general economic theory.
In an application of the SRI logic, Heinkel et al. (2001) develop a model in which inves-
tors differ regarding their preference for a firm’s environmental conduct. While one set of 
investors does not consider SRI related motives, the other investor class refuses to invest in 
firms displaying environmental misconduct. Consequentially, stocks of firms shunned by the 
norm conscious, ethically driven investor class are held in fewer amounts as compared to 
non-neglected stocks. As a result, neglected stocks are underpriced, which raises the respec-
tive firm’s cost of capital and therefore also raises expected returns. In this context, it is of 
utmost importance to note that for this theory to yield empirically measurable results, two 
conditions must apply: (i) the number of investors shunning stocks out of non-pecuniary mo-
tives is substantial and (ii) there are limits to arbitrage, i.e. not enough arbitrage capital is 
brought up in order to offset the negative price effect induced by SRI guided investors. The 
first condition is also mentioned in Fama and French (2007, p. 683), who assert that “distor-
tions of expected returns can be large when (...) investors with asset tastes (...) account for 
substantial invested wealth...” In order to assess the amount of capital that is in fact invested 
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according to SRI criteria, it is commonly referred to a share of 10% (Heinkel et al., 2001
building on Hamilton et al., 1993) to 12% (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) of total investments. 
With regards to arbitrage limits, there is no such assessment. Studies mentioning this assump-
tion (Renneboog et al., 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) emphasise its necessity but do not 
further comment on it.
While a vast body of literature has investigated the link between SRI and a firm’s financial 
performance (see Derwall et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2007; Galema et al. 2008; Statman and 
Glushkov, 2009 or Aktas et al., 2011 for recent studies), less attention has been drawn to the 
reverse side of SRI investing. Combining Merton’s (1987) theory on neglected stocks with 
the growing demand for SRI screened investments yields the following prediction: an inves-
tor holding stocks of firms active in controversial industries or with morally reprehensible 
conduct may profit from positive abnormal long-term returns, since these are exactly the 
stocks for which the SRI movement creates a demand shortage. The first scholars to formu-
late this logic are Angel and Rivoli (1997). Firms falling short of ethical screens will, as the 
authors ascertain, suffer from increased capital costs. Hence, an investor long in stocks of 
such firms may be able to profit from higher expected returns. Furthermore, the authors pre-
dict the effect on expected returns to be an increasing function of the number of investors 
shunning the stock. Surprisingly, it was not until the mid 2000s that researchers empirically 
addressed the predictions as formulated by Angel and Rivoli (1997).
The most widely acknowledged study in this field is the one on so-called sin stocks (stocks 
of firms that operate in the classical triumvirate of sin industries – alcohol, tobacco, and gam-
ing) conducted by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). In their study, the authors first examine 
ownership of sin stocks. Results indicate that a norm conscious subset of the institutional 
investor spectrum (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, university endowments and 
religious organisations) holds sin stocks in significantly lower amounts than a subset of the 
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spectrum which is believed not to invest guided by social norms (mutual funds and independ-
ent investment advisors). Since sell-side analysts are known to primarily cater to institutional 
investors, analyst coverage is potentially lower for sin stocks, as well. This latter hypothesis 
is similarly confirmed by the data. With the help of these findings, Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) establish the argument that sin stocks resemble neglected stocks in the sense of Mer-
ton’s (1987) model. As the theory on neglected stocks implies above average expected re-
turns for such stocks, the authors conduct several return performance tests. Results indicate 
that sin stocks outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis and after controlling for dimen-
sions on which sin stocks might differ from other stocks. Furthermore, using several proxies 
for stock valuation (market-to-book, price-to-earnings and price-to-EBITDA), the authors 
confirm the hypothesis that sin stocks are undervalued. After all, they contend that moral 
considerations as well as litigation risk heightened by such considerations are the cause for 
the observed effects. Regarding the analysis of sin stock returns, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) 
extend their research to cover international equity markets as well. Overall, they find results 
similar to those observed on the US market. However, statistical significance and economic 
magnitude are both lower. The authors attribute this to the fact that tobacco firms outside the 
US do not face litigation risk comparable to that of US tobacco firms. Since this risk compo-
nent is idiosyncratic in nature and is therefore not captured by the usual performance attribu-
tion models, it is mirrored in higher alphas which serve as a measure for risk-adjusted excess 
returns. In prior versions of the study published in 2009 (working paper versions date back 
until 2005), Hong and Kacperczyk aim at separating the neglect based explanation from the 
litigation risk explanation. Such attempts were unsuccessful, since Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) integrate both effects into their explanation in the published version.
In addition to the most widely cited study by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), a host of other 
authors contributed to the research of sin stocks. While these studies were sometimes pub-
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lished even before the Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) paper, they all refer to one of its prior 
working paper versions. As those working paper versions did for a fairly long time not con-
tain the part on international evidence, the most obvious adjacent analysis was the one of in-
ternational equity markets outside the US. Salaber (2007) investigates sin stocks in 18 Euro-
pean countries over the period 1975-2006. The industry definition she uses matches the one 
of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) in that she also investigates the classical triumvirate of sin 
(alcohol, tobacco and gaming). On the one hand, her analysis has a smaller scope in that she 
considers returns, only. On the other hand, she broadens the scope to contain an analysis of 
country differences that she hypothesises affect sin stock returns. Consistent with Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009), she finds sin stocks outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis. Fur-
thermore, she obtains evidence consistent with the notion that increased litigation risk is a 
driver of the positive risk-adjusted excess returns: risk-adjusted sin stock returns are higher in 
countries where litigation risk is higher, as well. As she supposes investors in protestant 
countries to display lower tolerance for sin firms, she also expects over-performance of sin 
stocks to be higher in protestant countries. This view is confirmed by a corresponding analy-
sis. Yet another dimension on which sin stocks differ across Europe is excise taxation. The 
author reasons that higher excise taxes should depress a stock’s valuation and therefore in-
crease its expected return. Consistent with this line of argumentation, she observes risk-
adjusted excess returns to be more pronounced in countries with higher excise taxation.
A similar path to extending the initial findings of Hong and Kacperczyk is undertaken by 
Fabozzi et al. (2008). Their research resembles the one of Salaber (2007) in that they look at 
a wide range of countries but confine the scope to a return analysis. In their brief study inves-
tigating returns of sin stocks (including adult entertainment, biotech, and weapons in addition 
to the classical three industries) in 21 different countries, the authors find a global portfolio of 
sin stocks to yield a statistically significant risk-adjusted excess return. While Fabozzi et al. 
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(2008) do not test any hypothesis with respect to the reason behind the risk-adjusted excess 
returns, they state that findings are consistent with several theories explaining the outperfor-
mance of sin stocks. First, their findings are consistent with the notion that sin companies are 
punished because they are neglected by certain investors. This might be due to SRI guided 
investment decisions or because investors simply do not like sin stocks. Although the authors 
do not explicitly refer to Merton (1987), the argument is consistent with the predictions of the 
Merton (1987) model. Second, “headline risk”, the risk of negative headlines about the firm 
negatively affecting a stock’s price, is higher for sin stocks. This risk in combination with 
litigation risk is likely to depress a stock’s valuation and thus increase expected returns. Third, 
sin industries are often monopolistic in nature. According to the authors, firms operating in 
such industries “have earned their monopolistic power and should be compensated with an 
excess "rent" in return” (Fabozzi et al.; 2008, p. 86).
In their analysis of the Chinese market (mainland China and Hong Kong), Visaltanachoti 
et al. (2009) confirm the abovementioned findings of risk-adjusted excess returns for sin 
stocks. Despite the fact that returns on sin stocks traded at mainland China stock exchanges 
vastly differ in magnitude from returns on Hong Kong traded securities (risk-adjusted excess 
returns are about six times higher for sin stocks traded at the Hong Kong stock exchange than 
they are for stocks traded on the mainland’s exchanges), the authors do not offer an explana-
tion for the deviation. Furthermore, they do not comment on the causes of the overall effect. 
Visaltanachoti et al. (2009) acknowledge the fact that China is different in terms of culture, 
religion, and lifestyle when compared to the US and European markets. Consequently, moral 
considerations might play a lesser role than on western equity markets and might therefore be 
less likely to have caused the sin stocks’ return premium. This latter aspect is left aside. The 
authors merely state that the detected effect is consistent with results obtained in US and Eu-
ropean studies.
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Apart from research in terms of international sin stock samples, authors chose other addi-
tional aspects to investigate about sin stocks. Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) are concerned 
about the causes of sin stocks’ superior risk-adjusted performance. Since the “asbestos alli-
ance” (Kim and Venkatachalam; 2011, p. 417) is trying to allege claims against the tobacco 
industry, tobacco firms might be incentivised to understate their true financial strength in 
order to downplay the potential proceeds from lawsuits against them. By applying poor fi-
nancial reporting standards, sin firms could try to hide their true financial strength from the 
public. As a consequence, poor information quality on sin firms would cause investors to 
require an information risk premium. Results indicate counterevidence to this line of reason-
ing. In fact, the authors obtain results consistent with the view that sin firms apply superior 
accounting standards as a reaction to the heightened scrutiny faced by them. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that sin firms try to overcome the neglect effect by offering superior infor-
mation quality supposed to attract a wider range of investors, thereby reducing their cost of 
capital.
In a second paper on sin stocks, Salaber (2009) investigates the question of whether the 
over-performance of such stocks is robust to changes in the business cycle. She uses US data 
and first confirms Hong and Kacperczyk’s (2009) finding of sin stocks offering a positive 
return premium to an investor long in such stocks. The analysis’ novel aspect is that in a se-
cond step, she tries to explain sin stocks’ positive excess returns with macroeconomic varia-
bles proxying for business conditions. In fact, conditional sin stock alphas either become sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero or can be shown to depend on business conditions. Nev-
ertheless, Salaber (2009) confirms the conventional wisdom (as it is put forward e.g. in 
Waxler, 2004) that sin investing is value adding especially in economically “bad times”. She 
finds that during times of poor business conditions, sin stocks still outperform the market. 
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Despite this latter finding, her analyses also reveal that other non-cyclical industries like the 
food sector are just as good a hedge against economically “bad times” as sin stocks are.
In addition to the abovementioned studies on sin stocks, two additional studies investigate 
the performance of such firms in the context of SRI related research. Kempf and Osthoff 
(2007) use data from the research firm Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD, the same firm 
that constructs the Domini 400 Social Index). They construct a so-called “low-rated” portfo-
lio meaning that stocks contained in the portfolio are involved in at least one controversial 
business area. This latter term is defined more broadly than the definition of sin stocks in the 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) study in that the authors define alcohol, tobacco, gambling, 
military, firearms, and nuclear power as controversial. They find their portfolio of controver-
sial stocks to yield positive abnormal returns based on a four-factor asset pricing model. In 
contrast to the results of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), the obtained four-factor alpha is sta-
tistically insignificant. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) comment on the difference in results as 
compared to Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and hypothesize that it could come from Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) using a longer data sample (l926-2006), as compared to the period of 
1991-2004 studied by them. As a second explanation, the authors suppose the narrower defi-
nition of sin stocks by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) as compared to their definition of con-
troversial stocks might have caused the difference in performance.
In a similar study, Statman and Glushkov (2009) construct a portfolio long in “accepted 
stocks” (stocks of firms that have no operations in sin industries) and short in “shunned com-
panies” (stocks of companies that have operations in at least one of the following industries: 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms, military and nuclear power). The portfolio yields signif-
icant negative excess returns using the one- and three factor model and insignificant negative 
excess returns using the four-factor model. Hence, results are consistent with Kempf and 
Osthoff (2007) but inconsistent with Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). The authors do not fur-
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ther comment on this. Since they also use the KLD data as Kempf and Osthoff (2007) do, it 
could be that the lack of statistical significance stems from them also using the broader defi-
nition of controversial stocks inherent in the KLD data.
Overall, empirical evidence suggests an investor long in a portfolio of sin stocks can earn 
risk-adjusted excess returns. This finding is robust to an expansion of the analysis to non-US 
equity markets (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Fabozzi et al., 2008; Salaber, 2007; Visal-
tanachoti et al., 2009). Results are mixed with respect to the exact scope of industries yielding 
superior returns. In samples encompassing a definition of sin stocks broader than the classical 
triumvirate of sin, Fabozzi et al. (2008) find such stocks to outperform the market on a risk-
adjusted basis. In contrast, neither Kempf and Osthoff (1997), nor Statman and Glushkov 
(2009) confirm the superior risk-adjusted performance by using broader definitions of poten-
tially shunned, controversial stocks. The results most contradictory to what has been found in 
the seminal Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) study are the ones presented in Salaber (2009). 
While she finds sin stocks’ superior performance can be explained by changes in the business 
environment and shows that sin stocks constitute as good a hedge against economically “bad 
times“ as other non-cyclicals do, she fundamentally mitigates previous sin stock related re-
search.
3. TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
Studies outlined so far share theoretical foundations with the dissertation at hand. The new 
aspect of this dissertation is that it combines the theoretical framework on neglected stocks 
with investors’ considerations on terror-free investing. This is why it is also related to re-
search on terror and its impact on financial markets. This latter field of research is fairly new 
as most studies have been published in very recent years. In a review of the literature in this 
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field, Karolyi (2006, p. 14) contends that “... we still know relatively little of the economic 
and financial consequences of terrorism...”
One of the first studies on the effects of terrorism on financial markets is Abadie and 
Gardeazebal (2003). In a case study setup, the authors investigate the economic consequences 
of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) terrorism directed at the Basque country. First, they in-
vestigate the impact of terrorism on GDP. To this end, they form a synthetic Spanish control 
region resembling the Basque country on major economic characteristics. This synthetic re-
gion (consisting of Catalonia and Madrid, while most of the weight is put on Catalonia), dis-
played a GDP growth path similar to that of the Basque country during the 1960’s. When 
ETA started implementing large-scale terrorism activities in the mid-1970s, the Basque coun-
try and the control region started to display remarkable discrepancies in GDP growth. In fact, 
the difference in per capita GDP between the two regions averages 10% during the subse-
quent 20 years. Furthermore, fluctuations in this gap are shown to be related to terrorist activ-
ity. Second, the authors investigate terrorism’s impact on firms with involvement in the 
Basque country. As the ETA announced a cease-fire in September 1998, firms with major 
involvement in the Basque country should have profited from improved business conditions. 
This is why stock prices of these firms should have increased in response. Similarly, when 
the ETA declared the cease-fire’s end in November 1999, stock prices of the same firms 
should have decreased. Consistent with the authors’ expectations, the control portfolio of 
firms with little business activities in the Basque country displayed a short-term return per-
formance inferior to the one of the portfolio consisting of firms with high activity in the 
Basque country during the time the cease fire was declared. When the ETA declared the 
cease-fire’s end, short-term return performance of control firms was superior.
In a study covering a time period of 86 years, Chen and Siems (2004) use an event-study 
methodology in order to assess the short-term impact of terrorist attacks on capital markets. 
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In total, the authors analyse 14 events starting with the sinking of the luxury ocean liner Lusi-
tania, torpedoed on May 7
th
, 1915, and ending with the September 11
th
, 2001 terror attacks 
(9/11). First, they analyse these events’ effects on the US equity market. In twelve out of 14 
cases, stock markets displayed a negative reaction to terrorist attacks. The first of the authors’ 
two main findings is that in earlier years, negative effects tended to prevail for a longer peri-
od of time after the actual event. Of the four incidents until 1950, three incidents caused sig-
nificantly negative reactions of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) in the eleven day 
event period ending ten days after the actual event. In contrast, only one out of ten incidents 
in the post 1950s period yielded abnormally negative DJIA reactions in this long event period. 
The authors attribute this finding to increased market efficiency in later years and to dedicat-
ed stability measures that were undertaken only in more recent years. The second main find-
ing is that of higher resilience of US capital markets when compared to other local equity 
markets. In comparison to many other local markets, US equity markets recovered more 
quickly, i.e. the negative short-term stock price effects were less persistent than in other mar-
kets. As the authors reason, this latter finding is most likely attributable to the strong bank 
and financial trading sector in the US. Furthermore, Chen and Siems (2004) obtain evidence 
consistent with the notion that nowadays, global capital markets are tightly interlinked. Fol-
lowing the August 2
nd
, 1990 invasion of Iraq in Kuwait and 9/11, global capital markets all 
displayed a substantially negative reaction.
In a similar vein as Chen and Siems (2004), Johnston and Nedelescu (2006) aim to shed 
light on institutional aspects of financial markets’ reaction to terrorism. While Chen and 
Siems (2004) present cross-sectional differences in international financial markets’ ability to 
recover from terror events, Johnston and Nedelescu (2006) are engaged in finding out about 
the policy and regulatory means that help financial markets absorb shocks to such unantici-
pated events. For this purpose, they review capital markets’ reaction to 9/11 and to the March 
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11
th
, 2004 attacks in Madrid. The study’s empirical part is solely descriptive in nature, as the 
authors draw on previous studies (e.g. Chen and Siems, 2004) in demonstrating the sequence 
of events and their consequences. In addition, the authors offer a detailed explanation of the 
crisis management measures that were undertaken in order to make capital markets recover. 
While such measures were not necessary in the case of the attacks in Madrid, efficient re-
sponse of regulatory bodies helped financial markets rebound in the case of 9/11. In conclu-
sion, the authors take sides with Chen and Siems (2004) in emphasising the critical im-
portance of “diversified, liquid, and sound (...) financial markets”. Moreover, they deem 
“timely and flexible response of the competent authorities” crucial (Johnston and Nedelescu; 
2006, p. 23). This conclusion does not really follow from the example of the attacks in Ma-
drid, where policy and regulatory intervention was neither observed nor regarded as helpful 
by the authors.
In a brief study on the impact of terrorism on six equity markets, Arin et al. (2008) find 
terror causes stock prices to decrease and volatility of returns to increase, regardless of the 
market under investigation. Of the six markets they analyse, the two European markets 
(Spain and the UK) display the weakest reaction to terror events. This is consistent with pre-
vious studies by Chen and Siems (2004) as well as Johnston and Nedelescu (2006) who find 
markets with higher institutional quality to display a higher level of resilience.
The study of Arin et al. (2008) is a little at odds with a similar one conducted by Nikkinen 
et al. (2008). In the latter study, the authors investigate the impact of 9/11 on stock returns 
and volatility. They confirm results of previous studies in that they find the event to have 
induced negative short-term stock price reactions and an increase in return volatility. In con-
trast to Arin et al. (2008) and other studies, their evidence indicates less sensitivity to the 
event for less integrated markets.
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Yet another study on 9/11 exclusively focuses on this event. Carter and Simkins (2004) 
investigate the incident’s impact on the returns of airline stocks during the period after the 
event. They are especially concerned with the question of whether investor reaction to the 
event can be considered rational. While they suppose the emotional nature of peoples’ reac-
tion might have caused them to engage in panic selling, their evidence does not support this 
presumption. In fact, the terror attacks resulted in significantly negative abnormal returns for 
each of the sample airlines. Because the authors further reject the hypothesis that the negative 
reaction was of the same magnitude for all firms tested, they infer that the market rationally 
incorporated information. When they analyse the determinants of abnormal returns, they find 
additional evidence for this interpretation. Negative reactions were stronger for firms that 
were less equipped with cash and cash equivalents. This is consistent with the notion that 
investors feared some airlines would not be able to meet their short-term obligations.
A very similar study (Drakos, 2004) also analyses the impact of 9/11 on the airline indus-
try. The author finds the attacks to have caused a structural shift in systematic risk as meas-
ured by the beta coefficient. When he decomposes total risk as measured by stock return 
volatility into its systematic and idiosyncratic component, he finds both risk types to have 
increased.
Yet another study by Drakos exhibits a link to Carter and Simkins (2004). In Drakos 
(2010), the author investigates psychological effects in the context of terror incidents and 
subsequent stock market reactions. In that Carter and Simkins (2004) are engaged in finding 
out whether the market rationally prices terrorism-related information, the two studies are 
related. Interestingly, Drakos (2010) finds that stock market reactions to terror events are 
stronger in cases where the psychosocial impact (as measured by “tangible changes in behav-
iour” like “symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder”: Drakos; 2010, p. 131) of such 
events is more pronounced. Thus, the study implicitly rejects Carter and Simkins (2004) in-
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terpretation of stock markets reacting rationally to terror events. However, the reason for the 
studies’ diverging interpretations of investor behaviour is not based on diverging empirical 
evidence. As a matter of fact, both studies find terrorist events to cause negative short-term 
stock price reactions. Rather, the divergence is inherent in the authors’ interpretation of ra-
tionality. While Carter and Simkins (2004) infer rationality from the observation that nega-
tive returns of sample firms vary in magnitude and are explainable by the differing degrees to 
which sample firms were equipped against short-term financial distress, Drakos (2010) inter-
prets capital market reactions to terror events as principally incommensurable with rationality. 
Under the null of market efficiency, as he asserts, such events should not at all have an im-
pact on stock returns. 
Eldor and Melnick’s (2004) study focuses on the Israeli stock and foreign exchange mar-
ket. In a period of investigation encompassing 13 years, the authors identify a total number of 
639 terror attacks. Each of the incidents is characterised along the dimensions location, target, 
type of attack and number of casualties. The authors aim to find out whether those determi-
nants have an impact on financial markets’ reaction. The most pervasive effect is found for 
suicide attacks and attacks in which the number of victims is high. The stock market as well 
as the foreign exchange market both display considerable sensitivity to these parameters. In 
contrast, location of an attack does not have an influence on either of the two capital markets 
under investigation. An interesting side aspect of the Eldor and Melnick (2004) study is the 
question of whether markets become insensitive to terror attacks over time. As terror attacks 
are a recurring phenomenon in Israel, markets might expect a certain number of incidents and 
internalise the information. Results indicate no such desensitisation of Israeli capital markets. 
Apart from kidnappings, the market’s reaction to the first of a series of similar events is not 
more pronounced than for subsequent events.
Related Research
30
Karolyi and Martell (2010) analyse the stock return impact of 75 terror attacks against 43 
firms during the period between 1995 and 2002. Unlike higher level incidents such as 9/11, 
the incidents investigated in Karolyi and Martell (2010) are all directed towards individual 
firms. Overall, the authors detect significantly negative abnormal returns on the day of the 
events. They employ a cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns in order to obtain insights 
about the determinants of abnormal stock price reactions. Evidence indicates that negative 
abnormal event day returns are more pronounced in wealthier and more democratic countries. 
Furthermore, when the terror incident is a kidnapping, negative reactions are of higher mag-
nitude. In addition to Eldor and Melnick (2004), Karolyi and Martell (2010) is the second 
study to document the special role of kidnappings among terror events. After all, human capi-
tal damage is perceived as more severe than losses of physical assets. 
Brounen and Derwall (2010) analyse 31 terror attacks between 1991 and 2005 and their 
impact on eight developed financial markets. Organisations responsible for the attacks in-
clude the ETA, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Al-Qa’ida and others. For the day of the 
terrorist event, the authors detect a statistically significant, negative abnormal return across 
the sample. However, the effect’s magnitude is diminished by approximately one third when 
9/11 is excluded from the analysis. After excluding this extreme event, the negative abnormal 
event day return loses its statistical significance. As a control, the authors investigate the ef-
fects of earthquakes on financial markets. Since earthquakes are just as unanticipated and 
catastrophic as terrorist attacks, these two types of events share many characteristics but the 
terror dimension. The authors find earthquakes not to cause any abnormal event day return 
reactions. In an additional analysis, Brounen and Derwall (2010) find that when adjusting for 
systematic risk differences across industries, terrorist events have little impact on short-term 
stock price movements. As in the previous analysis, the authors find 9/11 to have caused se-
vere negative stock price reactions, even after accounting for industry variations in systematic 
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risk. Interestingly, Brounen and Derwall (2010) obtain evidence consistent with the notion 
that 9/11 induced a change in systematic risk. In the period after the attacks, most industries 
under investigations displayed higher beta coefficients than before 9/11.
In a broad study on terrorism and its impact on financial markets, Chesney et al. (2011) 
extend existing research by not only analysing the equity market, but also bond, commodity 
and gold markets. The authors also compare the effects of terrorism to other extreme events. 
In their case, these extreme events are financial crashes and, as in Brounen and Derwall 
(2010), natural catastrophes. As it was found in prior studies, Chesney et al. (2011) find terror 
events to cause stock markets to drop. They further detect substantial inter-industry differ-
ences regarding the sensitivity to terror events. Some industries’ reactions to natural catastro-
phes and financial crashes are in fact similar to the reaction to terror events. Since commodity, 
gold and bond markets do not consistently display a negative reaction to terrorist events, they 
can at least partially be regarded as a potential hedge against terrorism risk on the equity 
market. Interestingly, the authors find the point in time at which markets recover from cata-
strophic events’ to differ from the point in time at which they recover from terror events and 
financial crashes. Consistent with prior work, the authors find markets to recoup quickly after 
terror events and financial crashes. In contrast, catastrophic events are often priced in the 
event’s aftermath.
Karolyi (2008) intends to find out whether terror-related considerations are priced in equi-
ty markets. The study consists of two analyses. First, the author aims to find out whether ter-
ror-related risk of a firm translates into a priced risk component and therefore increases a 
firm’s cost of capital. Second, he aims at investigating the risk and return consequences of 
terror-free investing (abstaining from investments in companies with operations in countries 
designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism by the U.S. Department of State). With respect to 
the first analysis, Karolyi (2008) calculates terror exposure scores for each firm in the S&P 
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500 as a proxy for terror-related risk. Exposure scores are high, if a firm has operations in 
many countries that are frequently subject to terror attacks. Depending on the data source, 
either India or Iraq is the country with the largest number of terror incidents. Operations in 
these countries do therefore increase a firm’s exposure score. If a firm has a substantial part 
of its business in such high-risk countries, its raw exposure score is high. In addition to the 
raw measure, the author also calculates exposure adjusted by the respective firm’s interna-
tionalisation. Therefore, the adjusted score measures the relative degree to which a firm’s 
revenues depend on geographic markets which are frequently subject to terrorist attacks. For 
the purpose of performance measurement based on exposure scores, Karolyi (2008) builds 
portfolios of stocks with high exposure scores (raw as well as adjusted) and portfolios con-
sisting of stocks associated with low terror exposure scores (raw as well as adjusted). All 
portfolios deliver mildly positive alphas estimated by means of a four-factor model. Most 
importantly, the spread portfolios of highest minus lowest exposure do not yield economical-
ly sizeable or statistically significant four-factor alphas. Hence, the author concludes that ter-
rorism-related risk is not priced by financial markets. An aspect that warrants some consider-
ation is revealed in the robustness checks. Karolyi (2008) finds that the portfolio of low expo-
sure firms experience a substantial increase in systematic risk exposure around oil price 
shocks, while the portfolio of high exposure stocks does not. He attributes this to the fact that 
a lot of firms in the high exposure portfolio are international oil producers operating in re-
gions of augmented instability. These firms are thus hedged against oil price shocks. This 
assertion is incompatible with the author’s prior statement of “the portfolios used in the study
(...)” being “(...) similarly distributed across industries” (Karolyi; 2008, p. 113). In fact, port-
folios seem to vary with regards to their industry composition at least in the case of the oil 
and gas industry. This casts doubt on the notion that the four-factor model used in the analy-
sis of abnormal returns is sufficient to grasp risk differences among the portfolios. Augment-
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ing the model with an industry factor would have eliminated an industry-bias and could po-
tentially have changed the results.
As mentioned above, Karolyi (2008) also investigates the risk and return characteristics of 
terror-free investing. If an investor wishes to implement such a strategy, he may consider the 
entire investment universe of stocks but stocks of firms with operations in countries designat-
ed as State Sponsors of Terrorism. In the Karolyi (2008) study, the author considers the S&P 
500 universe and excludes stocks of firms with operations in one of the potentially terror-
supporting countries. As he mentions, this analysis is confined to US firms, only. As com-
pared to non-US firms, US firms face tougher legislation with respect to activities in these 
countries. Therefore, very few US firms are active in such countries in the first place. This is 
why a terror-free investment strategy based on the S&P 500 excludes only very few stocks 
from the investment universe. Similar to the case of the terrorism exposure based investing 
strategy, results do not indicate performance differences between the terror-free strategy and 
a normal strategy. Four-factor alphas are again mildly positive for both strategies, with spread 
portfolio returns (terror-free minus full S&P 500) which are small in economic magnitude 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In the author’s concluding remarks, he again reveals the study’s limitation due to its exclu-
sive focus on the S&P 500 investment universe. As stated, the vast majority of firms operat-
ing in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism are non-US firms. This and the 
fact that public and private pension funds may have substantial holdings in those foreign 
firms lets the author conclude that research on terror-free investing incorporating a global 
investment universe warrants further investigation.
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4. FIRM WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH AFRICA
Literature on the South African boycott emerged in the 1990’s, when scholars analysed the 
effect of divestment campaigns targeted at firms with business in South Africa. In order to 
bring pressure on the apartheid regime, human rights and shareholder groups advocated for 
divesting shares of firms with operations in South Africa.
Meznar et al. (1994) is the first among a hand full of studies investigating shareholder 
wealth effects. In an event-study analysis in which a firm’s withdrawal announcement is the 
event, the authors find negative stock price reactions upon announcement for larger event 
windows, but no effect for the actual information release date. This result is at odds with an-
other study on the same research question. Posnikoff (1997) finds a positive relation between 
withdrawal and stock prices during two narrow event windows around the announcement. 
She hypothesises that public pension funds might have boosted prices by buying shares of 
firms no longer active in South Africa. A further study yielding results inconsistent with the 
two mentioned ones is Wright and Ferris (1997). The authors obtain results indicating a nega-
tive relation between withdrawal and firm value based on an analysis of day zero returns. 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) criticise those studies on methodological grounds. For exam-
ple, they require a sound event-study to explain abnormal event returns by means of a cross-
sectional regression. When McWilliams and Siegel (1997) replicate the results of Meznar et 
al. (1994), they therefore adopt a slightly different, superior research design yielding yet an-
other conclusion: no significant relation between withdrawal announcements and stock price. 
In light of this conflicting evidence, Meznar et al. (1998, p. 729) in a synthesis of the previ-
ously published studies, conclude that “the question of the impact of announcements of with-
drawal from South Africa on shareholder wealth has not been entirely resolved.”
Teoh et al. (1999) investigate several aspects of the South African boycott’s implications. 
Included is an analysis of legislative measures’ effects on US banks and on the South African 
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stock market as a whole. The authors also investigate institutional investors’ involvement in 
the process of the boycott. Interestingly, they find institutional holdings to have increased for 
firms that withdrew from the South African market. In a brief analysis, the authors also inves-
tigate the effect of firm withdrawals from South Africa on shareholder wealth. They find no 
significant impact of withdrawal decisions on the announcing firms’ stock prices. As previ-
ous studies did, Teoh et al. (1999) fail to address much of the methodological criticism ex-
pressed in McWilliams and Siegel (1997). Therefore, Meznar et al.’s (1998) conclusion of the 
shareholder wealth effects not being entirely resolved remains.
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5. OVERVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH
The following table (Table II-1) provides an overview of the key studies mentioned:
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Table II-1
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Abstract
Using an event-study framework, we examine the stock price impact of firm announcements 
of withdrawal from countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. Between March 
2003 and October 2011, we identify 49 publicly traded firms and 57 associated events. Re-
sults indicate that withdrawal announcements are on average associated with a statistically 
significant 1.54% increase in firm value. A cross-sectional analysis regarding the determi-
nants of abnormal returns reveals three firm characteristics positively associated with abnor-
mal returns: US domicile, affiliation to the oil and gas industry and, to a lesser extent, affilia-
tion to the bank and financial trading industry. Furthermore, we present evidence ruling out 
dissolved litigation risk as the cause for positive abnormal returns. We do not detect signifi-
cant long-term abnormal returns for the sample firms.
Keywords: Sin Stocks, State Sponsors of Terrorism, Stock Price Reaction
JEL-classification: G11, G12, G14, G15
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1. INTRODUCTION
The use of economic isolation as a means to exert pressure on countries that are believed 
to support terrorist groups or activities has become increasingly popular in recent years. Nu-
merous national and international laws have been passed that restrict trade with countries 
unwilling to abide by certain standards, e.g. by supporting acts of international terrorism as in 
the case of countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism by the U.S. Department of 
State. Firms operating in such countries face two obstacles. First, they are confronted with 
legislation restricting the scope and nature of operations. Second, they have to cope with 
shareholder pressure exerted from an increasingly norm conscious investor base. This pres-
sure is a result of shareholders expressing adverse moral judgement with respect to a firm’s 
operations by shunning a firm’s stock or by divesting from it. Usage of this means is not en-
tirely novel: it was first applied in the 1980s to bring pressure on the apartheid regime in 
South Africa (see Teoh et al., 1999, for an analysis of the boycott’s overall financial impact 
and Meznar et al., 1998, for a synthesis of the analyses of withdrawal announcements’ impact 
on stockholder wealth).
The recent resurgence of the tactic of targeting firms out of moral considerations began in 
Sudan, as human rights groups outraged by the Darfur crisis advocated for divestment from 
firms operating in the country. Such calls for divestment had an effect, even without the cor-
responding legislation in place. For instance, Talisman Energy of Canada was long said to 
trade for a “Sudan discount” arising from substantial divestment pressure until it decided to 
withdraw from the country in March 2003 (IW Financial, 2011).
After several US states had adopted legislation prohibiting state funds from investing in 
firms doing business in Sudan, it was in 2005 when Missouri State Treasurer, Sarah Steel-
man, extended the discussion beyond Sudan to all countries designated as State Sponsors of 
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Terrorism. Consequentially, the Missouri Investment Trust board adopted a new policy, ac-
cording to which investment decisions are guided by a terror-free investment policy 
(Hemphill and Cullari, 2010). Since then, numerous other US states followed suit, adopting 
legislation requiring state funds to abstain from investing in firms active in the designated 
countries. State funds are not the only institutional investors refraining from such invest-
ments. Universities are seen as early movers in the attempt to keep their endowment portfoli-
os free of firms active in countries engaged in activities that run counter to moral standards –
when Harvard decided to divest from PetroChina in April 2005, it referred to the firm’s activ-
ities in Sudan as the reason for divestment. Other universities expressing similar concerns 
were soon to follow. Only a few months later, Stanford and the University of California di-
vested their stakes in PetroChina (Yale and Lowenstein, 2005).
Apart from institutional investors’ efforts to keep portfolios clean from morally questiona-
ble investments, private investors have also displayed the desire for terror-free savings. 
Hemphill and Cullari (2010) cite a study conducted by Luntz Maslansky Strategic Research 
for the Center for Security Policy in 2007, which asked the following question to 800 US 
adults: “should US pension funds, mutual funds and individuals invest in companies that do 
business with terrorist sponsoring states such as Iran, Syria and Sudan?” – 75% of the re-
spondents said “definitely not” and 11% said “probably not.” For investors eager to actively 
screen out unwanted mutual funds, a tool called the terror-free calculator 
(http://www.terrorfreecalculator.com) offers the opportunity to screen out terror-related in-
vestments. Additionally, some investment firms (e.g. The Langerman-Seidman Group of 
Merrill Lynch or Credit Suisse) offer terror-free products to investors unwilling to actively 
implement terror-free investing themselves (UJCNJ/CSAG, The terror-free investing play-
book, retrieved at http://www.ujcnj.org/local_includes/downloads/27913.pdf).
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Regardless of divestment’s debatable suitability as a tool to change a country’s attitude 
towards “sponsoring” terrorism, one must acknowledge the movement has gained momen-
tum. As a matter of fact, firms are increasingly confronted with the question of whether they 
should withdraw from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country. Talisman did, and many others 
followed. In this context, firms oftentimes cite shareholder pressure as the primary motiva-
tion. So did Aon Corp., when it decided to pull out of Iran in January 2006. In the corre-
sponding press release, the firm declared its decision was caused by “concerns raised by the 
New York City Pension Funds about corporate connections to nations deemed to sponsor 
terrorism” (NCRI, 2006).
With respect to firm value, the withdrawal decision can principally have negative as well 
as positive effects. We argue that the merits of sustaining business relations in State Sponsor 
of Terrorism countries are outweighed by the drawbacks of such activities. While economic 
dependence on markets of State Sponsor of Terrorism countries is low, moral scrutiny regard-
ing such business – especially in the US – is high.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find empirical evidence for positive abnormal stock re-
turns of firms that announce withdrawal from one or more State Sponsor of Terrorism coun-
tries. During the period prior to announcement, the average sample firm earns a statistically 
significant abnormal stock return of 1.54%. We also find evidence for three further hypothe-
ses regarding the determinants of abnormal stock price reaction upon announcement. US 
firms experience higher abnormal returns than those domiciled in other countries. The same 
is true for oil and gas as well as bank and financial trading firms when compared to firms of 
other industries. We attribute these findings to US firms facing a more critical investor base 
than firms from other geographic regions. The two industry affiliations driving abnormal re-
turns are most likely attributable to increased public awareness regarding these two indus-
tries. Additionally, we rule out one of the potential causes for the observed positive stock 
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price effects. Evidence suggests the effect is not attributable to litigation risk being dissolved 
upon withdrawal.
When we test for long-term performance of firms announcing withdrawal from a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism country, we fail to find evidence for abnormal returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide an overview 
of related literature and the theoretical background. In Section 3, we describe the legislative 
environment for firms operating in State Sponsor of Terrorism countries. We set out our main 
hypotheses in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe and characterize our data. In the first part 
of Section 6, we test for abnormal returns upon announcement, while we investigate cross-
sectional determinants of abnormal returns in its second part. In Section 7, we analyse the 
long-term performance of firms announcing withdrawal from the designated countries. Sec-
tion 8 concludes.
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We classify our study among the vast body of research addressing the short- and long run 
effects of socially responsible firm behaviour on performance. That said, we believe with-
drawal announcements relating to State Sponsor of Terrorism countries match the general 
definition of social responsibility as defined in Mackey et al. (2007, p. 818). According to 
this definition, socially responsible behaviour is “voluntary and designed to improve social or 
environmental conditions.”
In a study conducted by Margolis et al. (2009), the authors count 251 studies analysing the 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance. Most 
of these studies using an event-study framework as we do are related to environmental firm 
practices (see e.g. Hamilton, 1995; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Gilley et al., 2000, as 
well as Lundgren and Olsson, 2010; Aktas et al., 2011, and Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 
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2011, for recent research). Other related work assesses the stock price impact of price fixing 
(Bosch and Eckard, 1991), corporate crime (Strachan et al., 1983), or sweatshop practices 
(Rock, 2003).
The special case of withdrawal announcements’ impact on shareholder wealth has been 
analysed in studies about firm withdrawal from South Africa. Three event-studies on the top-
ic were originally published: Meznar et al. (1994), Posnikoff (1997), as well as Wright and 
Ferris (1997). Interestingly, none of the studies yielded results consistent with either one of 
the other studies. Meznar et al. (1994) found negative stock price reactions for larger event 
windows, but no effect for the actual information release date. In contrast, Posnikoff (1997) 
found a positive relation between withdrawal and stock price during two narrow event win-
dows. Wright and Ferris (1997) obtained results indicating a negative relation between with-
drawal and firm value based on an analysis of day zero returns. When McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997) replicated the results of Meznar et al. (1994), they adopted a slightly different research 
design yielding yet another conclusion: no significant relation between withdrawal an-
nouncements and stock price. In light of this conflicting evidence, Meznar et al. (1998, p. 
729) in a synthesis of the previously published studies, conclude that “the question of the 
impact of announcements of withdrawal from South Africa on shareholder wealth has not 
been entirely resolved.”
Since our paper is about firms that are supposedly indirectly sponsoring terrorist activities, 
it is also related to a strand of research examining the consequences of terrorism on financial 
markets. Chen and Siems (2004) study the effect of terrorist/military attacks on the U.S. capi-
tal market as well as global capital markets’ response to the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the 
September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks. Based on a sample of 75 U.S. and international firms 
subject to terrorism-related incidents, Karolyi and Martell (2010) find that such firms on av-
erage experience a statistically significant loss in value. Brounen and Derwall (2010) analyse 
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the impact of terrorist attacks on stock markets and compare the reactions following these 
events to those following earthquakes. Negative price effects following terrorist-attacks are 
more pronounced than those following earthquakes. Chesney et al. (2010) study the impact of 
terrorism on the behaviour of stock, bond and commodity markets. They compare such inci-
dents to the market reactions following financial crashes and natural catastrophes. Karolyi 
(2008) assesses the performance of two terror-related investment strategies. One strategy is 
investing in firms that operate in countries subject to frequent terrorist attacks, the other is 
investing in firms that do not operate in countries designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism. 
To our knowledge, Karolyi (2008) is the sole paper to conduct a performance analysis based 
on an investment strategy guided by terror-related considerations.
After having outlined related literature, we will subsequently consider the direction of the 
effect that a withdrawal decision can have on the announcing firm’s stock price. Theoretical-
ly, a withdrawal announcement can have a positive as well as a negative impact on firm val-
ue. To begin with, we provide an overview of withdrawal consequences that speak in favour 
of an increase in stock prices.
First, as put forward in Mackey et al. (2007) as well as in Meznar et al. (1994), a firm can 
reach out to new customers once it withdraws. Some customers would simply not buy from a 
firm active in the designated countries. The same argument also counts for the labour market 
as firms with morally disputable business operations are ceteris paribus less attractive as an 
employer than firms refraining from such business activities. Due to withdrawal, a firm can 
therefore profit from more revenues and a more attractive appearance on the labour market. 
Second, in a similar vein as discussed in Bragdon and Marlin (1972), a firm is likely to suffer 
from litigation risk while operating in a sanctioned country. We assume a firm’s general ac-
tivities are coherent with the prevailing laws governing its operations. Nevertheless, some 
firms are forced to operate on the edge of legal provisions and thus face increased risk from 
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the possibility of impinging upon regulations. Third, issue management expense is likely to 
be reduced once a firm withdraws. Concerned stakeholders such as human rights groups of-
tentimes publicly blame firms for unethical behaviour, requiring the firm to enter into a dia-
logue (Meznar et al., 1994). Thus, dedicated resources for public affairs, advertising and lob-
bying have to be paid in order to deal with outraged stakeholders. Needless to say, such costs 
are saved once a firm withdraws from the country at stake. Fourth, withdrawal can be a 
means to overcome market segmentation. Merton (1987) develops a model in which some 
firms suffer from discrimination due to low investor recognition, while Arbel and Strebel 
(1982) empirically analyse stock price effects caused by such segmentation. In their study, 
discrimination is caused by low analyst coverage. We argue that discrimination can also re-
sult from investors’ moral beliefs if they are running counter to observed firm behaviour. 
Along these lines, a firm choosing to operate in a State Sponsor of Terrorism country faces a 
segmented equity market. Only a fraction of the investor base will be accessible to the firm in 
the sense that the investor clientele is open to investing in the firm despite its operations. In-
vestors deeming business involvement in such countries as morally reprehensible will either 
consider divestment in the case they already own shares or they will refrain from investing in 
the first place. This line of argumentation is consistent with Hong and Kacperczyks’s (2009) 
finding that firms belonging to sin industries are facing a segmented equity market. Addition-
ally, Posnikoff (1997) deems a trigger effect induced by withdrawal announcements respon-
sible for the positive stock price effects she detects in the case of withdrawals from South 
Africa. She mentions public pension funds as potentially boosting prices by buying shares of 
firms no longer engaging in morally disputable activities.
Despite the beauty of arguments speaking in favour of a positive effect on stock prices, ar-
guments predicting a negative effect warrant consideration. By withdrawing from a geo-
graphical market, a firm foregoes valuable business opportunities. While it chooses not to 
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offer its products in a certain market, it decreases its revenue base, thereby negatively impact-
ing cash flows as well as future expected cash flows. Therefore, withdrawals are likely to 
have a detrimental effect on a firm’s value. This argument counts especially for firms that 
merely have their products sold in the respective market. Firms with assets in the country can 
at least hope to sell these assets to other firms staying in the country. Nevertheless, such pro-
ceeds are likely not to outweigh the lost opportunities from withdrawal. One can imagine that 
a firm’s bargaining power is reduced once it decided to withdraw from a country in the first 
place.
We will balance these arguments for our case of withdrawal from State Sponsor of Terror-
ism countries when developing our hypotheses in Section 4.
3. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
The legislative and regulatory background will only briefly be discussed here, as it is not 
our main focus. Furthermore, we confine our description of measures against the designated 
countries to US legislation. Only in the US, there is legislation in place that is directly geared 
towards the group of countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. Although interna-
tional institutions as well as other countries also imposed sanctions on some of the designated 
countries, outside the US there is no such thing as a group of countries being stigmatised in a 
way comparable to the State Sponsors of Terrorism in the US.
3.1. Legislation directed towards US firms
The designation of a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism requires the US Secretary of 
State to determine that the government of that country has “repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism” (U.S. Department of State, retrieved at 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm). A list of countries that meet this definition is mandat-
ed under Section 6 [foreign policy controls] (j) [countries supporting international terrorism] 
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of the Export Administration Act (1979). The same formulation as above can also be found in 
Section 40 [transactions with countries supporting acts of international terrorism] of the Arms 
Export Control Act (1976) and in Section 620A [prohibition on assistance to governments 
supporting international terrorism] of the Foreign Assistance Act (1961). Sanctions resulting 
from designation under these authorities include “restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a 
ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscel-
laneous financial and other restrictions” (U.S. Department of State, retrieved at 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm).
Currently, four countries are entitled State Sponsor of Terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria. Other countries that have meanwhile been on the list, but were removed, include Iraq, 
Libya, North Korea, and South Yemen. Cuba was added to the list on March 1
st
, 1982, be-
cause it had a “tradition” of supporting terrorist groups in Latin America and was accused of 
having connections to international terrorism (Sullivan, 2005). Iran has been included in the 
list since January 19
th
, 1984, as a consequence of an attack on the U.S. marine barracks in 
Lebanon (Katzman, 2011). In a document issued by the US Department of State (2011, p. 
150), Iran is called the ”most active State Sponsor of Terrorism in 2010”. Since August 12
th
, 
1993, Sudan has been on the list, as well. The country was included for giving shelter to in-
ternational terrorists such as e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, or al-Qaeda. Despite measures being 
undertaken by Khartoum in order to reduce terrorist proliferation in the country, it still re-
mains on the list in 2011 (United States Department of State, 2011). The country with the 
longest history on the list is Syria, which was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism on 
December 29
th
, 1979, because it allegedly gave shelter to terrorists and funded international 
terrorism. In 2010, according to the US Department of State (2011, p. 152), the country has
“continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the 
region and beyond”.
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Apart from legislation related to the fact that a country is on the State Sponsor of Terror-
ism list, trade with several State Sponsor of Terrorism countries is restricted according to 
additional laws. Most notably, the earliest and toughest sanctions were imposed against Cuba. 
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACRs) ban US firms from trade with Cuban na-
tionals or the government. As these sanctions were imposed as early as 1963 and because 
sanctions are tougher than those applying to the other countries designated as State Sponsors 
of Terrorism, the presence of firms in Cuba is very low (Westbrook, 2010). As a practical 
matter, we will therefore not engage in further details on sanctions against this country.
US firms are banned from trading with and investing in Iran according to executive order 
12,959, imposed on May 6
th
, 1995 (Executive order 12959, 1995). Nevertheless, as West-
brook (2010) points out, US firms can exploit a legal loophole and have foreign registered 
subsidiaries operate in the country. This is because the applicability of the regulation to for-
eign subsidiaries is controversial. She cites Halliburton’s (which is one of our sample firms 
because it later announced withdrawal) activities in the country as an example of the regula-
tion’s lacking precision in this respect.
Regarding sanctions against Sudan, executive order 13,067, imposed on November 3
rd
, 
1997 by President Clinton (Executive order 13067, 1997) can be seen as the prelude to a 
number of sanctions against the country. Since 1998, US firms are not allowed to engage in 
any commercial activity with the government of Sudan. Amendments made to the regulations 
in 2006 additionally declare that US firms may not engage in transactions “relating to petro-
leum or petro-chemical industries in Sudan, including but not limited to oil, oilfield services, 
and oil or gas pipelines” (Westbrook; 2010, p. 1171). Comparable to the case of Iran, these 
regulations do not apply to foreign registered subsidiaries of US firms. Especially noteworthy 
in the case of Sudan is the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (SADA), 
which, according to Westbrook (2010, p. 1151) “authorizes state and local governments to 
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divest public assets from companies that are involved in certain business sectors in Sudan. It 
also provides a safe harbour for mutual funds and pension plans choosing to divest their as-
sets from such companies.”
The ban on US firms’ trade with Syria traces back to the Syria Accountability and Leba-
nese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (SAA). According to this act, the US president had 
the choice between a number of sanctions to be imposed in case Syria did not change its for-
eign policy. Amongst others, it was expected that Syria would “immediately and uncondi-
tionally halt support for terrorism, permanently and openly declare its total renunciation of all 
forms of terrorism, and close all terrorist offices and facilities in Syria, (…).” Since Syria did 
not react to these requests, the US President on May 11
th
, 2004 enacted executive order num-
ber 13,338 (Executive order 13338, 2004), thereby implementing sanctions according to the 
SAA. With respect to US firms’ business relations with the country, the most notable sanc-
tion was the “prohibition on the export to Syria of products of the United States, other than 
food and medicine” (Executive order 13338, 2004). Such sanctions are still in effect (Embas-
sy of the United States of America, Damascus; Syria; retrieved at: 
http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctions-syr.html) and have been renewed by US president 
Obama in May 2010 (BBC News, 2010).
3.2. US extra-territorial legislation
According to the legislative measures described in the previous section, US sanctions 
against State Sponsor of Terrorism countries ended beyond US borders: neither foreign regis-
tered subsidiaries nor foreign firms could be punished for business activities in the designated 
countries. In the case of Iran and Libya, the US went one step further. Extra-territorial legisla-
tion was enacted in order to make also those firms end their business activities with Iran and 
Libya that are registered in a foreign country. The law that was supposed to make this possi-
ble, was the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (1996), abbreviated ILSA. According to this act, 
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firms that make an investment of 20 US$ million or more in one year in the Iranian energy 
sector are subject to penalties. In the meantime, the act no longer applies to Libya and was 
amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (2010), 
abbreviated CISADA. As major additional measures of the act, Katzman (2011, p. 12) em-
phasises that it curtails the sale of “gasoline and gasoline production-related equipment and 
services” and that it restricts “international banking relationships with Iran”. Interestingly, 
CISADA also contains a special rule, under which sanctions do not have to be imposed on 
firms that pledge to end their business activities in the country.
4. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
In this paper, we empirically investigate the effect of firm announcements to withdraw 
from one or more State Sponsor of Terrorism countries on the announcing firms’ stock price. 
Based on theoretical considerations laid out in Section 2, we now develop our hypotheses.
Judging from the sheer number of arguments in favour of a positive/negative effect of 
withdrawal on stock prices, the picture is clear: four arguments warrant a positive impact, 
while only one argument predicts a negative effect. Such reasoning obviously disregards the 
arguments’ quality and is thus invalid. Foregone revenues in a market can have a truly detri-
mental impact on cash flows and are thus likely to substantially affect a firm’s value. Howev-
er, in the case of countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, business operations of 
sample firms are limited. In the respective press announcements, many firms deem their in-
volvement “immaterial”. Furthermore, hardly any sample firm’s revenue share earned in the 
country at stake amounted to more than 0.2% of total revenues. We therefore suppose the 
merits of sustaining business relations in State Sponsor of Terrorism countries are out-
weighed by the costs incurred. This leads us to formulating the following hypothesis:
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H1: Abnormal stock returns of firms announcing withdrawal from one or 
more countries designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism will be posi-
tive upon announcement.
H1 contains a prediction about the average effect of withdrawal announcements across the 
sample. Additionally, we will investigate cross-sectional determinants of the abnormal re-
turns. The term State Sponsor of Terrorism exists only in US legislation and nowhere else in 
the world. Furthermore, we showed that public opinion in the US is especially critical about 
investing in firms that operate in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. This 
evidence in conjunction with empirical findings on “home bias” (the disposition of investors 
to primarily invest in domestic assets, see e.g. French and Poterba, 1991) leads us to the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H2: Abnormal stock returns of US firms will be more positive than for 
firms domiciled in other countries.
The bank and financial trading sector as well as the oil and gas industry play a pivotal role 
in sanctions against the designated countries, which is why much of the attention has been 
drawn on isolating these industries. It is surely not a mere coincidence that CISADA contains 
special measures with respect to these industries. Moreover, in the case of oil and gas firms, 
withdrawing is oftentimes associated with the sale of assets in the country. Consequentially, a 
withdrawing oil and gas firm receives at least some compensation for forsaking business. 
This in mind, we formulate the following two hypotheses:
H3: Abnormal stock returns of oil and gas firms will be more positive 
than for firms belonging to other industries.
H4: Abnormal stock returns of firms belonging to the bank and financial 
trading industry will be more positive than for firms belonging to 
other industries.
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As laid out in Section 2, dissolved litigation risk could cause our sample stocks to react 
positively upon announcement. With the introduction of CISADA, firms are exempt from 
possible legal proceedings in case they pledge to end business relations in Iran. Therefore, 
withdrawal announcements made after the enactment of CISADA (July 5
th
, 2010) come with 
the advantage that the firm is immune to legal proceedings resulting from its presence in the 
country. If the litigation risk based explanation holds, we should expect positive abnormal 
returns to be more pronounced for firms that withdraw after the CISADA enactment. Hence, 
we formulate the following hypothesis:
H5: Abnormal stock returns of firms withdrawing after the enactment of 
CISADA will be more positive than for firms withdrawing before the 
enactment.
After the firms have announced withdrawal from the designated countries, reasons for in-
vestors to shun stocks of such firms vanish. They should thus also not trade for a discount. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis with respect to the firms’ long-term per-
formance in the period subsequent to the withdrawal announcements:
H6: No abnormal long-term returns can be earned from investing in firms 
that announced withdrawal from a State Sponsor of Terrorism coun-
try.
5. DATA
From IW Financial, a US based financial research and technology solutions provider, we 
obtain data on firms doing business in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. 
The data is partitioned in quarterly snapshots of a database called the Global Security Risk 
Monitor (GSRM) maintained by the Conflict Securities Advisory Group (CSAG). The very 
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same data is also used by FTSE for creating the FTSE CSAG Terror-Free Index Series (see 
FTSE, 2011 for more details).
For each of the firms mentioned, we perform a web search in order to check whether the 
respective firm had withdrawn its operations in the meantime. We search for the correspond-
ing announcements in four different languages (English, French, German, and Italian). For 
example, we use strings such as “withdraw from AND Iran”, “pull out of AND Sudan” or 
“end business AND Syria”. All these strings and their equivalents in the other languages (e.g. 
se retire AND Iran) yield the first set of firms. With respect to the press releases’ content, we 
checked whether lacking profitability unrelated to sanctions was mentioned as the withdrawal 
reason. If this is the case, we exclude the announcement from our sample. Our objective is
not to include firms whose withdrawal decision might have been the consequence of poor 
profitability. This way, a potentially positive announcement effect cannot be attributable to a 
positive delta in cash flows resulting from abandoning unprofitable operations. Certainly, it 
remains possible that firms tried to hide withdrawal decisions induced by former management 
errors regarding foreign market entries behind, e.g., statements of reaction to political pres-
sure. Explaining positive announcement effects this way would require that capital markets 
are able to look behind such pretended arguments which would render them useless. We 
therefore deem such a scenario quite implausible. Nevertheless, we will return to this inter-
pretation of withdrawals possibly induced by a want of profitable business opportunities in 
the countries under consideration later on.
In order to make sure we catch the first calendar time press release, we check the three 
months before the date of the press release we obtained from our initial search for any earlier 
withdrawal information. If an earlier date is identified, this date is declared the event date. 
We complete our sample by searching the web for historical lists that were compiled in order 
to help investors identify firms that operate in State Sponsors of Terrorism countries. Such 
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lists are provided by United Against Nuclear Iran (http://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com), 
the Genocide Intervention Network (http://www.genocideintervention.net) or on 
http://www.divestterror.org. Most of the withdrawal announcements are reported by press 
release distributors such as Associated Press, Business Wire, Dow Jones Newswires, or Reu-
ters.
As the withdrawal announcement date, we define the date at which the definite decision to 
withdraw is announced. In the case of e.g. Marathon Oil Corp. this means that press releases 
like “Syrian minister confirms Marathon seeking sale of Syria assets” does not suffice as an 
event-date. Not until the press release “Petro-Canada completes purchase of 90% of Mara-
thon Syria stake” came out was the deal definitely fixed. Hence, the latter press release is 
taken as the event date. Not all firms in the sample had been active in one of the designated 
countries themselves. As mentioned in Section 3, US firms are banned from doing business in 
Iran according to executive order 12,959. If US firms wish not to forego any business oppor-
tunities in sanctioned countries, they can circumvent the law by having foreign domiciled 
subsidiaries operate in the respective country. If this is the case, then the parent firm is in-
cluded in our sample. In certain cases, the respective firm only partially withdraws. Examples 
of such incidents are Marathon Oil Corp. (which sold 90% of its stake to a third party) or 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC, which in March 2010 announced it would abandon its downstream 
activities in Iran, thereby remaining active in the country’s upstream sector. We consider 
such partial withdrawals as well and include the respective events in our sample.
We start with a sample of 52 firms announcing withdrawal from a State Sponsor of Terror-
ism country. One firm has to be excluded because of a merger and two other companies are 
excluded because of an insufficient number of observations in the relevant time period. Our 
full sample therefore encompasses a total of 49 firms experiencing 57 events. In Table III-1, 
we provide an overview of the reason for withdrawal across firms. Most often, press articles 
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referred to pressure exerted on the firm for its motive to pull out of the respective country (22 
instances). Sanctions imposed on the country the firm withdrew from is the second most im-
portant cause of withdrawal. Such sanctions were predominantly imposed by the US (eleven
cases) as the breakdown of sanction related withdrawals shows. Additionally, eight of the 
withdrawing firms said they considered returning to the country in case the political climate 
changes or sanctions would eventually run out. Economically, this point of view is well 
founded. The most important (in terms of economic importance) State Sponsor of Terrorism 
countries displayed remarkable growth rates over the period of investigation. From 2003 to 
2010, Sudan grew by an annual 21%, Iran grew by an annual 18% and Syria by 14%, as 
measured in nominal US$ GDP (Bureau van Dijk, 2011).
Therefore, we are confident that none of our sample firms withdrew for reasons related to 
lacking profitability or poor business outlooks in either of the designated countries. Rather, 
the connection of withdrawal to the abandoned country operations is undoubtedly linked to 
the country of concern being designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Table III-1
Distribution of withdrawal reasons across firms
Reason Number of Firms
Political situation 14
Firm was pressured by 22
An advocacy group 9
The US 7
A pension fund 4
No specific reason 2
Sanctions imposed by 20
The US 11
No further distinction 5
Other countries or alliances 2
The US and other alliances 2
No reason mentioned 1
Total 57
This table presents the distribution of withdrawal reasons
across firms. Reasons were either given by firms
themselves as firm officials were quoted in the respective
press release or the author of the press release provided
the reason.
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In Table III-2, we display the distribution of sample firms and events across country of 
firm origin. Most firms are US firms (15) and most events relate to US firms (15), followed 
by eight German firms associated with eleven events. This apparent predominance of US 
firms is likely attributable to the fact that legislation is toughest and public alertness is highest 
in the US. We are just as little surprised to see German firms in second place, as the EU-27 is 
Iran’s major trade partner (European Commission, 2011) and Germany is “Iran's most im-
portant EU trade partner” (Réalité-EU, retrievable at:
http://www.realiteeu.org/site/apps/nlnet/
content3.aspx?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=2315291&ct=9333699).
Table III-2
Another aspect that warrants discussion is the fact that the sample does not contain any 
Chinese firm. While many countries joined the US in the effort to isolate Iran by stopping to 
Distribution of firms and events across country of origin
Country Firms Events
Australia 1 1
Austria 1 1
Canada 1 1
Finland 1 1
France 1 2
Germany 8 11
India 1 1
Italy 1 2
Japan 4 4
Netherlands 1 2
Norway 1 2
Russian Federation 1 1
South Korea 3 3
Spain 1 1
Switzerland 3 4
Turkey 2 2
United Kingdom 3 3
United States 15 15
Total 49 57
This table presents the distribution of sample firms and events across
country of firm origin.
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conduct business in the country, “Iran and China have developed quite close links” thereby 
“ignoring U.S. rules that impose sanctions on companies doing business in the country”
(Bloomberg, 2011). This development is also mirrored in the evolution of Iran’s major trad-
ing partners. While trade with China accounted for a mere 8.7% of total trade in 2004 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006), China was Iran’s second most important trading partner in 2010, 
accounting for a share of 17.6%. The very same development can be observed in the case of 
Sudan. According to Large (2008, p. 15), China’s interest in Sudan is characterised by 
“scaled-up economic investment spearheaded by that in oil and, more recently, a progressive 
broadening beyond this commercial anchor.” This view is shared by Patey (2009, p. 571), 
who concludes that the Sudan divestment campaign yielded limited results because “non-
traditional targets from Asia control the majority of Sudan’s oil sector, and have thus far been 
unsusceptible to conventional financial market coercion.”
In Table III-3, we present the distribution of sample firms and events across country of 
former operation. The total numbers of firms and events in this table do not match those of
Table III-1 and Table III-2, because in some press releases it was announced that a firm with-
draws from several countries under investigation in this study. The vast majority of events is 
related to withdrawal from Iran. We attribute this to the fact that Iran accounts for 61% of all 
State Sponsor of Terrorism countries’ GDP during the years 2003 through 2010 (Bureau van 
Dijk, 2011). Furthermore, as witnessed by the extraterritorial laws regarding firm operations 
in Iran outlined in Section 3, the pressure that the US exerts on firms to withdraw is more 
pronounced in the case of Iran.
In Error! Reference source not found., we display the distribution of firms and events 
across industries. 19 firms and 23 associated events belong to the petroleum and natural gas 
industry (henceforth called the oil and gas industry) when classified according to the Fama 
and French (1997) industry classification scheme. Iran heavily relies on this industry as it is 
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responsible for about 70% of government revenues (Katzman, 2011). Hence, an exposure to 
this industry does not come as a surprise. We will address a potential industry bias stemming
from this unequal distribution of events across industries in the methodology section.
Table III-3
The distribution of events through time is presented in Figure III-1. The first event we dis-
cover is Talisman’s announcement to withdraw from Sudan in March 2003. Of the 57 events 
Distribution of firms and events across country of operation
Country of operation Firms Events
Cuba 1 1
Iran 41 49
North Korea 1 1
Sudan 7 7
Syria 7 7
Total 57 65
This table presents the distribution of sample firms and events across
country of operation. The total numbers of firms and events do not match
the corresponding numbers in Table III-1 and Table III-2, because some
firms announced withdrawal from more than one State Sponsor of
Terrorism country.
Distribution of firms and events across industries
Industry Firms Events
Aircraft 1 1
Automobiles and Trucks 5 7
Banking 4 4
Business Services 1 1
Chemicals 2 2
Computers 1 1
Construction 1 1
Electrical Equipment 1 2
Electronic Equipment 1 1
Insurance 3 3
Machinery 7 7
Measuring and Control Equip 1 2
Petroleum and Natural Gas 19 23
Steel Works, etc. 1 1
Trading 1 1
Total 49 57
This table displays the distribution of events across industries according to
the Fama and French (1997) industry classification scheme. Four-digit SIC
codes of sample firms are allocated to the respective Fama and French (1997)
industry group.
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in the sample, 28 events occurred in the year 2010, all of which are related to withdrawal 
decisions from Iran. This development had its origin in the September 25
th
, 2009, revelation 
of a secret uranium enrichment facility in Iran (Sanger and Broad, 2009) and culminated in 
the legislative measures taken by the US and others in summer 2010. Two explanations for 
the accumulation of withdrawal decisions in 2010 are possible: either firms reacted to the 
laws passed which certainly made business activities in Iran more difficult, or firms were 
incited to leave the country for reasons of share- and stakeholder pressure.
Our data on the firms’ stock prices and other relevant stock specific data is obtained from 
Thomson DataStream. All other data such as country indices and country portfolios sorted on 
size and book-to-market are retrieved from DataStream.
Figure III-1
Following Lundgren and Olsson (2010), we make use of country specific portfolios sorted 
on size and book-to-market. For all the sample companies’ home country markets, we use the
corresponding large growth (lg), large value (lv), small growth (sg) and small value (sv) indi-
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ces. As laid out by Lundgren and Olsson (2010, p. 11), the country specific zero-investment 
portfolios SMB and HML at time t are calculated as follows
(1) SMB  =
sg
t
+svt
2
−
lg
t
+lvt
2
,
(2) HML  =
lvt+svt
2
−
lg
t
+sg
t
2
,
where
sgt = small cap growth index return at time t
svt = small cap value index return at time t
lgt = large cap growth index return at time t
lvt = large cap value index return at time t
6. CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CARs) UPON ANNOUNCEMENT
6.1. Testing for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement
6.1.1. Methodology: testing for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement
We analyse the effects of withdrawal decisions on stock prices using an event-study ap-
proach. After having defined the event as well as criteria for the classification of an observed 
incident as an event, the classical event-study approach involves three further steps: (i) esti-
mation of “normal performance” during an estimation period used for parameter estimation, 
(ii) estimation of abnormal returns in the event period based on the parameter estimates ob-
tained in the first step and (iii) performance of a statistical test against the null hypothesis 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Binder 1998; Johnston, 2007). Following MacKinlay (1997), Corrado 
(2011) and numerous other event studies, we estimate normal performance during a 250 day 
estimation period starting at day t = −265 (265 days prior to the event date) and ending at day 
t = −16 (16 days prior to the event date). Normal returns are estimated using a country-
specific three factor model defined as follows:
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(3) Rit =	αi +	β1iRmt +	β2iSMBt +	β3iHMLt +	εit,
where Rit is the return on security i at time t, Rmt is the return on the country specific mar-
ket portfolio (DataStream total market index) SMBt is the return on a country specific zero-
investment portfolio long in small stocks and short in large stocks and HMLt is the return on 
a country-specific zero-investment portfolio long in high book-to-market stocks and short in 
low book-to-market stocks.
As depicted in Error! Reference source not found. and discussed in the data section, the 
distribution of events across industries leans towards the oil and gas industry. In order to ac-
commodate this, we could include industry portfolio returns as controls into regression equa-
tion (3). MacKinlay (1997) also mentions this possibility and deems the inclusion of appro-
priate control factors advisable. This procedure would be similar to the one tested in Thomp-
son (1988). Albeit its theoretical merits, Thompson (1988, p. 80) concludes that “(…) it 
doesn’t seem to matter which model is used” when comparing models with and without in-
dustry factors. Building on this finding, we do not expect the inclusion of an industry factor 
to qualitatively improve our results. Nevertheless, we will check results obtained from esti-
mating normal performance with the three-factor model as shown in regression (3) for ro-
bustness with the help of a model augmented by an industry factor.
In a second step, based on the parameter estimates obtained in the estimation period, ab-
normal returns are calculated. They are defined as the disturbance term of the factor model in 
event-time and are calculated as follows:
(4) ARiτ =	Riτ – (α i +	β 1iRmτ +	β 2iSMBτ +	β 3iHMLτ),
where τ denotes any day in the event window and α i as well as β ki (k = 1, 2, 3) are the pa-
rameter estimates obtained from estimating regression (3). In a third step, we perform two 
statistical tests against the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return during the event window. 
In this respect, the most straightforward methodology to apply is the “classical” one as out-
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lined in Brown and Warner (1985). This test is frequently applied in event-studies and has, as 
Corrado (2011, p. 218) puts it, “come to eponymously define the genre”. Although the meth-
od is still widely used (see e.g. Bargeron et al., 2008; Doidge et al., 2010 or Arena et al., 
2011), it comes with two disadvantages. First, due to the use of non-standardised abnormal 
returns, securities with large variances are likely to dominate the test. Although Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) declare the use of standardised abnormal returns to be principally supe-
rior, they conclude that standardisation makes little difference if event windows are suffi-
ciently narrow. Since we aim to test event windows of up to thirteen days, standardisation is 
crucial in our case. Second, event-induced variance can bias test results towards rejecting the 
null. Brown and Warner (1985, p. 27) are well aware of this caveat, but do not conclusively 
discuss the issue, stating that “further research is necessary to fully understand the properties 
of alternative procedures for measuring abnormal performance in such situations”.
These two shortcomings of the test statistic introduced by Brown and Warner (1985), 
henceforth called the BW test, are accommodated with the introduction of an alternative test 
statistic advanced by Boehmer et al. (1991). The authors call this test statistic the “standard-
ised cross-sectional method.” Henceforth, it will be called the BMP test. While this test statis-
tic weighs each abnormal return by the inverse of its variance in the estimation period, the 
nominator standardises residuals. The test statistic is therefore less exposed to large variance 
securities. The denominator uses the cross-sectional standard deviation of the standardised 
abnormal returns during event-time and thus accounts for a potential increase in variance 
during event-time. Due to these advantages of the BMP test, we decide in favour of this test 
statistic among the many alternative parametric tests.
Albeit these merits, the BMP test shares one critical assumption with the BW test: the as-
sumption of normally distributed returns. While Brown and Warner (1985, p. 25) ascertain 
that “the non-normality of daily returns has no obvious impact on event study methodolo-
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gies”, Campbell and Wasley (1993) found standard parametrical event study procedures to be 
poorly specified. The analysis of NASDAQ returns seemed to pose problems unknown from 
NYSE data. Since return data from non-US exchanges is assumed to be equally difficult in 
the sense that parametric tests might be poorly specified, we make additional use of the Cor-
rado (1989) rank test. MacKinlay (1997) also proposes this procedure, stating that it was 
worthwhile considering a non-parametric test in order to check the robustness of conclusions 
based on parametric results. We calculate the test statistic as proposed in Corrado (1989) 
adopted for a multiday event window according to Cowan (1992) and Campbell et al. (2010). 
Each security’s abnormal return is transformed into its respective rank among the total num-
ber of abnormal returns in the combined estimation- and event period. Thus, the test is non-
parametric and does therefore not rely on the assumption of normally distributed returns.
Methodologically, our approach is superior to the ones used in the three initial studies on 
withdrawal from South Africa. Neither Meznar et al. (1994), nor Wright and Ferris (1997), 
nor Posnikoff (1997) combine a parametrical test with a non-parametrical one. These anal-
yses are therefore much more prone to committing a type I error (i.e. to rejecting a true null 
hypothesis) than ours. Possibly, this lack of methodological diversity has caused results of the 
studies to be incommensurable in the sense that they yielded conflicting results and interpre-
tations.
6.1.2. Results: testing for cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) upon announcement
Panel A of Table III-4 displays cumulative average abnormal returns relative to the three-
factor model for four different event windows (−15 to −3, −2 to +2, 0 to +1, +3 to +15). 
While we observe hardly any abnormal sample stock price reaction around the announcement 
date and thereafter, we detect a substantially positive abnormal stock price reaction in the 
event window prior to the announcement day (−15 to −3). Across securities in the sample, the 
average abnormal return’s run-up during the period prior to the event is 1.54%. This increase 
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in security prices is not only economically sizeable, but statistically significant as well. The 
corresponding t-statistic obtained from calculation of the parametric BMP test (2.45) is statis-
tically significant at the 5%-level of confidence.
Despite the BW tests methodological drawbacks discussed in the methodology section, we 
also calculate test-statistics according to the Brown and Warner (1985) methodology. 
Untabulated results implying the same significance levels as those obtained from calculating 
the BMP test obviously lead to the same conclusions. When we check this result for robust-
ness using the non-parametric Corrado rank test (Panel C), we obtain similar results: the t-
statistic obtained from calculation of the Corrado rank test is 2.32 and therefore indicates 
significance at the 5%-level of confidence, as well. Consequentially, we confirm H1: abnor-
mal stock returns of firms announcing withdrawal from one or more countries designated as 
State Sponsors of Terrorism are positive upon announcement.
Table III-4
Event returns
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns
−15 to −3 −2 to +2 0 to 1 +3 to +15
CAR 1.54% −0.26% 0.04% −0.08%
Panel B: BMP test
t-Statistic 2.45 0.10 0.87 −0.05
P>|t| 1.8% 92.4% 38.6% 96.1%
Panel C: Corrado test
t-Statistic 2.32 −0.21 0.89 −0.16
P>|t| 2.4% 83.7% 37.6% 87.2%
This table presents tests results against the null hypothesis of no abnormal return in the
respective event window. Panel A displays the CAR (cumulative abnormal return) for 57
firm events relative to the country-specific Fama and French three-factor model. Panel B
reports t-statistics and associated p-values obtained from performing the BMP test.
Panel C reports t-statistics and associated p-values obtained from performing the
Corrado rank test.
Event window
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As mentioned in the data and methodology sections, we also estimate normal performance 
with a four-factor model including an industry specific global portfolio. In accordance with 
our expectations stemming from earlier research conducted by Thompson (1988), our results 
remain qualitatively unchanged once we augment the three-factor model by an industry spe-
cific factor. We omit results of this analysis for the sake of brevity.
An aspect that surely warrants some discussion, is the fact that information was incorpo-
rated into prices before the actual event took place. That said, information about the with-
drawal announcement had leaked into the market before the firm’s decision was made public 
through the press. Such incidences are not uncommon and are well documented in the litera-
ture. Most often when information leakage is detected, abnormal stock price reactions of 
mergers and acquisitions are analysed (see e.g. Dodd, 1980; Asquith, 1983; Asquith et al., 
1983; Schipper and Thompson, 1983 or DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989), but it also occurs in 
other fields of research: see Davidson et al. (1996) for the case of early retirement program 
announcements, Faff et al. (2002) for the case of international cross-listings and Samitas et al. 
(2008) for the case of sports sponsorship announcements. In the mentioned studies, infor-
mation is incorporated into prices prior to the announcement because the market anticipated 
the events to occur. When a firm decides to withdraw from a country designated as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism, it is most often confronted with public and political pressure before-
hand. As a reaction, firms engage in extensive debates within firms and with stakeholder 
groups. Meznar et al. (1994, p. 1640), also make this point for the case of South Africa with-
drawals. They note that “information (…) may often have been available well ahead of the 
announcement itself”. Furthermore, in the case of oil and gas firms ending upstream activities 
in one of the designated countries, the withdrawal decision is inextricably linked with the sale 
of assets (see e.g. the abovementioned case of Marathon Oil. Corp.’s asset sale to Petro-
Canada). Such deals do upfront require price negotiations as well as the sporadic intervention 
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of the local government and are therefore even more prone to public awareness. Hence, the 
apparent information leakage in the case of the decision to withdraw from a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism country does not come to our surprise.
Cumulative abnormal returns in two of the remaining three event windows are negative alt-
hough statistically indistinguishable from zero (−2 to +2, +3 to +15). Especially the negative 
cumulative abnormal return in the period subsequent to the event (+3 to +15) raises the ques-
tion whether the positive abnormal returns prior to announcement are of transitory nature. 
The untabulated cumulative abnormal return from the event day until 100 days after the event 
(0 to +100) is positive and suggests a permanent increase in firm value attributable to the 
withdrawal decision. Beyond the rejection of a potential mean reversion of abnormal returns 
subsequent to the announcement, this finding also nurtures the supposition of the withdrawal 
potentially having a long-term impact on firm value. We test for this possibility in Section 7.
6.2. Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions
6.2.1. Methodology: cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions
In this section, we aim to shed light on the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock 
price reactions in the period prior to the event (−15 to −3). As we did not detect any abnormal 
stock price reactions in the other event windows, we will only briefly comment on the cross-
sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions in the event window centred around 
the event (−2 to +2). We omit a discussion of the results regarding the remaining event win-
dows for brevity. For the purpose of the analysis, we estimate various permutations of the 
following cross-sectional regression:
(5) CAR(i;−15,	−3) =	α	+	β X  +	β    +	ε ,
where CAR(i;−15, −3) is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return during event window (−15 to 
−3), X  is a vector of firm control characteristics and Y  is a vector including variables of con-
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textual interest. It contains various permutations of the variables used to test Hypotheses H2 
to H5.
A problem that is likely to occur in such regressions is that of heteroskedasticity. There are 
two commonly used methods to accommodate the issue. MacKinlay (1997) proposes the use 
of heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors according to White (1980), a proce-
dure also used by numerous other scholars (see e.g. Hertzel, 1991, or Masulis et al., 2009). 
The second popular method is the use of standardized cumulative abnormal returns as in the 
BMP test statistic of Boehmer et al. (1991). This approach is used by Balakrishnan and Koza 
(1993), Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) as well as Wiles and Danielova (2009). We decide in 
favour of using robust standard errors, since this allows direct economic interpretation of the 
independent variables’ coefficient estimates.
Our analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns is a second methodo-
logical advantage over the three initial South Africa related studies conducted by Meznar et 
al. (1994), Wright and Ferris (1997) and Posnikoff (1997). As the authors did not analyse the 
cross-sectional variation in abnormal announcement returns, it is even harder to say where the 
conflicting evidence with respect to results comes from. In explaining abnormal returns by 
means of a cross-sectional regression, we satisfy an important quality criterion of event stud-
ies as posited by McWilliams and Siegel (1997).
We distinguish independent variables used to explain the cumulative abnormal returns in 
control variables (X ) and variables of contextual interest (Y ). The control variables X  are
 Size I (LN_MV)
LN_MV is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s US$ stock market capitalisation
(price times number of shares outstanding).
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 Size II (LN_REVENUE)
LN_REVENUE is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s average US$ revenues 
during the estimation period.
 Size III (LN_EMPLOYEES)
LN_EMPLOYEES is defined as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total number of employ-
ees in the year prior to the announcement.
 Market-to-Book (LN_MTBV)
LN_MTBV is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s market-to- book ratio in the 
year prior to the announcement
 Time relative to first announcement (TIME)
TIME is defined as the time distance between the respective firm event and the first firm 
event in the sample.
With the inclusion of LN_MV, LN_REVENUE and LN_EMPLOYEES we aim to proxy 
for firm size. The primary purpose of including these variables as well as LN_MTBV is test-
ing whether the international three-factor model used for abnormal return estimation success-
fully controlled for any potential size or book-to-market effect. We assume at least the coeffi-
cients pertaining to LN_MV and LN_MTBV to be statistically insignificant, since these are 
the units according to which the factor-mimicking portfolios in the three-factor model are 
constructed. TIME is also introduced as a control in order to check for any time-dependency 
of cumulative abnormal returns relative to the first event. The variables Yi of contextual in-
terest are (in order of the corresponding hypothesis)
 US domicile (USA)
USA is a dummy variable equaling one if a firm is a US firm and zero otherwise.
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 Oil and gas industry (OIL_GAS)
OIL_GAS is a dummy variable equaling one if a firm is an oil and gas firm and zero oth-
erwise. A firm is defined as an oil and gas firm if, according to the Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification scheme, it resides in the industry group labeled “petroleum and nat-
ural gas”.
 Bank or financial trading industry (BANK_TRADING)
BANK_TRADING is a dummy variable equaling one if a firm is a bank or financial trad-
ing firm and zero otherwise. A firm is defined as a bank or financial trading firm if it ei-
ther belongs to the Fama and French (1997) industry group labeled “banking” or to the one 
named “trading”.
 Announcement was made after the enactment of CISADA (POST_CISADA)
POST_CISADA is a dummy variable equaling one if a firm announced withdrawal after 
the July 5
th
, 2010, enactment of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act (CISADA) and zero otherwise. CISADA contains a special clause which 
excludes firms from prosecution in case they pledge to end all business relations with the 
country (CISADA, 2010). A positive coefficient on this variable would support the notion 
that litigation risk dissolved upon withdrawal caused the positive price reactions.
In accordance with hypotheses H2 to H5, we expect coefficients on USA, OIL_GAS,
BANK_TRADING, and POST_CISADA to be positive, since having one of these character-
istics is presumably associated with higher positive cumulative abnormal returns during the 
event window.
In Table III-5, we display correlations of all introduced independent variables. Unsurpris-
ingly, all three size proxies exhibit high positive correlation. This is especially the case for 
LN_MV and LN_REVENUE. As witnessed by the significant negative correlation between 
TIME and USA, US firms were “early movers” with respect to withdrawal announcements. 
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As the US has been the country of most outrage with respect to firms operating in State 
Sponsor of Terrorism countries, legislation was adopted early and public pressure was most 
pronounced in the US, as well. Thus, US firms were forced to react earlier as compared to 
non-US firms. The same is true for bank and financial trading firms: the last bank or financial 
trading firm the sample terminated its operations in a State Sponsor of Terrorism country in 
summer 2007, which is just past the investigation period’s calendar time midpoint.
Table III-5
Correlations of explanatory variables in cross-sectional regression
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LN_MV 1.00
LN_EMPLOYEES 0.72* 1.00
LN_REVENUE 0.91* 0.74* 1.00
LN_MTBV −0.03 0.10 −0.26 1.00
TIME −0.01 −0.01 0.11 −0.19 1.00
USA −0.11 −0.04 −0.19 0.13 −0.35* 1.00
OIL_GAS 0.27 −0.26 0.20 −0.12 −0.13 0.07 1.00
BANK_TRADING 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.07 −0.34* −0.05 −0.26 1.00
POST_CISADA −0.13 −0.00 −0.07 0.02 0.61* −0.24 −0.03 −0.22 1.00
This table displays correlations of explanatory variables in the cross-sectional regression. LN_MV is the natural logarithm of the
firm’s average market capitalisation during the estimation period, LN_EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total
number of employees in the year prior to the announcement, LN_REVENUE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s average revenues
during the estimation period, LN_MTBV is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio in the year prior to the
announcement, TIME denotes the time span of the firm event relative to the first firm event in the sample, USA is a dummy variable
equalling one if a firm is a US firm and zero otherwise, OIL_GAS is a dummy variable equalling one if a firm is an oil and gas firm and
zero otherwise (a firm is defined as an oil and gas firm if, according to the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications, it resides
in the industry group labelled “petroleum and natural gas”), BANK_TRADING is a dummy variable equalling one if a firm is a bank
or financial trading firm and zero otherwise (a firm is defined as a bank or trading firm if it either belongs to the Fama and French
(1997) industry group labelled “banking” or to the one named “trading”), POST_CISADA is a dummy variable that equals one for
events that occured after the enactment of CISADA (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act) and zero
otherwise. * p < 0.01
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6.2.2. Results: cross-sectional determinants of abnormal stock price reactions
Results of regressing cumulative abnormal sample stock returns on various permutations 
of the factors described in the previous section are displayed in Table III-6. The primary pur-
pose of model specification (1) is testing whether the three-factor model used for abnormal 
return estimation successfully controls for any potential size or book-to-market effect. From 
the insignificant coefficients pertaining to LN_MV and LN_MTBV, we infer that both fac-
tors are of limited explanatory power when estimating cumulative abnormal returns in the 
event window −15 to −3. If there was a size or book-to-market effect, it has been captured by
the three-factor model. Furthermore, the coefficient pertaining to TIME is negative and statis-
tically significant on the 10%-level of confidence – earlier withdrawal is apparently associat-
ed with higher abnormal returns. In specifications (2) and (3), we test the remaining two size 
proxies for explanatory power. As we infer from the respective coefficient’s t-values, a firm’s 
revenues help better explain the cross-sectional variation in cumulative abnormal returns than 
a firm’s number of employees. This is why we rely on LN_REVENUE in all further permuta-
tions. In specification (4), we add three of the four variables of contextual interest. Inclusion 
of these variables substantially increases the model’s goodness of fit as measured by the ad-
justed R-squared. The coefficient pertaining to the US domicile dummy is positive and signif-
icantly different from zero on the 5%-level of confidence, while the coefficient belonging to 
the oil and gas dummy is significantly different from zero on the 10%-level of confidence. 
US firms as well as oil and gas firms realise higher positive CARs than other firms announc-
ing to withdraw from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country. On first sight, we fail to find evi-
dence supporting the expectation of higher positive CARs for firms in the bank and financial 
trading industry. Recall from Table III-5 that the US dummy as well as the bank and financial 
trading dummy display highly significant negative correlation with the time variable. There-
fore, specification (4) is likely to suffer from problems associated with multicollinearity. As 
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the coefficient pertaining to TIME displays a t-value far from statistical significance at any 
conventional level, we decide to omit TIME in specifications (5) and (6). This finding of 
withdrawal time being a characteristic with statistically insignificant explanatory power for 
abnormal returns is especially noteworthy in connection with the South Africa studies. Mez-
nar et al. (1998) find that earlier withdrawal was associated with more negative announce-
ment returns than later withdrawals as investors’ interpretation of withdrawal benefits versus 
costs seemed to have shifted towards higher benefits towards the end of the investigation pe-
riod. However, our study is in this respect not fully comparable with the South Africa related 
literature. While South Africa is one single country over which public debate increased over 
time, we investigate withdrawal from several countries. Furthermore, untabulated results 
from investigating the time dimension only for the subset of firms withdrawing from Iran 
again reveals that TIME is not a statistically significant determinant of abnormal stock price 
returns.
In specification (5), the significance-level of all coefficients belonging to the variables of 
contextual interest is raised: the coefficient pertaining to US domicile is now statistically sig-
nificant on the 1%-level of confidence, the one belonging to the oil and gas industry is statis-
tically significant on the 5%-level of confidence and the one belonging to the bank and finan-
cial trading industry is now significantly different from zero on the 10%-level of confidence. 
The significantly positive coefficient on the oil and gas dummy further strengthens our asser-
tion that a lack of profitability in the countries firms withdrew from is not the reason for the 
observed average positive announcement effect. Since oil and gas firms were able to sell as-
sets to other firms that remained active in the respective market, these firms are most unlikely 
to benefit from abandoning unprofitable operations. Thus, higher returns for firms belonging 
to the oil and gas industry are inconsistent with a “lack of profitability explanation”. Moreo-
ver, in order for such a profitability based explanation to hold, one would have to assume that 
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especially US firms’ operations in the designated countries were particularly unprofitable.
We do not see a reason why one should make such an assumption and deem our investor cli-
entele based explanation mentioned above much more probable.
Table III-6
Cross-sectional regression, dependent variable: CAR (−15 to −3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LN_MV −0.002
(−0.31)
LN_EMPLOYEES −0.001
(−0.09)
LN_REVENUE −0.005 −0.007 −0.007 −0.007
(−1.22) (−1.40) (−1.68)* (−1.78)*
LN_MTBV 0.003
(0.18)
TIME −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 −0.001
(−1.68)* (−1.72)* (−1.60) (−0.39)
USA 0.038 0.040 0.037
(2.45)** (2.72)*** (2.38)**
OIL_GAS 0.026 0.028 0.027
(1.96)* (2.12)** (2.12)**
BANK_TRADING 0.024 0.029 0.025
(1.27) (1.99)* (1.76)*
POST_CISADA −0.010
(−0.64)
Observations 55 53 55 55 55 55
Prob > F 21.7% 9.8% 4.1% 1.3% 0.6% 0.8%
Adj. R-squared 1.3% 3.7% 5.6% 14.7% 16.2% 15.3%
This table presents cross-sectional regression results. The dependant variable is CAR (−15 to −3).
LN_MVis the natural logarithm of the firm’s average market capitalisation during the estimation period,
LN_EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total number of employees in the year prior to the
announcement, LN_REVENUE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s average revenues during the
estimation period, LN_MTBVis the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio in the year prior
to the announcement, TIME denotes the time span of the firm event relative to the first firm event in the
sample, USA is a dummy variable equalling one if a firm is a US firm and zero otherwise, OIL_GAS is a
dummy variable equalling one if a firm is an oil and gas firm and zero otherwise (a firm is defined as an
oil and gas firm if, according to the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications, it resides in the
industry group labelled “petroleum and natural gas”), BANK_TRADINGis a dummy variable equalling
one if a firm is a bank or financial trading firm and zero otherwise (a firm is defined as a bank or trading
firm if it either belongs to the Fama and French (1997) industry group labelled “banking” or to the one
named “trading”), POST_CISADA is a dummy variable that equals one for events that occured after the
enactment of CISADA (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act) and zero
otherwise. t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Specification (6) differs from specification (5) in that we add POST_CISADA as an addi-
tional explanatory variable. As we infer from the coefficients’ low t-value, withdrawal after 
enactment of CISADA has no explanatory power in estimating CARs. Thus, we infer that 
withdrawing after CISADA enactment is not associated with more pronounced positive ab-
normal returns. According to CISADA, sanctions will not be imposed on withdrawing firms. 
Therefore, the finding is inconsistent with the supposition that dissolved litigation risk might 
cause the positive price effect.
Despite the fact that the average CAR in the event window centred on the event (−2 to +2) 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero for the sample as a whole (see Table III-4), we also
analyse cross-sectional determinants of the individual CARs in this event window. Evidence 
indicates CARs in the event window (−2 to +2) are lower for small firms (as measured in 
market capitalisation) and for growth firms. While large firms and value firms display ab-
normal event returns close to zero, these returns are substantially negative for smaller firms. 
To give an example, the average CAR of the smallest ten firms in the sample is −1.95%. Un-
fortunately, due to data limitations, we cannot draw on the revenue share each firm earns in 
the respective countries it withdraws from. Therefore, we can only suppose that the revenue 
share earned in such countries is higher for smaller firms. Large multinationals with a global 
distribution network are less depending on single markets. In contrast, small firms spread 
their operations over fewer countries and are therefore more likely to depend on revenues 
generated from single markets. Since we assume operations in the designated countries to be 
profitable on average, total cash flows of smaller firms should in relative terms be hit harder 
when the firm withdraws. This effect translates into negative abnormal returns once the firm 
abandons its operations in the country. To some degree, the detected pattern is also visible in 
the analysis of abnormal returns in the event window before the event (−15 to −3) as depicted
in Table III-6. In specifications (5) and (6), the size proxy (LN_REVENUE) is negative. 
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Hence, the negative effect for small firms is only partially priced in the early window but 
fully captured by the event window centred on the event.
7. LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE
7.1. Data and methodology: long-term performance
As shown in Section 6, sample stocks do not display a mean reversion of abnormal returns 
in the 100 day period following the announcement. This finding nurtures the presumption that 
a portfolio of sample stocks could potentially display long-term abnormal return perfor-
mance. In this section, we describe the methodology used for answering the question whether 
an investor can earn long-term abnormal stock returns from holding a portfolio of firms that 
announced withdrawal from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country. We label this portfolio the 
“good” portfolio since it contains firms that met the decision to refrain from investing in a 
potentially “evil” country. A firm is added to the “good” portfolio in the month subsequent to 
the announcement and is held for the next 40 months. In order for a portfolio return to be 
included in the analysis, the portfolio must consist of ten stocks or more.
We measure abnormal long-term performance relative to a control group of firms. From 
IW Financial, we obtain databases from the Global Security Risk Monitor (GSRM) series. 
These quarterly snapshot databases contain information on firms that were active in a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism country at the respective point in time. For every firm in the “good” 
portfolio, we match a control firm that was active in a State Sponsor of Terrorism country by 
the time the “good” firm made the withdrawal announcement.
As laid out in Section 5, our “good” sample leans towards oil and gas firms. While match-
ing control firms, we are thus most concerned about a potential industry bias. The first di-
mension on which we match is industry classification (DataStream level six industrial classi-
fication, data type INDG and INDM). The second dimension is country of origin 
(DataStream geographical classification, data type GEOL). If we then have the choice among 
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several matching control firms, we choose the firm with the highest proximity in size as 
measured in market capitalisation. In case we do not have the opportunity to match industry 
and country of origin, we first try to match the region (according to the DataStream allocation 
of geographical classification to region) and then search worldwide. The latter case is rele-
vant for oil and gas firms, since hardly any US and European oil and gas firms continued to 
do business in a State Sponsor of Terrorism country. We add a firm to the portfolio of “evil” 
firms when the corresponding “good” firm is added to the “good” portfolio and remove it 
once the “good” firm is removed. Buy and hold returns from investing in the “good” portfo-
lio, those obtained from holding the “evil” portfolio, and spread portfolio returns (a portfolio 
long in “good” firms and short in “evil” ones) are estimated by a global version of the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model as follows:
(6) RPt – rft =	α	+	β1(Rmt – rft)	+	β2SMBt +	β3HMLt +	εt,
where RPt – rft is the return on one of the equal weighted portfolios described above 
(“good”, “evil” and “good” minus “evil”) at time t, α is the intercept and in this context also 
the coefficient of interest, Rmt – rft is the return on a global market portfolio (MSCI World) in
excess of the risk-free rate at time t, SMBt is the return on a global zero-investment portfolio 
long in small stocks and short in large stocks at time t, and HMLt is the return on a global 
zero-investment portfolio long in high book-to-market stocks and short in low book-to-
market stocks at time t. Construction of the latter two portfolios is analogous to the method-
ology laid out in Section 5. If an investor is indeed able to earn abnormal returns, α will be 
significantly different from zero.
In addition to the global version of the three-factor model, we estimate returns using a 
brand new three-factor model introduced by Hou et al. (2011). The authors find that a three-
factor model adding a value-based factor (cash flow-to-price) and a momentum factor to a 
global market proxy captures much of the time-series variation in global stock returns. That 
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said, the model differs from the one proposed in Fama and French (1993) in that it does in-
deed contain a value-based factor, but relies on cash flow-to-price instead of book-to-market. 
Secondly, the small firm factor is omitted in favour of a momentum factor resembling the one 
introduced in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). To this end, we estimate the following regression 
with the “HKK” factors:
(7) RPt – rft =	α	+	β1(Rmt – rft)+	β2(C/P)t +	β3MOMt +	εt,
where RPt – rft and Rmt – rft are defined as above (although the market proxy is a different 
one and is constructed by the authors of Hou et al., 2011), (C/P)t is the return on a global ze-
ro-investment portfolio long in high cash flow-to-price stocks and short in low cash flow-to-
price stocks at time t and MOMt is the return on a global zero-investment portfolio long in 
prior return winners and short in prior return losers at time t. If α turns out to be significantly 
different from zero, investors earn abnormal returns.
7.2. Results: long-term performance
We display buy and hold abnormal returns estimated with the global Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model in Table III-7. In the first specification, returns from holding the 
“good” sample portfolio are the dependent variable. The monthly alpha (constant) in this re-
gression is positive (0.005) and statistically different from zero on the 10%-level of confi-
dence. Economically, this corresponds to an annualized excess return of 6.2%. When we turn 
our eyes to the “evil” portfolio, we see that the model is less well specified as compared to 
estimating returns of the “good” portfolio. This is witnessed by the adjusted R-squared of 
0.81 compared to 0.92 for the “good” portfolio. Alpha, albeit associated with lower statistical 
significance, is of similar economic magnitude as compared to the one of the “good” portfo-
lio; the monthly excess return of 0.005 corresponds to an annualized abnormal return of 6.6%.
Unlike the “good” portfolio, the “evil” portfolio loads significantly (5%-level of confidence) 
and positively on SMB. We attribute this to the fact that oftentimes the largest firm in a coun-
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try’s industry is among the “good” firms. Therefore, potential control firms were oftentimes 
smaller than sample firms. Most importantly, we do not observe an alpha far from zero from 
estimating returns on holding the spread portfolio (“good” minus “evil”). We therefore draw 
the conclusion that no abnormal returns can be earned from holding a portfolio of firms that 
announced withdrawal from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country when measured against the 
global version of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. We will see if this conclu-
sion still holds when we use the HKK-model as an alternative.
Table III-7
Results obtained from estimating the three return series (“good” portfolio, “evil” portfolio 
and “good” – “evil” portfolio) with the HKK-factors from Hou et al. (2011) are displayed in
Table III-8. Adjusted R-squares are somewhat lower than for the FF-model. We attribute this 
to the fact that the market proxy used in the HKK-model captures less of the portfolios’ re-
turn variance when compared to the market proxy used in the global FF-Model. Interestingly, 
Buy and hold portfolio returns: FF-model
"Good" "Evil" "Good−Evil"
Alpha 0.005 0.005 −0.000
(1.78)* (1.11) (−0.12)
Mkt−rf 1.379 1.008 0.371
(41.34)*** (21.90)*** (8.58)***
SMB 0.256 1.003 −0.747
(1.60) (2.48)** (−2.21)**
HML −0.240 0.133 −0.373
(−1.30) (0.49) (−1.72)*
Observations 70 70 70
Adj. R-squared 0.92 0.81 0.30
This table presents results from estimating buy and hold returns of the "good", the
"evil" and the "good−evil" portfolio estimated with a global version of the FF-three-
factor model. Mkt−rf is the return on a global market portfolio net of the risk-free rate,
SMB is a global zero-investment portfolio long in small stocks and short in large stocks
and HML is a global zero-investment portfolio long in high book-to-market stocks and
short in low book-to-market stocks.The time period ranges from 01/2006 to 10/2011.
t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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the “good” portfolio loads positively (5%-level of confidence) on cash flow-to-price. This is 
especially noteworthy as the same portfolio loaded negatively on HML in the global FF-
model regression. Since both factors proxy for value based measures, we would have ex-
pected the corresponding coefficients to be of the same sign. However, the finding of differ-
ent signs is in line with Hou et al.’s (2011, p. 2529) assertion that “different measures of the 
value-growth effect are not easily interchangeable”.
Table III-8
The alpha corresponding to the “good” portfolio is positive but lacks statistical signifi-
cance on all conventional levels of confidence. Furthermore, it is economically marginal: the 
monthly alpha of 0.001 corresponds to an annualized excess return of 1.6%. This is not the 
case for the “evil” portfolio: the alpha of 0.005 is of almost the same magnitude as the corre-
sponding alpha obtained from estimating the “evil” returns with the global FF-model. Never-
theless, the coefficient lacks statistical significance. This also counts for the alpha obtained 
Buy and hold portfolio returns: HKK-model
"Good" "Evil" "Good−Evil"
Alpha 0.001 0.005 −0.004
(0.41) (1.02) (−1.11)
Mkt−rf 1.277 1.064 0.213
(15.04)*** (9.96)*** (3.83)***
C/P 0.341 0.118 0.223
(2.18)** (0.48) (1.35)
MOM 0.038 −0.222 0.260
(0.44) (−1.45) (2.09)**
Observations 60 60 60
Adj. R-squared 0.84 0.75 0.21
This table presents results from estimating buy and hold returns of the "good", the
"evil" and the "good−evil" portfolio estimated with the HKK model. Mkt−rf is the return
on a global market portfolio net of the risk-free rate, C/P is the return on a global zero-
investment portfolio long in high cash flow-to-price stocks and short in low cash flow-to-
price stocks and MOM is the return on a global zero-investment portfolio long in prior
return winners and short in prior return losers.The time period ranges from 01/2006 to
12/2010. t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors in parantheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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from regressing spread portfolio returns on the HKK-factors: with an alpha of 0.004 and a 
corresponding t-statistic of 1.11, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of this coefficient being 
equal to zero.
We conclude that holding a portfolio of “good” firms (those that announced withdrawal 
from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country) does neither reward nor penalise an investor with 
long-term abnormal returns. Although we find the three-factor global FF-model alpha to be 
modestly positive, we fail to confirm this result once we introduce a control portfolio and 
once we estimate the “good” return series with the HKK-factor model. Therefore, we confirm 
H6: no abnormal long-term returns can be earned from investing in firms that announced 
withdrawal from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country.
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper adds to the understanding of the effects of social norms on financial markets by 
analysing stock price reactions to firm announcements of withdrawal from one or more na-
tions designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. We find that withdrawal is, on average, 
associated with a 1.54% positive abnormal return measured in the period prior to the actual 
announcement. Hence, the benefits from withdrawal outweigh associated costs. This infor-
mation is incorporated into prices before the actual announcement is made. Due to the noisy 
nature of upfront public dialogue with involved stakeholders, the market rewards withdrawals 
before announcements are finally made.
In a cross-sectional regression, we aim to understand the determinants of the announce-
ment effect. Consistent with our hypotheses, excess returns during the interval prior to an-
nouncement are higher for (i) US domiciled firms, (ii) firms in the oil and gas industry and, to 
a lesser extent, for (iii) firms in the bank and financial trading industry. We attribute the for-
mer finding to increased scrutiny of investors in the US, who are believed to primarily hold 
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equity of US firms (see French and Poterba, 1991). With respect to the oil and gas and the 
bank and financial trading industry, we conjecture investors took side with US legislation in 
deeming these industries critical to efforts to isolate the respective country. Moreover, oil and 
gas firms often have assets in the country, which they sell upon withdrawal. Since they are 
able to sell those assets to other firms not withdrawing, associated costs for oil and gas firms 
are potentially lower than for firms of other industries. We also find evidence supporting the 
notion that the stock price increase was caused by reasons unrelated to dissolved litigation 
risk. Firms that withdrew after such withdrawal announcements were relevant for avoidance 
of sanctions under CISADA (Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment 
Act) did not earn higher abnormal returns than firms that withdrew before.
In a long-term performance analysis, we are unable to find evidence for long-run abnormal 
return performance of “good” firms that announced withdrawal as compared to “evil” firms 
that continued to operate in a country designated to be a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009, p. 35), deem the question whether socially responsible in-
vesting can constitute an incentive for firms to change their behaviour a “key issue” in the 
literature. We contribute to answering this question by showing that firms who choose to 
withdraw from a State Sponsor of Terrorism country are rewarded by a substantial, non-
transitory increase in firm value. Investors’ behaviour is indeed norm driven in the sense that 
norm-compliant firm behaviour (in this case, refraining from operating in a morally question-
able country) is rewarded by a considerable stock price increase.
In Breuer and Felde (2011), we investigated stock price reactions to the SEC’s publication 
of an online tool for detecting firms doing business in countries designated as State Sponsors 
of Terrorism. When we compare the study’s findings to the results obtained in this paper, we 
observe the following main difference: positive stock price effects detected are more quickly 
incorporated into prices and are more pronounced than the negative effects detected in Breuer 
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and Felde (2011). Since the studies are complementary in the sense that they investigate 
emergence and dwindling of terror-related moral stigmatisation, the question that arises is 
why reactions to these events differ in magnitude.
We posit that the difference could be attributable to a well-documented behavioural phe-
nomenon: investors’ disposition to hold on to stocks experiencing negative returns for too 
long as compared to the holding period of stocks that gained in value. This effect was e.g. 
found in Odean (1998) and has been entitled the “disposition effect” by Shefrin and Statman 
(1985). Translated into our study, this means that when investors were informed about firms 
doing business in the designated countries by means of the online tool, they displayed inac-
tion leading to deferred selling of the corresponding shares. Since comparable inaction does 
not exist in the case of the buying decision, good news are more quickly incorporated into 
prices. This is consistent with our evidence, since the run up in stock price upon withdrawal 
occurs even before the actual announcement is publicly made.
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Abstract
In this paper, we study the impact of moral considerations on the equity market using the 
example of firms being stigmatised as terror supporting. In summer 2007, the SEC published 
an online tool with information on firms doing business in State Sponsor of Terrorism coun-
tries. We take sides with those arguing that for moral reasons, investors will have traded on 
the information provided in the tool by selling stocks of mentioned firms. Hence, we hypoth-
esise that stock prices of stigmatised sample firms will have fallen. Contrary to our expecta-
tion, we find no evidence of a negative stock price reaction during the time the tool was post-
ed online but do find such reaction subsequent to the tool’s publication. Additionally, we 
provide evidence for the notion that stigmatisation is not transitory: During a long-term peri-
od subsequent to the tool’s suspension, investors were able to earn positive abnormal returns 
from holding an equally weighted portfolio of sample firms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“No investor should ever have to wonder whether his or her investments or retirement sav-
ings are indirectly subsidizing a terrorist haven or genocidal state,” said Christopher Cox, 
former chairman of the SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007a). In reaction 
to the widespread demand for easy access to information about firms’ potential business ties 
with countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, the SEC provided an online tool on 
its webpage in June/July 2007. In this context, State Sponsors of Terrorism are such countries 
that are determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism and are designated pursuant to three laws: section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the For-
eign Assistance Act (U.S. Department of State, 2011; retrieved at http://www.state.gov/
s/ct/c14151.htm).
Before that SEC online tool, other lists compiled by think tanks circulated in the web 
(Hemphill and Cullari, 2010), but did not receive attention comparable to the SEC’s tool. The 
tool’s publication by the SEC on June 25
th
, 2007, was the first attempt of a federal agency to 
make information about firms doing business in State Sponsor of Terrorism countries availa-
ble to investors in a consolidated form. By clicking on the tab “State Sponsors of Terrorism”, 
users were directed to a list of countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism by the U.S 
Department of State (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007a). At the time the tool 
was online, these countries were Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2007b). In the country specific menus, firms with business ties to 
a respective country were listed. Some firms were listed only once, while others were accused 
of doing business in all five countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. When click-
ing on one of the listed firms, users were transmitted to the full text of the firm’s latest annual 
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report as filed with the SEC (forms 10-K, 20-F and 40-F). Of the 90 firms mentioned, most 
firms were large multinationals with a comprehensive distribution network. They were either 
active by selling goods in designated countries themselves or third party distributors did the 
job for them. The industry most prevalent in the sample is the oil industry. Nine sample firms 
belong to the two-digit SIC code number 13, labelled “oil and gas extraction”. Another group 
of six sample firms is assigned to SIC code 29, named “petroleum refining and related indus-
tries”. Both codes fall into the oil industry following the Fama and French (1997) classifica-
tion scheme of 49 industries. Among these firms, involvement in Iran is the predominant rea-
son for list inclusion. This does not come as a surprise as Iran ranks third in the world in natu-
ral oil reserves (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2009).
The Financial Times was the first among a handful of newspapers to report on the tool’s 
existence. In the article “SEC's anti-terror tool angers companies” (Grant, 2007) the author 
expressed reservation regarding the online tool’s general suitability. He argued that the tool 
did not encompass any information on whether the firm still operated in one of the designated 
countries or if it had already abandoned its operations. The second argument put forward was
the lack of information on how material the respective firm’s involvement in the country ac-
tually was. In the tool, the SEC added no information beyond what was written in the annual 
reports. Some annual reports just included the name of one or more of the designated coun-
tries without any quantification on how big the firm’s involvement was. Todd M. Malan 
(2008), president and CEO of the Organisation for International Investment (representing the 
interests of foreign firms listed at US stock exchanges) feared that investors would unwisely 
trade on the information that a particular firm had been added to the list: 
“(…) we believe there is a very real risk that investors will see a company 
name on the SEC's web list and make an investment decision without 
"clicking through" to read the context, having made the assumption that the 
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SEC would not have put the company on the list in the first place if there 
was no reason for concern.”
Although the site had been very popular as far as the sheer number of visitors are con-
cerned (according to the SEC, material posted on the tool was clicked on for more than 
150,000 times), the SEC took the tool offline on July 15
th
, 2007, for temporary suspension. 
According to the SEC, concerns about the fact that information accessible via the tool might 
not reflect a firm’s latest actions in the matter were taken seriously, which is why the tool was 
supposed to undergo temporary reconstruction (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2007b). As a next step, on November 16
th
, 2007, the SEC sent out a concept release, request-
ing the public to comment on the question whether the SEC should again engage in develop-
ing “mechanisms to facilitate greater access to companies’ disclosures concerning their busi-
ness activities in or with countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism” (U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 2007c). Predominantly, respondents argued that a tool like 
the one posted in June/July 2007 did not appropriately serve its purpose of accurate and unbi-
ased investor information. May it be in lack of a suitable alternative to the online tool or, as 
Todd M. Malan (2008) mentioned, because the entire topic of terror-free investing had shift-
ed to the private sector: to date, we are not aware of any publication that compares to the 
online tool published in June/July 2007.
The analysis conducted in this paper will give answer to the concern of many affected 
firms as it was formulated by Werner Schnappauf (2008), by that time director general and 
member of the presidential board of the Federation of German Industries (BDI): “references 
to “terrorism” and “State Sponsors of Terrorism” could provoke strong reactions by investors 
and other users, which could lead to imprudent investment decisions.” The concern was that 
investors might be encouraged by the tool to trade based on the information provided, selling 
stocks of firms with business ties to State Sponsor of Terrorism countries.
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In order to investigate whether such claims were justified, we use an event-study method-
ology and a long-term performance analysis. With the help of the event-study, we assess any 
abnormal stock price reactions of affected firms following the publication of the online tool. 
If the concerns and the anger were appropriate, affected firms should on average have in-
curred negative abnormal returns when the tool was provided to investors wishing to “divest 
terror”. The event itself is not, in contrast to the majority of event-studies conducted, the 
firms’ publication of the information that they do business in these countries. What we define 
as the event is the SEC, as a federal agency and with the explicit mission to protect investors, 
stigmatising a group of firms as behaving in a morally questionable way by doing business in 
countries that the U.S. Department of State labels State Sponsors of Terrorism. It is the offi-
cial labelling by the SEC that we suppose has induced investors to sell stocks, not the bare 
information disclosed in the respective firms’ SEC filings. On that note, we believe the SEC’s 
disclosure contained additional information. Therefore, our research question is consistent 
with the assumption of financial markets being efficient in the semi-strong form sense.
In the long-term performance analysis, we investigate whether trading on the information 
provided in the tool offers the possibility to earn long-term abnormal returns. If investors sold 
stocks of firms mentioned in the tool, their prices will subsequently be depressed as com-
pared to their fundamental value. An investor long in the portfolio of stigmatised firms could 
thus earn positive abnormal returns in the period after the event. We test this hypothesis by 
conducting an alpha-study in which returns from holding the portfolio of stigmatised stocks 
are estimated with a global version of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF-
model). If our hypothesis is to be true, the corresponding alpha should be positive for the pe-
riod succeeding the tool’s publication.
Our paper is organised as follows: the next section provides an overview of related litera-
ture and sets out our academic contribution. Section 3 describes and summarises the data. In 
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Section 4, we investigate the short-term effect of the tool’s publication: in its first part, the 
event-study methodology is described, before results are presented in its second part. In the 
third part, we check the results for robustness. Section 5 is about the long-term effects of the 
tool’s publication. In its first part, we briefly describe the methodology used for estimating 
long-term return performance of the designated firms. In the second part of Section 5, we 
present results of the long-term effect analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION
This paper aims to investigate the effects of moral views on the financial performance of a 
group of firms. Therefore, it is related to studies examining the interplay between social 
norms and financial markets. Early research on this topic comes from Becker (1957). He sets 
out a framework in which agents in the market place are assumed to discriminate because of 
“race, religion, sex, colour, social class, personality, or other non-pecuniary considerations”. 
As a result, the discriminating agents reduce their own income as well as that of the people 
they discriminate against. Arbel and Strebel (1982) specifically apply this theory to financial 
markets. They find that some firms are much closer followed by analysts than others. Relat-
ing to the framework established by Becker (1957), this means that firms less covered by 
analysts are the ones discriminated against in the sense that they get less attention than other 
firms. The authors detect a negative relation between excess returns and their measure of ana-
lyst coverage.
Probably the most important field of research in the area of discrimination on financial 
markets is socially responsible investing (SRI), defined as “an investment discipline that con-
siders environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to generate long-term 
competitive financial returns and positive societal impact" (The U.S. Social Investment Fo-
rum, 2010). With his guide on how to identify socially responsible stocks, Moskowitz (1972) 
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was among the first scholars to publish studies on SRI investing. Since then, the research 
field has become increasingly popular: Margolis et al. (2009) count 251 studies analysing the 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance. Of 
these studies, 106 have been published in the period between 1998 and 2007. In their meta-
analysis, the authors reveal a small positive effect of social responsible behaviour on financial 
performance. However, the only discernable effect is detected for cases in which firms dis-
play substantial socially irresponsible behaviour.
While SRI investing either means considering only those stocks that are associated with 
exceptionally good social responsibility performance (positive screening) or those that are not 
associated with poor social responsibility performance (negative screening), other academic 
research as well as popular literature has drawn attention to the reverse side of SRI – sin 
stocks. Investor guides such as “Stocking up on sin: how to crush the market with vice-based 
investing” (Waxler, 2004) or “Investing in vice: the recession-proof portfolio of booze, bets, 
bombs & butts” (Ahrens, 2004) give guidance on successfully investing in firms whose oper-
ations are regarded as sinful. In the academic world, the first scholars to relate to potential 
return advantages of sin stocks are Angel and Rivoli (1997). The authors suppose that stocks 
avoided by a certain group of investors – as sin stocks are avoided by socially responsible 
investors – will have higher expected returns than “ordinary” stocks. They further suppose 
that the return differential is higher, the higher the proportion of sin stock avoiding investors 
in the market. Essentially, they use the same reasoning as Arbel and Strebel (1982). In a sem-
inal paper, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide empirical evidence for the assertion of An-
gel and Rivoli (1997). In a long-term return analysis, the authors find significant positive ab-
normal returns for a portfolio of sin stocks after controlling for the usual predictors of return 
performance. Furthermore, the authors find that stocks of firms operating in sin industries are 
less held by institutional investors subject to norm constraints (e.g. pension funds or endow-
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ment funds) and are less followed by analysts, who are believed to primarily cater to such 
institutional investors. As the reason for the stocks’ outperformance, the authors find that the 
“neglect effect” as well as increased litigation risk is causing sin stocks to outperform their 
peers on a risk-adjusted basis. Shunned by a large investor base consisting of norm con-
strained institutional investors and norm conscious individuals, sin stocks trade cheaply as 
compared to fundamentals and thus offer superior risk-adjusted returns to the investor.
Also closely related to this paper are studies by Teoh et al. (1999) as well as Rock (2003). 
Teoh et al. (1999) investigate the impact that the boycott of South Africa in the late 1980’s 
had on the South African financial market. Political and public pressure was exerted on firms 
investing in South Africa in order to make them withdraw their investments. Contrary to what 
had been reported in the financial media, the authors find no negative impact of legislative 
and shareholder boycott on either the valuation of the South African financial market or on 
firms with operations in South Africa. Rock (2003) uses an event-study methodology in order 
to examine the effect of public disclosure about sweatshop practices on firms. During a five 
year period ranging from the year 1996 through 2000, he identifies eight multinational cloth-
ing firms for which he assesses the impact of incidents where sweatshop practices become 
public. Results suggest that firms were indeed punished by investors for relying on such prac-
tices.
As the online tool is about firms doing business in terror supporting countries, this paper is 
also related to research in the field of terrorism and its impact on financial markets. Especial-
ly since the September 11, 2001 attacks, an increasing body of literature examines the links 
between terrorism and the stock market. Chen and Siems (2004) study the U.S. capital mar-
ket’s response to 14 terrorist/military attacks and global capital markets’ response to the 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Karolyi and Martell 
(2010) investigate stock price reactions to terrorist attacks of 75 U.S. and international firms. 
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Brounen and Derwall (2010) analyse the impact of terrorist attacks on stock prices and com-
pare the reactions following these events to those following earthquakes. Chesney et al. 
(2010) study the impact of terrorism on the behaviour of stock, bond and commodity markets 
over a period of 11 years. Like these studies, the vast majority of studies in the field of terror-
ism related research in finance are confined to short-term effects.
The paper most closely related to ours and also the sole study to focus on the longer-run 
consequences of terrorism on investment returns and risks is Karolyi (2008). He investigates 
two investment strategies based on the S&P 500 investment universe: investment in firms 
that operate in countries subject to frequent terrorist attacks on the basis of a terrorism-related 
risk score on the country level as well as investment in firms that are “terror-free” and there-
fore do not operate in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. The results he 
obtains indicate positive abnormal returns of both investment strategies that are small in eco-
nomic magnitude and statistically insignificant.
Albeit the vast body of SRI related research, there is still a lot that has to be understood 
about the reverse side of SRI investing. We are the first to take a look at this reverse side in 
the special field of terror-free investing. While Karolyi (2008) in his analysis of a “terror-
free” portfolio considers a broad equity universe and excludes firms with business ties to “ter-
ror countries”, we investigate exactly those sinfully behaving firms. Both our investigations, 
the short-term impact and the longer-run consequences of firm stigmatisation due to poten-
tially terror related operations have not been analysed, so far. If, as we hypothesise, investors 
are indeed guided by moral considerations when meeting investment decisions with respect to 
firms operating in State Sponsor of Terrorism Countries, this is impacting the trade-off a firm 
faces when confronted with the question whether or not to operate in such countries. Should 
reputational risk materialise in poor stock market performance, managerial decision making 
will be enriched by an additional factor to be considered. That said, we make a completely 
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new contribution to the field of terror-free investing. Putting this into the big picture, we con-
tribute to the understanding of how social norms affect capital markets.
Since we investigate the appearance of moral stigmatisation on the firm level, this paper 
can be considered as a complement to Breuer and Felde (2012), where we examine the effect 
of dwindling stigmatisation. Beyond representing the counterpart to Breuer and Felde (2012), 
this paper contributes to the understanding of social norms’ effects on financial markets for 
two further reasons. First, as opposed to the case of withdrawals from countries designated as 
State Sponsor of Terrorism, firms mentioned in the tool did not operatively do anything. 
What causes the stigmatisation is the tool’s bare information content, not a corporate action 
as in the case of Breuer and Felde (2012). The exact complimentary action to Breuer and 
Felde (2012) would be a firm expansion into previously untouched markets of countries des-
ignated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. Thus, the study at hand isolates the effect of the bare 
information that a firm is associated with one of the designated countries. Second, following 
the adaption of the social norm not to potentially finance terrorist operations, investors have 
to sell stocks of the firms mentioned. Therefore, the analysis presented in this paper serves as 
an additional robustness check for what has been found in Breuer and Felde (2012). The posi-
tive impact upon withdrawal from a morally stigmatised country would be consistent with a 
negative impact upon publication of the tool. For reasons formulated e.g. in Odean (1998), 
investors are generally assumed to realise losses more reluctantly than they are to realise
gains. That said, we believe the negative effects of the tool’s publication to be of smaller 
magnitude than the positive impact of firm withdrawals.
3. DATA
Since the SEC withdrew the online tool from its webpage in July 2007, the list of firms 
accused of having business ties with State Sponsor of Terrorism countries is no longer avail-
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able online. For the purpose of this study, QVM group – a private investment advisory firm –
generously provided us with the list of firms mentioned in the tool.
The original list as provided by QVM encompasses 90 firms. For the analysis, we had to 
exclude seven firms because of merger, no trading or missing data. Additionally, we excluded 
two Argentinean firms because the required input for the model parameters was not available 
for the Argentinean market. Of the remaining 81 firms, 29 are US based and 52 have head-
quarters domiciled outside the US. While all of the US firms were directly listed, foreign 
firms predominantly listed equity at US stock exchanges in the form of ADRs (American 
Depositary Receipts). Table IV-1 displays an overview of the sample firms’ size as measured 
in market capitalisation as well as total assets in the year 2007. The average sample firm has a 
market capitalisation of US$ 39 billion, while the median sample firm has a market cap of 
US$ 13 billion. Breaking the sample up by geographical firm origin reveals that non-US 
sample firms are considerably larger than US sample firms. This observation is in line with 
the results of Foerster and Karolyi (1999, p. 986), who declare that “cross-listed firms tend to 
be very large.” With a market value of equity of US$ 54 billion, the average non-US sample 
firm is more than four times larger than the corresponding US firm (US$ 13 billion). This 
picture is even more pronounced if one takes a look at total assets. By this measure, the aver-
age non-US firm is about 25 times larger than the average US firm in the sample (US$ 297 
billion and US$ 12 billion, respectively). Since banks as an industry are known to be more 
asset intensive than others, the large discrepancy when size is measured in assets comes from 
the fact that all five banks in the sample are non-US banks. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that by both standards, non-US firms are substantially larger than US firms. Non-US firms 
almost exclusively belong to the category of large multinationals, while many US firms on 
the SEC’s list do not belong to this category.
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In Panel B of Table IV-1, we provide an overview of the sample firms’ market-to-book ra-
tios. The average firm in the sample has a market-to-book ratio of 2.5. Contrary to what we 
observed in the case of firm size, we do not recognise considerable differences between non-
US and US sample firms.
Table IV-1
Since the SEC as a federal agency is only responsible for firms listed at US stock ex-
changes, firms not listed at US exchanges but with business ties to State Sponsor of Terror-
ism countries would of course not have been on the list. Of the firms on the list, many have 
more than one listing. This primarily applies to the non-US firms on the list. For these firms, 
the US equity market represents an attractive opportunity to address investors that would oth-
erwise not have invested in the respective firm. In addition to their listing at a US exchange, 
these firms are listed at their respective home exchange, which also serves as their primary 
exchange. As displayed in Table IV-2, primary exchange also means that most trades are ex-
Panel A: Firm size (2007)
Market capitalization (US$ million)
Average Median Obs.
All firms 38,746 13,479 81
US Firms 13,317 1,057 29
Non-US Firms 53,704 31,187 52
Assets (US$ million)
Average Median Obs.
All firms 196,919 9,857 77
US Firms 11,717 772 27
Non-US Firms 296,929 47,734 50
Panel B: Firm market-to-book (2007)
Average Median Obs.
All firms 2.52* 2.47 72
US Firms 2.50* 2.52 26
Non-US Firms 2.55  2.45 46
This table displays key characteristics of sample firms. Characteristics are presented for
the entire sample of firms, for firms domiciled in the US and for firms domiciled outside
the US. Panel A reports firm size as measured in US$ million of market capitalization as
well as firm size as measured in US$ million of total assets in 2007. Panel B reports market-
to-book ratios in 2007. * One firm excluded because of identification as an outlier.
Size and market-to-book ratio of sample stocks
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ecuted via these home exchanges. Trading at US exchanges makes up for a mere 6% of the 
combined primary exchange and US exchange trading volume for non-US firms. This num-
ber of 6% is substantially lower than what has been found in other studies. Marosi and Mas-
soud (2008) report a relative trading volume ratio of 36% for the control sample they use. 
However, this number is likely to be higher than ours, since the sample also includes stocks 
with an emerging market as a home exchange. As found by Halling et al. (2008), cross listed 
firms listing on the US equity markets have relatively more trades executed at the US market 
in case they are domiciled in a less developed country. The vast majority of our sample firms 
have a developed equity market as their home market. Therefore, the relative volume ratio of 
17% for such firms as found by Baruch et al. (2007) is better for comparative purposes. How-
ever, the 17% share is based on a ten year data period beginning in the mid-90s. As in recent 
years it became easier to execute direct trades at foreign exchanges for US investors, this 
number will supposedly further decrease in the subsequent period. Therefore, our number 
does not seem to contradict the evidence from other studies.
Table IV-2
With respect to the analysis carried out in this paper, 94% of the combined trading volume 
at the respective home market means these markets are more liquid and thus provide more 
efficiency of information incorporation than US equity markets. This does not come to our 
surprise, since research in the field of ADRs has already born similar findings. Ely and 
Number of shares traded (million, 2007)
US exchanges Home exchanges Obs.
All firms 25,037 199,750 78
US Firms 13,244 13,244 29
Non-US Firms 11,794 186,507 49
This table presents trading volume as measured in million shares traded 2007 for the
entire sample of firms, for firms domiciled in the US and for firms domiciled outside the
US.
Trading volume of sample stocks
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Salehizadeh (2001) investigate the degree of integration among international equity markets. 
They find that home markets generate a higher amount of information and are thus the more 
important source of information when compared to US equity markets. Gagnon and Karolyi 
(2010) are engaged in determining the importance of cross-listings. They find that between 
2004 and 2008, the number of foreign firms cross-listing at NYSE or NASDAQ has declined. 
Therefore, our own results and previous research lead us to the conclusion that investigations 
should focus on the firms’ home markets.
All our stock return data is retrieved from Thomson DataStream. The respective market’s 
DataStream total market indexes serve as market proxies. We convert prices to US$ where 
necessary. The one-month US Treasury bill serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. As control 
variables, we construct the Fama and French (1993) factors (FF factors) SMB and HML. Fol-
lowing Lundgren and Olsson (2010), we make use of country specific portfolios sorted on 
size and book-to-market. For all the sample companies’ home country markets, we use the 
corresponding large growth (lg), large value (lv), small growth (sg) and small value (sv) indi-
ces. As laid out by Lundgren and Olsson (2010, p. 11), the country specific zero-investment 
portfolios SMB and HML at time t are calculated as follows
(1) SMB  =
sg
t
+svt
2
−
lg
t
+lvt
2
,
(2) HML  =
lvt+svt
2
−
lg
t
+sg
t
2
,
where sgt = small cap growth index return at time t
svt = small cap value index return at time t
lgt = large cap growth index return at time t
lvt = large cap value index return at time t
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4. SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF THE TOOL’S PUBLICATION
4.1. Short-term effect: methodology
In our case, the event occurs at the same point in calendar time for all firms affected. As 
noted e.g. by Binder (1985, 1998) and MacKinlay (1997), the classical event-study method-
ology introduced in particular by Fama et al. (1969) is not suitable if the event occurs at the 
same point in calendar time for all affected firms. In this case, excess returns are cross-
sectionally dependent, an effect commonly referred to as “event clustering”. Since cross-
sectional independence of excess returns is one of the crucial assumptions in the conventional 
methodology, we have to make use of a different methodology. As Binder
(1998, p.124) shows, the problem of event-clustering can be circumvented by integrating 
so-called “event-dummies” into the return equations. The model to be estimated is
(3) Rit =	αi +	βi Rmt +	γiDt +	εit,
where Rit is the return on security i at time t, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio at 
time t and Dt is a dummy variable that equals one during the event period and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient of interest is γi, a measure of the abnormal return during event-time. In con-
trast to the approach by Fama et al. (1969), where abnormal returns are defined as residuals 
from the market model, this approach parameterises the abnormal return in the market model 
regression equation. Although the two procedures might look different at first sight, Lamdin 
(2001, p. 173) points out that the cumulative abnormal return approach most often found in 
the event-study literature has the same goal as the parameterised approach, “and in fact can 
be shown to be a matter of presentation rather than a different empirical approach.”
The method of estimating regression equation (3) is twofold: one can either estimate the 
regression for each firm in the sample separately using OLS (ordinary least squares). Alterna-
tively, one can follow an approach building on Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR). In such a system of equations, regression equation (3) is estimated for each firm 
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separately using GLS (generalised least squares). As pointed out by Binder (1998, p. 124), 
returns on N securities of firms affected by A events can be estimated separately in the fol-
lowing system of equations:
(4) R1t =	α1 +	β1 Rmt +	

A
a 1
γ1aDat +	ε1t,
R2t =	α2 +	β2 Rmt +	

A
a 1
γ2aDat +	ε2t,
.
.
.
RNt =	αN +	βN Rmt +	

A
a 1
γNaDat +	εNt.
The error terms are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated (cross-correlation), ex-
actly what is assumed for the error terms of stock returns in the case of “event clustering”. 
Most commonly in event-studies, tests are performed against the null-hypothesis of no aver-
age or no cumulative average abnormal returns during the event-period (Binder, 1998). The 
real advantage of the SUR method not only lies in the fact that it is statistically more appro-
priate and computationally simpler. Rather, it is the possibility to extend the range of testable 
hypotheses beyond what is possible with the standard method: joint hypotheses about abnor-
mal returns can easily be tested after estimating a SUR system of equations. In this paper, we 
test two null hypotheses:
(A) H0: 

N
i 1
= 0; cumulative abnormal returns across the sample are equal to zero
(B) H0: Median γi = 0; the median abnormal return of all firms is equal to zero
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For our analysis, we adapt regression equation (3) to fit the purpose of analysing sample 
stock returns at the firms’ respective home exchange. Therefore, we estimate stock returns in 
a SUR system as follows:
(5) Rhit – Rft =	αi +	β1i(Rhmt – Rft)	+	β2iOILGSWDt	+	β3iSMBht +	β4iHMLht +	γiDt +	εit,
where Rhit – Rft is the home market return on sample firm i net of the risk-free at time t. 
Rhmt – Rft is the return on the home market net of the risk-free rate at time t. SMBht is the 
home market return on a zero-investment portfolio long in small firms and short in large 
firms at time t, while HMLht is the home market return on a zero-investment portfolio long in 
high book-to-market firms and short in low book-to-market firms at time t. About these terms 
it is worth noting that they all differ by the respective firm i’s home market. Rhmt for example 
is the return on firm i’s respective country market portfolio. For a German firm i in the sam-
ple, Rhmt is the return on the German market portfolio at time t. For an Indian firm, Rhmt is the 
return on the Indian market portfolio at time t. The same holds true for SMBht and HMLht. 
OILGSWDt (DataStream World-DS Oil & Gas) is the return on a global portfolio of oil and 
gas companies. It is introduced in order to control for the high number of oil companies in the 
sample. Dt is the event-dummy that equals one during event-time and zero otherwise. Apart 
from a small firm-, a value- and an industry effect, we cannot think of any other effect poten-
tially evoking biased estimates of abnormal returns. Thus, we believe to have built in all pos-
sible factors that might otherwise cause us to draw false inferences.
We conduct our analysis with the full sample of firms and additionally with two subsam-
ples for which we suppose the hypothesised effect is likely to be even more pronounced. The 
criteria used for building these subsamples are:
 Firm origin
As noted above, the sample of firms include US based firms as well as non-US based 
firms. There is reason to believe that the effect will differ by firm domicile: “home bias” 
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could lead to US firms being more affected by the list’s publication than non-US based 
firms. As documented in various studies on “home bias” (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991), 
investors tend to mainly invest in domestic equity. Since the list’s publication was primari-
ly directed towards US investors, the degree to which information on investors’ “terror 
averse” investment preferences is incorporated into prices will most likely be higher for 
US firms. In order to grasp a potentially different effect of the tool’s publication on US 
firms and non-US firms, the analysis is carried out with a subsample encompassing US 
firms, only.
 Operations in Iran
Information on which firms belong to the group being accused of doing business in State 
Sponsors of Terrorism countries was accessible to users after clicking on the specific 
country of interest. According to the SEC, information on firms doing business in Iran was 
most “popular” in the sense that it was the country most often clicked on (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2007b). One potential interpretation for this fact is that inves-
tors were especially feared their investments could enhance the nuclear threat supposedly 
emanating from Iran. While we do not aim to analyse the exact cause of investors interests, 
we hypothesise negative stock price reactions of firms operating in Iran to be more pro-
nounced than for the sample as a whole.
It is common practice to measure abnormal returns during a time interval around the actual 
event (see e.g. MacKinlay, 1997). In this respect, the length of the event-windows is one of 
the most broadly discussed issues. McWilliams and Siegel (1997), in a review of event-
studies, reveal that windows with differing lengths in the interval −90 to +90 are widely used. 
Although the authors criticize careless definition of longer event windows, they admit that the 
nature of the specific subject might justify longer event windows, as well. In defining event 
windows, we draw on Cooper et al. (2001) and on more recent studies of Chang et al. (2007) 
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as well as Jorion and Zhang (2009), who use pre-event windows of up to 15 trading days and 
substantially longer post-event windows (up to 120 trading days as in Cooper et al., 2001). 
We therefore consider the following event windows, in which we test for abnormal stock 
price reactions of sample firms:
 June 4
th
– June 22
nd
, 2007: pre event period
The period has a length of 15 trading days and ends on the last trading day before the tool 
was published. It therefore measures any information leakage that might have caused stock 
prices to react abnormally even before the tool was published.
 June 25
th
and June 26
th
, 2007: short event period (two trading days)
The tool was published on June 25
th
, 2007. In order to allow for trading of the affected se-
curities on markets that were already closed by the time the information was released (Eu-
ropean and Asian markets), June 26
th
is added to the event-period.
 June 25
th
– July 16
th
, 2007: long event period (15 trading days)
The tool was taken offline on July 16
th
. This period covers the entire period during which 
information was online on the SEC’s website.
 July 17
th
– August 20
th
, 2007: post event period
The period starts one day after the tool was taken offline. This 25 trading day post-event 
period measures any information that was incorporated into prices after the tool’s publica-
tion.
During these periods, the event-dummy is set equal to one. For all other trading days dur-
ing the estimation period it is set equal to zero. Regressions are estimated using daily returns 
from July 2006 (one year before the tool was launched online, a sum of approx. 250 trading 
days) until December 2007 (approx. 100 trading days after the tool was taken offline).
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4.2. Short-term effect: results
In this section, we describe the results obtained from estimating regression equation (5) 
with returns from holding the complete sample of firms as well as two different subsamples. 
Four different specifications of the event-dummy Dt are defined in order to measure the im-
pact of the pre event period, the short event period, the long event period, and the post event 
period. All tests conducted involve a statement about the coefficient of interest (γi), which 
measures abnormal returns during event time.
4.2.1. Short-term effect: full sample of firms
To begin with, we test the two hypotheses described above for the entire sample of firms. 
Table IV-3 displays the results. In Panel A, we provide sums of coefficient γi estimates. The 
sum of 0.194 for the post event period indicates that on aggregate, excess returns on sample 
firms were negative in the period succeeding the tool’s provision. As indicated by the corre-
sponding chi
2
value, the sum of 0.194 is statistically significant at the 10%-level of confi-
dence (corresponding p-value = 0.063). Hence, we find faint evidence for the notion that in-
vestors did indeed act upon the information provided in the tool and sold stocks of firms ac-
cused of having business ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. This 
interpretation is strengthened by testing the null hypothesis of the median coefficient being 
equal to zero. Results are displayed in Panel B. We observe a negative median coefficient 
(0.001) for the post event period and can reject the null of the median coefficient being 
equal to zero on the 1%-level of confidence.
The SEC’s Publication of an Online Tool for Detecting Firms Doing Business in Countries Designat-
ed as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Short-Term Investor Reaction and Long-Term Consequences
113
Table IV-3
4.2.2. Short-term effect: US firms
In light of what has been found for the entire sample of firms, we expect results to be even 
more pronounced for the subsample of US firms. Results for this subsample, provided in Ta-
ble IV-4, do not confirm our expectations. First, drawing on results from the parametrical test 
displayed in Panel A, we have to stick to the null for the hypothesis that the sum of the event-
dummy coefficients is equal to zero, regardless of the time period tested. Second, when test-
ing whether the median coefficient is equal to zero, we are able to reject the null on the 5%-
level of confidence. Overall, we obtain a mixed picture with respect to the subsample of US 
firms. Thus, we have to reject the hypothesis that the effect of the tool’s publication is more 
pronounced for firms domiciled in the US.
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.026 
1)
0.068 
1)
0.071 
1)
−0.194 
1)
(Wald test) (0.03) (0.02) (0.32) (3.46)*
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
0.000 
2)
0.000 
2)
−0.001 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 47/34 41/40 45/36 23/58
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (1.80)* (0.08) (0.71) (−4.22)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 81 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: full sample stock returns
 
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Table IV-4
4.2.3. Short-term effect: firms with operations in Iran
Firms with operation in Iran constitute the second subsample of firms for which we sup-
pose the effect of the tool’s publication will be more pronounced. In Table IV-5, we report 
results of the two hypotheses tested. As in the case of the US firm subsample, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of the sum of the event-dummy coefficients being equal to zero. Again, 
this is true for all periods tested. Test results presented in Panel B confirm these findings for 
the pre-, short- and long event period. The sole significant result is obtained for the post event 
period. We can reject the null of the median event-dummy coefficient being equal to zero on 
the 1%-level of confidence. Since the median coefficient (0.001) is negative, we reject the 
null in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the median is smaller than zero. The fact that 
36 out of 50 event-dummy coefficients are negative constitutes further indicative evidence for 
the interpretation that stock prices of sample firms depressed subsequent to the tool’s availa-
bility. Nevertheless, we have to reject the hypothesis that the negative stock price effect of 
the tool’s publication has been more severe for firms operating in Iran.
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.022 
1)
−0.041 
1)
0.046 
1)
−0.083 
1)
(Wald test) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.80)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.002 
2)
−0.006 
2)
−0.000 
2)
−0.002 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 20/9 12/17 13/16 8/21
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (1.61) (−1.20) (−1.05) (−2.15)**
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 29 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: US sample stock returns
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Table IV-5
4.2.4. Short-term effect: summary of results and additional analyses
Our hypothesis about stock price reactions to the publication of the SEC’s online tool is 
partially confirmed. While we fail to detect a statistically significant impact in three out of 
four event windows tested, price reactions in the post event period support the notion of the 
tool’s negative impact. While results obtained from parametric test offer only slight evidence, 
the non-parametric tests we conduct render highly significant results. The fact that non-
parametric results are more pronounced than the parametric ones lets us conclude that the 
negative effect affected securities broadly but lacked magnitude.
Overall, we have no reason to believe that the information which firms would be men-
tioned in the tool was incorporated into prices before the tool’s release on June 25
th
, 2007. 
For all of the samples tested, the parametrical test renders stock price reactions in the pre 
event period insignificant. The sole significant result is obtained for the non-parametrical test 
when the full sample of firms is tested. Since the reaction is small in magnitude, positive and 
therefore counterintuitive, we believe this finding to be an artefact. With regards to the short-
and long event period, we obtain no significant results regardless of the subsample and hy-
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 −0.047 
1)
−0.008 
1)
0.075 
1)
−0.095 
1)
(Wald test) (0.30) (0.00) (1.20) (2.69)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
0.001 
2)
0.000 
2)
−0.001 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 27/23 26/24 33/17 14/36
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (1.22) (0.60) (1.55) (−3.17)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 50 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: Iran operations sample stock returns
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pothesis tested. Therefore, we can assert that investors did by no means quickly react to the 
information provided in the tool. Both periods do not display any abnormal stock price reac-
tions of sample firms’ stocks. Contrary to what we expected, subsamples did not react more 
pronounced than the complete sample. Neither did the sample of US based firms nor the 
sample of firms with operations in Iran react stronger than the full sample of firms. Although 
the evidence for investors selling stocks of stigmatised firms is slightly supported by the sub-
sample results, we find no evidence for investors punishing US firms or firms with operations 
in Iran harder.
Table IV-6
The fact that we receive significant results for the post event period strikes us. If financial 
markets are efficient in the semi-strong form, then why did it take so long until information 
was incorporated into prices? Should not the short event period be the one for which statisti-
cally significant results are obtained? Since we have no information regarding the distribution 
of the 150,000 clicks during the time the tool was online, we can only guess that clicks were 
Full sample US sample Iran sample
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.007 
1)
−0.031 
1)
−0.032 
1)
(Wald test) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 −0.000 
2)
−0.002 
2)
−0.000 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 40/41 10/19 24/26
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (0.18) (−0.83) (0.34)
Observations 363 363 363
Hypothesis testing: press release as event date
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation
(5) for the full sample of firms as well as for the subsample of US firms and the subsample of firms with
operations in Iran. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero
(hypothesis A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
B). The estimation window ranges from 07/2006 to 12/2007. Chi
2
values for Wald tests and z-values for
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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made throughout the entire period the tool was online and that not all investors met their de-
cision to sell at the very first or second day. Investors seem to have waited until they sold 
stocks of stigmatised firms. Another interpretation consistent with the results is that the 
enormous press coverage caused investors to react. In the press it was argued that information 
provided in the tool was of poor quality and did not reflect the most recent developments 
concerning a firm’s involvement in the designated countries. If investors had the same views 
about the information provided, they will not have reacted to the bare information in the tool 
but to the implicit warnings in the press. As it was put forward that investors could quickly 
react and sell-off equity of the stigmatised firms, they might have feared their peers’ reaction. 
By supposing that others act unwisely, selling stocks could have seemed to be a smart deci-
sion. However, the analysis in which we define the Financial Times article about the tool’s 
existence as the event (displayed in Table IV-6) yields no significant results.
Table IV-7
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.021 
1)
0.102 
1)
0.029 
1)
−0.104 
1)
(Wald test) (0.41) (0.67) (0.57) (10.05)***
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 −0.000 
2)
0.002 
2)
0.000 
2)
−0.001 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 26/26 30/22 32/20 15/37
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (0.96) (1.50) (1.83)* (−3.84)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 52 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank test are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: non-US sample stock returns
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Table IV-8
We also build the respective opposite subsamples to the ones displayed in this section and 
test corresponding short-term return effects. Results for the subsamples of non-US firms and 
firms not active in Iran reveal no considerable differences to the results obtained for the US 
and Iran subsamples. The only slight difference is that results for the non-US subsample are 
somewhat more pronounced than those for the sample of US firms. Corresponding analyses 
are presented in Table IV-7 and Table IV-8.
4.3. Short-term effect: robustness checks
4.3.1. Portfolio level analysis
So far, we have analysed results on the single stock level. In this section, we aim to test the 
results for robustness by building portfolios. As modern portfolio theory suggests, exposure 
to idiosyncratic risk is reduced in a portfolio of assets. Thus, building portfolios is also ideal-
ly suited in an event-study: while the return variance unique to individual assets is diversified 
away, risk common to firms in the sample is not. The first scholar to make use of the portfo-
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.097 
1)
0.067 
1)
−0.000 
1)
−0.096 
1)
(Wald test) (1.04) (0.03) (0.00) (1.25)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
−0.003 
2)
−0.000 
2)
−0.003 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 19/12 14/17 15/16 9/22
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (1.51) (−0.35) (−1.06) (−2.69)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 31 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank test are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sums of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: non-Iran sample stock returns
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lio approach in an event-study framework was Izan (1978), who used equally weighted re-
turns on a portfolio of firms experiencing the event as the dependent variable.
Similar to the model estimated in the case of individual securities during the preceding 
sections, we investigate portfolio returns by means of the following regression specification:
(6) Rpt –Rft = α + β1(Rmt – Rft) + β2OILGSWDt + β3SMBt + β4HMLt + γDt + εt,
where Rpt – Rft is the return on the portfolio of sample stocks net of the risk-free rate at 
time t, Rmt – Rft is the return on a global market proxy net of the risk-free rate at time t, 
OILGSWDt is the return on a global portfolio of oil firms at time t, SMBt is the return on a 
global zero-investment portfolio long in small firms and short in large firms at time t, HMLt
is the return on a global zero-investment portfolio long in high book-to-market firms and 
short in low book-to-market firms at time t. Dt is the event-dummy which equals one during 
event-time and zero otherwise. Before estimating the regression, we run a test for heteroske-
dasticity according to Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Cook-Weisberg (1982), commonly re-
ferred to as the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and a test according to White (1980). Test 
statistics indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also run two tests for serial correla-
tion. The first is according to Durbin (1970), the second test conducted is according to 
Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978), generally called the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multi-
plier test. The null of no serial correlation does not have to be rejected. Therefore, we report 
heteroskedasticity consistent (HC), Huber-White standard errors according to Huber (1967) 
and White (1980).
We are well aware of the studies by Fomby and Murfin (2005) as well as Ford et al. 
(2010), both referring to the possibility of misinterpreting event-study results obtained from 
careless use of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. Since 
a necessary condition for drawing misleading conclusions is that the disturbances are inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we believe that the rejection of the i.i.d. case for 
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our sample is enough to believe we are amply equipped against the danger of misinterpreting 
our results.
Table IV-9 reports results obtained from the estimation of regression equation (6). γp, the 
coefficient of interest, is statistically indistinguishable from zero for all tested periods but the
post event period. For the latter time period, the coefficient pertaining to the event-dummy is 
negative (0.002) and significantly different from zero on the 5%-level of confidence. This 
result is consistent with the results obtained from estimating the SUR system of equations in 
the preceding section. Therefore, it supports the notion that investors sold stocks of stigma-
tised firms, but did so with a rather long lag of time.
Table IV-9
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
γp 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.002
(0.55) (0.17) (0.54) (−2.37)**
α 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.98)** (2.08)** (1.95)* (2.50)**
RM-Rf 0.708 0.706 0.707 0.698
(12.40)*** (12.35)*** (12.39)*** (12.36)***
OILGSWD 0.341 0.342 0.341 0.339
(8.79)*** (8.88)*** (8.85)*** (8.72)***
SMB 0.282 0.281 0.282 0.259
(2.36)** (2.35)** (2.36)** (2.17)**
HML −0.143 −0.146 −0.143 −0.153
(−0.96) (−0.98) (−0.96) (−1.08)
Observations 363 363 363 363
Adj. R-squared 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
This table presents results obtained from estimating regression equation (6). The estimation window ranges from 07/2006 to
12/2007. Independent variables are: A world market proxy net of the risk-free rate (RM-Rf ), a global oil and gas index(OILGSWD)
and global versions of the Fama and French factors SMB and HML.The null hypothesis tested is that of the event-dummy
coefficient (yp) being equal to zero. t-statistics based on Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: full sample portfolio returns
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4.3.2. Additional robustness checks
In addition to the portfolio level analysis presented in the preceding chapter, we conduct 
numerous additional robustness checks. First, we check our results for robustness on the US 
equity market. For reasons declared in Section 3, we believe that respective home markets are 
better suited for our investigation. Nevertheless, not least for reasons of arbitrage, similar 
findings should be observable on the US equity market. US results reveal no notable differ-
ences to the results obtained from the home exchange analysis. Corresponding results are 
presented in Table IV-10, in Table IV-11, and in Table IV-12. Results for US firms on the US 
market differ from results for US firms on the (US) home market, because the factors used 
for the US market analysis were downloaded from the data library on Kenneth French’s web-
site (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html), while factors 
for the home market were taken from DataStream.
Table IV-10
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.100 
1)
0.122 
1)
0.087 
1)
−0.282 
1)
(Wald test) (0.46) (0.09) (0.35) (5.83)**
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
0.002 
2)
0.001 
2)
−0.003 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 56/25 46/35 49/32 15/66
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (3.11)*** (1.02) (0.89) (−5.64)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
Hypothesis testing: full sample stock returns (US market)
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5) adapted for the US
market. The sample encompasses a total of 81 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to
zero (hypothesis A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation
window ranges from 07/2006 to 12/2007. Chi
2
values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in
parentheses. 1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table IV-11
Table IV-12
Second, we check robustness to potentially erroneous allegations of the tool. When the 
tool went online, some firms mentioned were demonstrably inactive in each of the designated 
countries. Other firms’ activities were humanitarian in nature and could therefore not be re-
garded as sinful. Therefore, we also build subsamples according to the firms’ involvement in 
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.059 
1)
−0.027 
1)
0.066 
1)
−0.115 
1)
(Wald test) (0.24) ( 0.01) (0.30) (1.45)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.002 
1)
−0.005 
2)
0.000 
2)
−0.003 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 22/7 11/18 16/13 8/21
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (2.20) (−1.14) (0.64) (−2.89)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5) adapted for the US
market. The sample encompasses a total of 29 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to
zero (hypothesis A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation
window ranges from 07/2006 to 12/2007. Chi
2
values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in
parentheses. 1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: US sample stock returns (US market)
 
N
1i
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 −0.015 
1)
0.064 
1)
0.109 
1)
−0.162 
1)
(Wald test) (0.02) (0.07) (1.65) (5.60)**
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
0.004 
2)
0.001 
2)
−0.003 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 35/15 31/19 34/16 9/41
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (2.34)** (2.16)** (2.50)** (−4.56)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5) adapted for the US
market. The sample encompasses a total of 50 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to
zero (hypothesis A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation
window ranges from 07/2006 to 12/2007. Chi
2
values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are in
parentheses. 1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: Iran operations sample stock returns (US market)
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the designated countries. Results displayed in Table IV-13 and Table IV-14 reveal no strong-
er negative effect than for the full sample of firms. After all, investors do not seem to have 
based their decisions on the firms’ respective involvement.
Table IV-13
Table IV-14
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.049 
1)
0.082 
1)
0.087 
1)
−0.194 
1)
(Wald test) (0.18) (0.04) (0.50) (3.61)*
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
0.000 
2)
0.000 
2)
−0.001 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 43/33 39/37 44/32 20/56
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (1.97)** (0.31) (0.99) (−4.37)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
Hypothesis testing: involvement sample stock returns
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 76 firms. Firms that had demonstrably no business in the designated countries by the time the tool went
online are excluded from the sample. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero
(hypothesis A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation
window ranges from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank test are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
 
N
1i
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.075 
1)
0.148 
1)
0.078 
1)
−0.194 
1)
(Wald test) (0.47) (0.18) (0.48) (4.24)**
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.001 
2)
0.002 
2)
0.000 
2)
−0.002 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 40/28 39/29 42/26 16/52
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (2.60)*** (0.97) (1.57) (−4.46)***
Observations 363 363 363 363
Hypothesis testing: material involvement sample stock returns
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 68 firms. Excluded are the following types of firms: (i) Firms that had demonstrably no business in the
designated countries by the time the tool went online. (ii) Firms that had commited not to engage in any new business or were
solely engaged in humanitarian activities by the time the tool went online. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the
sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero
(hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges from 07/2006 to 12/2007. Chi
2
values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon
signed-rank test are in parentheses. 1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
 
N
1i
The SEC’s Publication of an Online Tool for Detecting Firms Doing Business in Countries Designat-
ed as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Short-Term Investor Reaction and Long-Term Consequences
124
A final robustness check concerns the analysis of control groups. To this end, we match 
two different control samples. One is a size, country and industry matched global sample of 
firms that were not active in a country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the time 
the SEC’s tool went online. The other control group consists of firms that did operate in one 
or more of the designated countries but were not mentioned in the SEC tool. Data for the lat-
ter control sample is provided by IW Financial, which distributes the so-called Global Securi-
ty Risk Monitor (GSRM) databases maintained by the Conflict Security Advisory Group 
(CSAG). As displayed in Table IV-15 and in Table IV-16, none of the analyses of short-term 
effects yield statistically significant results. Hence, the negative post event period effect is 
unique to firms active in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. Furthermore, it 
is stigmatisation by means of the SEC tool that induced the observed negative announcement 
effects. If investors’ attention to all firms active in the designated countries was aroused by 
the tool’s publication, then the GSRM sample should have displayed a negative reaction, as 
well.
Table IV-15
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 −0.100 
1)
−0.049 
1)
0.062 
1)
−0.060 
1)
(Wald test) (0.89) (0.03) (0.37) (0.53)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 −0.001 
2)
−0.000 
2)
0.001 
2)
−0.000 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 37/44 35/46 43/38 35/46
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (−1.69) (−0.45) (0.21) (−1.46)
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 81 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank test are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: terror-free control sample
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Table IV-16
5. LONG-TERM EFFECT OF THE TOOL’S PUBLICATION
5.1. Long-term effect: methodology
In the previous section, we obtained results consistent with our hypothesis that investors 
did in fact sell stocks of firms mentioned in the tool. In this section, we aim to find an answer 
to the question of whether investors could reap long-term abnormal returns by trading on the 
information provided in the tool. Subsequent to the tool’s publication, prices will have been 
depressed as compared to fundamentals. This is why we hypothesise that abnormal returns 
could be earned during a long-term period after the publication. The fact that sample firms 
have been mentioned in the tool makes them match the definition of “neglected stocks”. 
Thus, they should subsequently suffer from being shunned by a norm conscious investor 
base.
As Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) point out, two assumptions are necessary if one wishes to 
find measurable return differences between “neglected” and “normal” stocks. The first as-
sumption must be that of limits to arbitrage: capital in the market moved by arbitrageurs does 
not suffice for the elimination of effects induced by norm constrained, discriminatory inves-
Pre Event Period Short Event Period Long Event Period Post Event Period
Panel A
H0:         γi = 0 0.074 
1)
−0.031 
1)
−0.028 
1)
−0.014 
1)
(Wald test) (0.94) (0.02) (0.14) (0.05)
Panel B
H0: Median γi = 0 0.000 
2)
−0.000 
2)
−0.001 
2)
−0.000 
2)
Coef. positive/negative 42/39 38/43 35/46 38/43
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (0.81) (−0.78) (−0.75) (−0.33)
Observations 363 363 363 363
This table displays hypotheses about γi, the event-dummy coefficient as estimated in regression equation (5). The sample
encompasses a total of 81 firms. Panel A provides results for the hypothesis that the sum over all γi is equal to zero (hypothesis
A). Panel B reports results for the hypothesis that the median γi is equal to zero (hypothesis B). The estimation window ranges
from 07/2006 to 12/2007.  Chi
2
 values for Wald tests and z-values for Wilcoxon signed-rank test are in parentheses.
1) Displayed is the sum of coefficient estimates, 2) Displayed is the median coefficient.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Hypothesis testing: GSRM control sample
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tors. The second assumption is that, over time, discriminatory tastes are stable. While the 
short-term effects discovered in the previous analysis mark light evidence for limited arbi-
trage, it has to be proven whether discriminatory tastes are in fact stable over time. This could 
be difficult for two reasons. First, especially the media and affected firms remained doubtful 
about the tool meeting certain quality standards in the sense that it legitimately sanctioned 
immoral firm behaviour. Hence, it might be that after some time investors stopped discrimi-
nating against sample firms. Second, firms could have reacted to being mentioned in the tool 
by abandoning operations in the designated countries. On the one hand, these firms would 
then no longer be regarded as acting immorally, thereby losing the attribute of being a 
shunned stock and thus stop trading cheaply. On the other hand, it would in this case still 
remain in doubt whether investors could forgive and stop discriminating against these firms. 
Answers to these questions will be given by the empirical evidence presented in the next sec-
tion.
Methodologically, we start out by building an equally weighted portfolio of sample firms. 
Returns to holding our equally weighted sample portfolio are estimated with the following 
regression:
(7) Rpt –Rft = α + β1(Rmt - Rft) + β2OILGSWDt + β3SMBt + β4HMLt + εt,
where net sample portfolio returns on the left-hand side of the equations (Rpt –Rft) are ex-
plained by Rmt – Rft, a global equity portfolio net of the risk-free rate, OILGSWDt, a global 
portfolio of oil and gas firms, SMBt, the return on a global zero-investment portfolio long in 
small firms and short in large firms at time t and HMLt, the return on a global zero-
investment portfolio long in high book-to-market firms and short in low book-to-market firms 
at time t. We estimate the regression with 180 weekly returns ranging from July 27
th
, 2007 to 
December 31
st
, 2010. Thus, the time period of investigation starts in the first week after the 
tool was abandoned. If our hypothesis holds to be true, a positive alpha is generated by re-
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gressing the sample firm portfolio returns on the two explanatory variables. For this analysis 
of long-term effects, we exclude firm returns above +100% and below 50% to avoid the risk 
of drawing incorrect inferences based on outliers. As a result, 0.4% of firm returns are ex-
cluded.
5.2. Long-term effect: results
Results of the long-term analysis are provided in Table IV-17. In model specification (1), 
the dependent variable is the return on the portfolio of sample firms mentioned in the SEC 
tool (henceforth called SEC Tool). From the adjusted R-squared of 0.94 we infer that our 
sample portfolio’s return variance is well explained by the model we use. As witnessed by the 
corresponding t-value of 6.93, the oil and gas firm portfolio adds considerable explanatory 
power to the model. Furthermore, the SEC sample portfolio loads positively and highly sig-
nificant (1%-level of confidence) on SMB, a finding supporting the notion that sample port-
folio returns are to a large degree driven by small firms. By way of contrast, we do not ob-
serve a loading on HML. From this, we infer that our portfolio neither leans towards growth-, 
nor value stocks. Our greatest interest is directed at alpha. Consistent with our hypothesis of 
stock prices being depressed after investors sold stocks of stigmatised firms, we find the four-
factor alpha of the equally weighted sample firm returns to be positive and significantly dif-
ferent from zero on the 10%-level of confidence. The corresponding p-value of the coeffi-
cient is 0.056 and indicates statistical significance almost at the 5%-level of confidence. Fur-
thermore, alpha is economically sizeable as well. The estimate of 0.002 corresponds to a 
weekly risk-adjusted excess return of 0.15% and an annualised excess return of 8.16%.
Although these findings offer some support in favour of our hypothesis, alternative expla-
nations have to be considered, as well. Possibly, the positive alpha will also be observed in a 
portfolio of firms not active in any country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism 
(henceforth called Terror-Free). Furthermore, a portfolio of firms active in the designated 
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countries but not mentioned in the tool (henceforth called GSRM, named after the database it 
is generated from, see Section 4.3.2. for a description) could also generate abnormal positive 
returns. If the former was the case, the positive alpha observed in model specification (1) 
would not be attributable to the terror-related stigmatisation. If the latter was the case, the 
same alpha would not be attributable to the SEC tool but to the plain fact that firms were ac-
tive in the designated countries. Results obtained from estimating returns of the Terror-Free 
portfolio are displayed in specification (2). The corresponding alpha is mildly positive and 
lacks statistical significance at conventional levels. The same is true for the GSRM portfolio 
as displayed in specification (3). Specifications (4) and (5) display results for spread portfoli-
os (return on the SEC Tool portfolio minus the respective control sample portfolio) for the 
Terror-Free portfolio and the GSRM portfolio, respectively. Results indicate that the alpha 
obtained for the SEC Tool portfolio is not statistically different from the alphas of the control 
sample portfolios Terror-Free and GSRM. As an additional robustness check, we also esti-
mate SEC Tool portfolio returns in the 180 weeks period before the tool’s publication (Janu-
ary 16
th
, 2004 to June 22
nd
, 2007). As the control portfolios’ alphas, it is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero at conventional levels of confidence. Additionally, its economic magni-
tude is low: the alpha of 0.001 corresponds to a weekly risk-adjusted excess return of 0.07% 
and an annualised risk-adjusted excess return of 3.69% – less than half the risk-adjusted ex-
cess return in the period subsequent to the tool’s publication (0.15% weekly and 8.16% annu-
ally). However, in untabulated tests, we fail to find statistically significant differences be-
tween the alphas estimated in the 180 weeks period after and before the tool’s publication 
(specifications (1) and (6), respectively).
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Table IV-17
Thus, our interpretation of the SEC Tool portfolio offering abnormal long-term returns to 
an investor is somewhat mitigated by the finding that the corresponding alpha is (i) not sig-
nificantly different from the control groups’ alphas and (ii) not significantly different from 
the alpha before the tool’s publication.
6. CONCLUSION
In this study, we aimed at investigating the short-term investor reaction and the long-term 
consequences of the SEC’s publication of an online tool for detecting firms doing business in 
countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. From the results obtained, we draw the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.92)* (1.20) (0.95) (0.66) (0.54) (1.25)
RM-Rf 0.781 0.744 0.615 0.037 0.166 0.624
(10.71)*** (10.06)*** (6.60)*** (0.61) (1.71)* (9.73)***
OILGSWD 0.339 0.260 0.424 0.079 −0.085 0.330
(6.93)*** (4.60)*** (6.42)*** (1.77)* (−1.23) (10.34)***
SMB 0.381 0.464 0.486 −0.083 −0.105 0.415
(4.49)*** (4.68)*** (3.03)*** (−0.89) (−0.60) (3.23)***
HML 0.140 0.091 0.114 0.049 0.026 −0.257
(1.39) (0.64) (0.78) (0.39) (0.19) (−1.64)
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180
Adj. R-squared 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.13 0.02 0.83
This table presents results obtained from estimating regression equation (7). Dependent variables in the 6 specifications are
as follows. Specification (1): Portfolio returns of firms mentioned in the SEC online tool (SEC Tool) net of the risk-free rate.
Specification (2): Portfolio returns of firms not active in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism (Terror-Free) net 
of the risk-free rate. Specification (3): Portfolio returns of firms active in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism
but not mentioned in the SEC tool (GSRM) net of the risk-free rate. Specification (4): Spread portfolio returns of SEC Tool and 
Terror-Free. Specification (5): Spread portfolio returns of SEC Tool and GSRM. Specification (6): SEC Tool returns in the 180
week period before the SEC tool's publication net of the risk-free rate. The time period of investigation ranges from 07/2007 to
12/2010 for specifications (1) to (5). For Specification (6), the time period of investigation ranges from 01/2004 to 06/2007.
Independent variables are: A world market proxy net of the risk-free rate (RM-Rf ), a global oil and gas index (OILGSWD) and
global versions of the Fama and French factors SMB and HML. t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors
using five lags in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Alpha study: portfolio returns
The SEC’s Publication of an Online Tool for Detecting Firms Doing Business in Countries Designat-
ed as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Short-Term Investor Reaction and Long-Term Consequences
130
following main conclusions: (i) investors were sensitive to the information provided in the 
tool, as they sold stocks of firms mentioned. Information was incorporated rather slowly, 
since prices started falling during a 25 day period after the tool had been available. Moreover, 
the effect is not more pronounced for US firms and investors did not punish firms harder that
operated in Iran. (ii) We obtain faint evidence consistent with the notion that investors were 
able to earn positive abnormal returns from holding an equally weighted portfolio of sample 
firms during the period starting after the tool’s suspension until the end of 2010. From this, 
we infer that investors were on average not forgetting about the unethical behaviour of certain 
firms. Findings in this paper shed new light on the question in how far social norms affect 
capital markets. Investors are in fact guided by moral considerations when making decisions 
about their investments. As shown, such considerations cause stocks of stigmatised firms to 
offer attractive investment opportunities for investors without moral advisements. For the 
stigmatised firms, findings in this paper offer new insights with respect to the consideration 
of whether to do business in a State Sponsor of Terrorism country. For sure, a firm refraining 
from business opportunities in the designated countries limits its ability to generate extra rev-
enue. In light of the evidence presented in this paper, managerial decision making must also 
consider reputational risks that materialise in poorer stock market performance when balanc-
ing the assets and drawbacks of such investment decisions.
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Paper No. 3
V. FIRMS WITH TIES TO COUNTRIES DESIGNATED AS STATE SPONSORS 
OF TERRORISM: A NOTE ON OWNERSHIP
by Wolfgang Breuer and Moritz Felde
Abstract
We investigate equity holdings of two supposedly norm conscious investor types in firms 
with ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. These investor types are 
pension and endowment funds as well as US investors in general. Results indicate that pen-
sion and endowment funds are significantly less likely to own a majority stake in a firm if 
that firm is intensively involved in a country designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism by 
having locally operating employees or facilities. Consistent with our expectation, evidence is 
more pronounced for firms in the oil and gas industry than it is for firms in other industries. 
An analysis of US holdings reveals no evidence for the proposition that US investors own 
fewer shares in firms with ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism than 
they do in otherwise comparable firms.
Keywords: Sin Stocks, State Sponsors of Terrorism, Institutional Ownership
JEL-classification: G11, G15, G23, G32
Firms with Ties to Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism: a Note on Ownership
135
1. INTRODUCTION
Referring to stocks of firms operating in specific segments of the economies in Iran and 
Sudan, Rob Feckner, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System’s (CalPERS) 
board president, announced that “the cost of continuing to hold the stock of these eight com-
panies is greater than the value of divesting them” (CalPERS press release, 2011). Among
pension funds, such decisions are not unique. Motivated by corresponding US state legisla-
tion (for an overview, see Hemphill and Cullari, 2010), other funds have initiated similar di-
vestments. Examples include the New York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF; 
McDaniel, 2010) or the Indiana Public Retirement System (INPRS; Vasan, 2011). Another 
class of institutional investors considering non-pecuniary motives when meeting investment 
decisions are university endowment funds. When in 2005 Harvard University divested its 
stakes in PetroChina because of the firm’s operations in Sudan, other universities such as 
Stanford and the University of California were soon to follow (Yale and Lowenstein, 2005). 
The apparent sensitivity of pension and endowment funds towards moral and political topics 
is not surprising, since these institutions’ investments have often been subject to public dis-
cussion held on moral grounds. To give an example, former Missouri State Treasurer, Sarah 
Steelman, fueled a public debate by giving statements like “(…) the door is open to American 
dollars going into the pockets of terrorist countries. Our job is to close that door one step at a 
time” (May, 2007).
In the scholarly world, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) make the case for the notion that 
both institutional investor types mentioned are subject to heightened social norm pressure. In 
their analysis of so-called sin stocks, the authors find that stocks of firms in the alcohol, to-
bacco and gaming industry are held less by norm conscious investors such as pension and 
endowment funds. Similarly, Teoh et al. (1999) obtain faint evidence indicating that institu-
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tional holdings of shares of firms formerly active in South Africa increased upon divestment 
from the country. In a broader context, the decision not to invest in certain firms on moral or 
political grounds is related to the work of Merton (1987). He develops a model in which in-
vestors only know about a limited number of securities available in the market place. They 
are therefore incompletely informed. It is well conceivable that neglecting particular firms as 
an investment opportunity may not stem from information deficiency as in Merton’s (1987) 
model, but from the deliberate decision not to invest in these firms. In case a particular firm’s 
moral conduct runs counter to an investor’s beliefs, he or she might well be inclined to ignore 
the firm as an investment opportunity. The most prominent example of such an investment 
strategy is Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), which, amongst others, is based on so-called
negative screens. This strategy builds on the premise of excluding “all companies from the 
investment opportunity set which are involved in perceived controversial business areas” 
(Kempf and Osthoff; 2007, p. 909). Since operating in countries designated as State Sponsors 
of Terrorism surely is a “controversial business area” at least in the eyes of the investor spec-
trum’s norm conscious subset, not investing in firms that do business in such countries 
matches the definition of a negative screen in the sense of SRI.
It is not our goal to answer the question whether the surge of divestment from firms doing 
business in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism by pension and endowment 
funds is to be seen as merely following the public debate or whether it is better interpreted as 
following a novel strand of SRI. Rather, we aim to shed light on the question whether firms 
limit their accessible investor base by operating in countries designated as State Sponsors of 
Terrorism and in consequence face a Merton (1987) type segmented equity market. If they 
do, as we hypothesise, pension and endowment funds as representing the norm conscious 
subset of institutional investors should less often own majority stakes in firms with ties to 
countries believed to sponsor terrorism than in otherwise comparable firms. Our second hy-
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pothesis concerns geographic differences in moral thinking. The topic of terror-free investing 
has by far been discussed most broadly in the US. Therefore, we suspect US investors to be 
more sensitive to the subject and thus also to be more likely than investors in other countries 
to shun stocks of firms operating in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Using a comprehensive sample of 387 firms with ties to State Sponsor of Terrorism coun-
tries, we find that pension and endowment funds do not generally shun stocks of these firms. 
Instead, results indicate that pension and endowment funds are significantly less likely to own 
a majority stake in firms with an equity tie (i.e. a firm has employees or facilities in the re-
spective country). The odds for a pension or endowment fund to own a majority stake in a 
firm are about 24 % lower in case the firm has an equity tie to a country designated as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism. Furthermore, we find that industry affiliation of the firm at stake does 
in fact play a role. As implied by CalPERS’ abovementioned divestment, the fund did very 
well make industry based distinctions when meeting its decision. Since the oil and gas indus-
try is particularly pivotal to most State Sponsor of Terrorism countries’ governments, we test 
whether this is mirrored in the asset allocation decisions of norm conscious institutional in-
vestors. We find that pension and endowment funds are significantly less likely to own a ma-
jority stake in an oil and gas firm that operates in one of the designated countries than they 
are to own a majority stake in otherwise comparable oil and gas firms.
Contrary to our expectation, we find no support for the hypothesis that US investors are 
more sensitive to the topic of terror-free investing than investors in other countries. The frac-
tion of shares in firms with ties to the designated countries owned by US investors is not low-
er than the fraction of shares owned in otherwise comparable firms.
Our paper complements and extends the research of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) as well 
as that of Teoh et al. (1999). To varying degrees, both papers contain evidence for the notion 
that at least certain institutional investors consider non-pecuniary investment motives by 
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shunning stocks of firms displaying ethical misconduct. In Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), this 
motive is reluctance to investing in a sin-related industry, in Teoh et al. (1999) it is aversion 
to investing in firms that operate in South Africa during the reign of the apartheid regime. We 
extend these findings by detecting yet another aspect on which norm conscious investors may 
base their investment decision: the question of whether a firm has ties to a country designated 
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Furthermore, we add do the understanding of the positive 
stock price effect upon announcement of withdrawal from a country designated as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism as detected in Breuer and Felde (2012a). Our results lend support on 
the proposition that the stock price reaction might have been induced by norm conscious in-
vestors demanding the stock upon withdrawal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background 
information on the data sources used, outline the procedure for matching control firms and 
describe the resulting combined sample. In Section 3, we introduce the variables used in the 
analysis. We present results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. DATA
2.1. Background information on the Global Security Risk Monitor (GSRM) database 
and selection of sample firms
From IW Financial, a US based financial research and technology solutions provider, we 
obtain data on firms doing business in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. 
The data is partitioned in quarterly snapshots of a database called the Global Security Risk 
Monitor (GSRM) maintained by the Conflict Securities Advisory Group (CSAG). The very 
same data is also used by FTSE for creating the FTSE CSAG Terror-Free Index Series (see 
FTSE, 2011 for more details). For the scope of our analysis, two dimensions of the databases 
are specifically relevant: a risk assessment as well as a categorization of the firm’s business 
activity in the respective country. Based on the nature and scope of a firm’s involvement in a 
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particular country, CSAG evaluates the type and degree of risk faced by the firm. Firms face 
two types of risk by operating in one or more of the designated countries: financial risk and 
reputational risk. The former assesses the likelihood that the respective firm’s profitability, 
cash flow and/or operations are negatively affected by the firm’s engagement in the country. 
Such negative effects may stem from sanctions imposed against the country or legal costs 
caused by sanctions against the firm. This direct effect on key financials could cause the 
stock price to decline. The latter measure assesses the potential for a negative impact on a 
firm’s overall reputation, which may also cause a decrease in firm value. That said, both 
types of risk can either directly, as in the case of financial risk, or indirectly, as in the case of 
reputational risk, be harmful to a firm’s share price. The risk metric is categorised in “com-
pounded risk”, “risk”, “insufficient information” and “no apparent risk”. In this respect, 
“compounded risk” indicates the potential for “more pronounced” financial or reputational 
risk and can therefore be interpreted as an augmentation of “risk”.
Additionally, the databases provide information on the type of a firm’s involvement in a 
State Sponsor of Terrorism country. It is differentiated among several types of “ties”, the re-
spective firm has to a certain country. The “tie” can either be an “equity tie” (meaning that 
the firm has employees or facilities in the respective country), a “non-equity tie” (indicating 
the firm either sells products in the country or sources preliminary products from that coun-
try) or an “other tie” (e.g. the firm’s products are distributed in the country by a third party 
provider).
We start with a total number of 1,342 firms for which information on the International Se-
curities Identification Number (ISIN) is available. In our analysis, we consider only those 
firms with a risk assessment of “risk” and “compounded risk”, thereby excluding firms which 
do not encounter an apparent risk as well as those for which there was insufficient infor-
mation in order to make a risk assessment. We do not make exclusions based on the type of 
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“tie”. A further requirement for a firm to be included in the sample is the availability of in-
formation on domicile country, industry classification and market capitalisation in Thomson 
DataStream, since those are the dimensions according to which we match the control sample 
of firms. These requirements reduce our sample to a total of 387 firms. In Table V-1, we dis-
play the distribution of GSRM sample firms over time. At the starting point in May 2005, the 
sample encompasses a monthly average of 141 firms. This number increases until 2008, 
where it reaches its peak. Until February 2012, the average monthly number of firms declines 
to 150.
Table V-1
2.2. Selection of control firms
Each sample firm is matched with a control firm that does not operate in a country desig-
nated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. For a firm to be a potential control firm it must have 
data on domicile country, industry classification and market capitalisation available in Thom-
son DataStream. Since our sample contains active as well as inactive firms, we consider ac-
tive as well as inactive equities as potential controls. We start by downloading the entire 
Thomson DataStream equity universe of stocks with information on the abovementioned di-
Distribution of GSRM sample firms by year 
Year Number of firms
2005 141
2006 153
2007 185
2008 211
2009 170
2010 168
2011 157
2012 150
Total 387
This table displays a distribution of GSRM sample
firms over time. Included are firms that fall into risk
category 1 (compounded risk) or 2 (risk) according to
the GSRM databases. The period of investigation
ranges from 05/2005 to 02/2012.
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mensions. In total, this gives us the opportunity to select from as many as 78,387 potential 
control firms. In a first step of the selection process, we match a control firm based on domi-
cile country and industry classification of the respective sample firm. For industry classifica-
tion, we use the DataStream industry classification benchmark sector code (ICBSC). Accord-
ing to this classification scheme, firms may be assigned to one of 39 different industries. We 
use this data type instead of the Fama and French (1997) categorization because it is available 
for more equities than the four-digit SIC code on which the Fama and French (1997) scheme 
is based.
Generally, as the control firm j for a sample firm i we select the firm from the same coun-
try as firm i that operates in the same industry sector as firm i and that minimises the size 
differences defined as |ln(US$ market capitalisation firm i) – ln(US$ market capitalisation 
firm j)|. In case there is no potential control firm that satisfies the criterion |ln(US$ market 
capitalisation firm i) – ln(US$ market capitalisation firm j)| < 2, we try to match a firm domi-
ciled in the same region (according to the five worldwide regions as defined in DataStream) 
as firm i which operates in the same industry sector. If we do not find a matching firm, we try 
to match a firm from the same region that operates in the same industry super sector (industry 
classification benchmark super-sector code; ICBSSC). In case we are still unable to find a 
matching firm, we relax the difference in size constraint to the condition |ln(US$ market capi-
talisation firm i) – ln(US$ market capitalisation firm j)| < 3.
2.3. Key sample and control sample characteristics
In Table V-2, we present the distribution of GSRM sample and control sample firms by 
domicile country. The combined sample contains a total of 59 countries, thereby covering 
developed, emerging and frontier markets. Most sample firms are from South Korea (36), 
followed by Japan (33) and India (30). Among control firms, the majority is domiciled in 
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Table V-2
Distribution of GSRM sample and control firms by country
Country GSRM sample Control sample Combined
Abu Dhabi 5 2 7
Australia 5 7 12
Austria 4 4 8
Bahrain 3 2 5
Belgium 5 7 12
Brazil 2 1 3
Canada 5 5 10
Chile 0 1 1
China 20 23 43
Croatia 1 1 2
Czech Republic 0 1 1
Denmark 1 1 2
Dubai 6 5 11
Egypt 6 5 11
Finland 8 6 14
France 20 15 35
Germany 20 15 35
Greece 4 4 8
Hong Kong 4 7 11
Hungary 1 0 1
India 30 23 53
Indonesia 3 2 5
Ireland 0 2 2
Israel 0 3 3
Italy 11 10 21
Japan 33 40 73
Jordan 2 1 3
Kazakhstan 0 1 1
Kenya 1 0 1
Kuwait 10 8 18
(continued)
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Table V-2 - continued
Distribution of GSRM sample and control firms by country
Country GSRM sample Control sample Combined
Luxembourg 1 0 1
Malaysia 19 17 36
Morocco 2 1 3
Netherlands 6 3 9
New Zealand 0 1 1
Norway 12 10 22
Oman 1 1 2
Pakistan 0 2 2
Philippines 1 1 2
Poland 1 1 2
Portugal 1 3 4
Qatar 3 3 6
Romania 0 1 1
Russian Federation 9 14 23
Saudi Arabia 4 6 10
Singapore 2 1 3
Slovakia 2 0 2
Slovenia 0 1 1
South Africa 3 5 8
South Korea 36 27 63
Spain 7 9 16
Sweden 5 5 10
Switzerland 7 9 16
Taiwan 2 6 8
Thailand 3 3 6
Turkey 5 5 10
Ukraine 1 0 1
United Kingdom 24 29 53
United States 20 21 41
Total 387 387 774
This table presents a distribution of GSRM sample firms, control firms and the
combined sample by country of firm domicile. Included are firms that fall into
risk category 1 (compounded risk) or 2 (risk) according to the GSRM
databases. The period of investigation ranges from 05/2005 to 02/2012.
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Japan (40), followed by the United Kingdom (29) and South Korea (27). The fact that coun-
tries like Japan or the United Kingdom have slightly more control firms than sample firms 
can be explained by reconsidering the matching algorithm described in the previous section. 
If a control firm of adequate size and with the required industry classification cannot be 
found in a country, we match in the corresponding region. As Japan and the United Kingdom 
have large equity universes as compared to their respective region, a disproportionate number 
of control firm matches is allotted to these countries. Overall, we believe the distribution of 
sample and control sample firms does not display a country bias of noteworthy magnitude.
In Table V-3, we display the distribution of the GSRM sample, the control sample, and the 
combined sample of firms by industry classification. Of the 39 different industries among 
which ICBSC differentiates, a total of 34 industries are represented in our sample. Apart from 
a very few cases, we are able to match the respective GSRM sample firm’s industry when 
selecting a control firm. That said, we are not running the risk of inducing an industry asym-
metry. The most prevalent industry in our sample is the oil and gas sector consisting of Oil & 
Gas Producers and Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution. Taken together, these industries 
account for a 20% share of all represented industries. This does not come to our surprise, 
since the samples used in Breuer and Felde (2012a) and Breuer and Felde (2012b) are also 
heavily leaning towards the oil and gas sector.
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Table V-3
Distribution of GSRM sample and control firms by industry
Industry GSRM sample Control sample Combined
Aerospace & Defense 5 5 10
Alternative Energy 2 2 4
Automobiles & Parts 12 12 24
Banks 47 47 94
Chemicals 14 14 28
Construction & Materials 38 38 76
Electricity 8 8 16
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 9 8 17
Equity Investment Instruments 1 1 2
Fixed Line Telecommunications 6 7 13
Food Producers 3 3 6
Forestry & Paper 2 2 4
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 10 10 20
General Financial 12 12 24
General Industrials 6 6 12
Health Care Equipment & Services 1 1 2
Industrial Engineering 33 33 66
Industrial Metals 20 21 41
Industrial Transportation 15 16 31
Leisure Goods 1 1 2
Life Insurance 2 2 4
Mining 8 7 15
Mobile Telecommunications 9 8 17
Nonlife Insurance 4 4 8
Oil & Gas Producers 49 49 98
Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 28 28 56
Personal Goods 2 2 4
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 1 1 2
Real Estate Investment & Services 2 2 4
Software & Computer Services 2 3 5
Support Services 18 18 36
Technology Hardware & Equipment 14 13 27
Tobacco 1 1 2
Travel & Leisure 2 2 4
Total 387 387 774
This table displays a distribution of GSRM sample firms, control firms and the combined sample by
industry classicication (industry classification benchmark sector name). Included are firms that fall
into risk category 1 (compounded risk) or 2 (risk) according to the GSRM databases. The period of
investigation ranges from 05/2005 to 02/2012.
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3. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
3.1. Dependent variables
In the analysis presented in the subsequent section, we use two dependent variables: pen-
sion and endowment fund ownership and US ownership. Pension and endowment fund own-
ership (PEFODUM) is a dummy variable that equals one if a pension or endowment fund 
owns a majority stake (5% of the equity or more) in the respective firm and zero otherwise. 
US ownership (US_OWNED) is the fraction of shares of the respective firm that are held by 
US investors. We obtain data for PEFODUM from Thomson DataStream. The mnemonic we 
use is NOSHPF, the percentage of total shares in issue strategically held by pension funds or 
endowment funds. Strategically means that only holdings exceeding 5% or more ownership 
of a certain firm are counted. For reasons related to statistical considerations, we transform 
NOSHPF into a binary variable (PEFODUM).
Data for construction of the variable measuring US ownership is retrieved from Bloom-
berg. The data type “All Holders Public Filings” includes information on all current holders 
of the security from the latest public filings. Amongst others, this data type indicates the 
domicile country of the respective equity owner. Data on sample and control firms was re-
trieved on February, 23
rd
, 2012, even though most filings on which the data is based are year-
end 2011 filings. We define US_OWNED as the number of shares held by a US investor di-
vided by all holders’ shares as it is reported in public filings.
Before analysing the difference between the GSRM sample and the control sample in 
more depth, we now aim to shed light on the distribution of the variables of interest between 
the two groups of firms. In Panel A of Table V-4, we present the distribution of PEFODUM 
over the GSRM sample group and the control group. Over both groups, the number of firms 
that have a pension or endowment fund as a majority stakeholder increases over time. During 
the years 2005 and 2006, about 2% of the firms in the overall sample had 5% or more of their 
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shares held by a pension or endowment fund. This number more than doubled in later years 
until it reached a peak during 2011. Taking a look at the time-series means of cross-sectional 
averages reveals that GSRM sample firms are slightly favoured by pension and endowment 
funds when compared to the control sample. During the period of investigation, 3.69% of all 
GSRM sample firms have one or more pension or endowment funds as majority owners. This 
denotes a 0.15%-points difference to the control sample, where 3.54% of the firms have one 
or more pension or endowment funds as majority owners. In Panel B of Table V-4, we dis-
play the distribution of US_OWNED over the GSRM sample and the control sample. In 
2012, about 14.4% of the average GSRM sample firm’s shares are owned by US investors. 
This is slightly more than the corresponding value for the control sample, where about 14.2% 
of the shares are owned by US investors. In the next section, we will explain the independent 
(control) variables.
Table V-4
Distribution of dependent variables over GSRM sample and control sample
Panel A: Distribution of PEFODUM
Year GSRM sample Control sample Combined
2005 1.68% 2.39% 2.04%
2006 1.58% 2.12% 1.85%
2007 2.17% 2.93% 2.55%
2008 3.07% 2.76% 2.92%
2009 5.00% 3.83% 4.42%
2010 4.92% 5.16% 5.04%
2011 5.79% 4.46% 5.12%
2012 5.35% 4.68% 5.02%
Time-series average of means 3.69% 3.54% 3.62%
Panel B: Distribution of US_OWNED
Year GSRM sample Control sample
2012 14.37% 14.06% 14.21%
This table presents the distribution of the dependent variables PEFODUM and US_OWNED by
year for GSRM sample firms, control firms and the combined sample. Displayed averages are equal
weighted. PEFODUM is a dummy variable that equals one if a pension or endowment fund owns a
majority stake (5% or more) of the equity in the respective firm. US_OWNED signifies the fraction
of equity holders that are US investors. Included are firms that fall into risk category 1 (compound
risk) or 2 (risk) according to the GSRM databases. For PEFODUM, the period of investigation
ranges from 05/2005 to 02/2012, for US_OWNED a snapshot as of 02/2012 is provided.
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3.2. Independent variables
Building on previous studies analysing the determinants of institutional investors’ stock 
ownership (see Gompers and Metrick, 2001 or Ferreira and Matos, 2008) and on Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009), who present a similar analysis for so-called sin stocks, we introduce a 
host of independent control variables for the explanation of pension and endowment fund 
ownership. Determinants of US ownership have been analysed e.g. by Ahearne et al., (2004) 
and Ammer et al. (2006). We borrow from these and other studies in our selection of control 
variables that have proven to be determinants of US investors’ equity ownership. Subsequent-
ly, we describe each independent variable together with a rationale for its inclusion and a 
hypothesis regarding its impact on the dependent variables.
3.2.1. Firm specific independent variables
 Size (LN_MV)
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s US$ stock market capitalisation 
(price times number of shares outstanding). As Ferreira and Matos (2008) point out, insti-
tutional investors have a preference for high liquidity stocks and stocks associated with 
low transaction costs. In their study, the authors confirm size as a key determinant of insti-
tutional ownership as do Gompers and Metrick (2001). We have no reason to believe that 
institutional investors should have size preferences different from the one found in previ-
ous studies. Therefore, LN_MV should positively influence PEFODUM. With regards to 
LN_MV’s effect on US_OWNED, we believe it should be of the same (positive) sign. 
Ammer et al. (2006) find that among non-cross-listed international stocks, US investors 
display a preference for larger firms. Moreover, Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign 
investors in the Japanese equity market prefer large firms. The authors posit three potential 
reasons for the observed effect: first, large firms are likely to be better known internation-
ally. Second, and in a similar vein as it is put forward in Ferreira and Matos (2008), size 
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could proxy for higher liquidity. Third, larger firms could be easier to invest in because 
they might be more easily available outside their home market.
 Market-to-Book (LN_MTBV)
Market-to-Book is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s market to book ratio 
(market value of equity divided by book value of equity). While Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
find that international institutional investors do on aggregate prefer growth stocks, Gom-
pers and Metrick (2001), Ammer et al. (2006) as well as Ferreira and Matos (2008) find 
that US (institutional) investors display a preference for value stocks. Thus, we believe 
that LN_MTBV has a positive impact on PEFODUM and negatively predicts 
US_OWNED.
 Inverse of stock price (LN_PRINV)
The inverse of a stock’s price is defined as the natural logarithm of one divided by one 
plus the firm’s stock price as measured in US$. Institutional investors are believed to 
avoid stocks with a low price. This is confirmed by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), who 
find the inverse of price and institutional ownership to be positively related. We expect the 
same relation for our sample of firms, meaning that LN_PRINV should be a negative pre-
dictor of PEFODUM. We also believe that LN_PRINV negatively predicts US_OWNED, 
as foreign firms with a lower stock price could be less well known than firms with a higher 
stock price.
 Dividend yield (DY)
Dividend yield is defined as the per share dividend as a percentage of the share price. 
Since institutional investors do on aggregate not display a preference for high or low divi-
dend-paying firms (Ferreira and Matos, 2008), we have no distinct expectation regarding 
DY’s effect on PEFODUM. Ammer et al. (2006) find that U.S. investors own more shares 
in dividend paying firms. Although the authors arrive at this assertion by means of a 
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dummy variable whereas our measure is continuous, we suppose DY will have a positive 
impact on US_OWNED.
 Return (RET)
Return is defined as a firm’s average weekly US$ stock return measured in a rolling win-
dow over the past year. In case institutional investors or US investors follow a momentum 
or contrarian investment strategy, past return should positively/negatively predict PE-
FODUM and US_OWNED. In Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), past return is negatively as-
sociated with institutional ownership. In Ferreira and Matos (2008), the authors detect no 
effect of past returns on institutional ownership. We therefore include this variable as a 
control into the analysis but do not expect it to be related to PEFODUM. In an analysis of 
international portfolio flows, Froot et al. (2001) obtain results consistent with a momen-
tum based investment strategy or positive feedback trading: international flows are posi-
tively related to past returns. By way of contrast, Curcuru et al. (2011) find that US inves-
tors tend to sell past winners. The authors interpret this as evidence for the implementation 
of investors’ portfolio rebalancing motives. As a result of this conflicting evidence with 
respect to past returns’ influence on investment decisions, we include RET as a control in 
the US ownership analysis without making assumptions of its effect on US_OWNED.
 Return standard deviation (STDEV)
Return standard deviation is measured as a firm’s raw return standard deviation of weekly 
US$ returns measured in a rolling window over the past year. Since professional money 
managers are believed to invest according to the “prudent-man” rules expressed in Del 
Guercio (1996), institutional investors possibly favour stocks associated with low risk as 
measured in return standard deviation. This prediction is confirmed in Hong and Kacper-
czyk (2009). We therefore include STDEV as a control and expect it to be negatively as-
sociated with PEFODUM. We have no indication that US investors favour low or high 
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risk stocks and do therefore not expect a statistically significant relation between STDEV 
and US_OWNED.
 Idiosyncratic variance (IDIOVAR)
The idiosyncratic variance of a firm’s weekly stock return is measured in a rolling window 
over the past year. IDIOVAR is estimated from a domestic, one-factor market model. For 
a broader explanation of the methodology, see Bekaert et al. (2010). Principally, the “pru-
dent-man” considerations expressed above are also valid for IDIOVAR. Thus, one would 
expect institutions to favour stocks with low idiosyncratic variance. Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) also use this measure and find a positive relation with institutional ownership. This 
means they reject implications derived from the “prudent-man” rules. In light of this con-
flicting evidence, we make no predictions regarding the impact of IDIOVAR on PEFOD-
UM. As with STDEV, we have no dedicated expectation concerning the effect of IDIO-
VAR on US_OWNED.
 Availability as an American Depositary Receipt (ADR)
ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has American Depositary Receipts 
traded at a US exchange and zero otherwise. In Ferreira and Matos (2008), this measure 
has proven to positively influence total institutional ownership. Hence, we suspect ADR to 
positively predict PEFODUM. A vast body of literature finds a positive association be-
tween US investor interest and US cross-listings (e.g. Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Ahearne, 
et al. 2004; Edison and Warnock, 2004 and Ammer et al., 2006). Moreover, Ammer et al. 
(2006) find cross-listing at a US exchange to be the key determinant of US investor inter-
est. Building on these findings, we expect a strong, positive influence of ADR on 
US_OWNED.
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 FTSE 100 membership (FTSE)
FTSE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a member of the FTSE Global 100 
and zero otherwise. In Ferreira and Matos (2008) it is revealed that membership in a glob-
al equity index positively predicts institutional ownership. The same is true for the relation 
between equity index membership and US investor ownership (Ammer et al., 2006). We 
therefore suppose FTSE to positively predict PEFODUM as well as US_OWNED.
3.2.2. Country specific independent variables
In the panel analysis of pension and endowment fund holdings, we use country dummies 
in order to control for country specific effects. Since the cross-sectional analysis of US own-
ership is based on a substantially lower number of observations, we only include the most 
important country effect (USA) as a dummy variable and try to gauge the remaining country 
effects by means of country specific variables explained below.
 US firm domicile (USA)
USA is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is domiciled in the US and zero oth-
erwise. A large body of research deals with the disposition of investors to display poor in-
ternational diversification, i.e. to overweigh domestic assets in their portfolio holdings. 
The phenomenon is first empirically observed in French and Poterba (1991). In the mean-
time, it has decreased in magnitude (Bohn and Tesar, 1996) but is still present, regardless 
of the country examined (Lau et al., 2010). Hence, we believe USA will be a strong, posi-
tive predictor of US_OWNED.
 Common law in domicile country (COMMONLAW)
COMMONLAW is a dummy variable that equals one if common law is practiced in the 
firm’s domicile country and zero otherwise. As La Porta et al. (1998) show, common law 
countries have the strongest legal investor protection measures in place. Since US inves-
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tors will favour investment in those countries where their rights are best protected, we 
suppose COMMONLAW to be positively associated with US_OWNED.
 English language is official language in domicile country (ENGLISH)
ENGLISH is a dummy variable that equals one if English is an official language in the 
firm’s domicile country and zero otherwise. As US investors might have easier access to 
firm information in English language if the official language in the respective firm’s dom-
icile country is English, US investors supposedly favour investing in such firms. Thus, we 
expect ENGLISH to have a positive impact on US_OWNED.
 Home market is classified as developed (DEVELOPED)
Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s domicile country is classified as developed ac-
cording to the new Dow Jones classification scheme (Dow Jones, 2011) and zero other-
wise. We suppose US investors will be more inclined to invest in foreign markets that are 
classified as developed. Therefore, we introduce DEVELOPED and suppose it will be 
positively associated with US_OWNED.
 Chinn-Ito financial openness measure (KAOPEN)
The Chinn-Ito financial openness measure is an index measuring the degree to which an 
economy is open to cross-border capital transactions. It therefore serves as a proxy for fi-
nancial openness. The index has been developed by Chinn and Ito (2008). The higher the 
index value, the easier it is for foreign investors to execute cross-border financial transac-
tions. Hence, we suppose this measure to have a positive impact on US_OWNED.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Pension fund and endowment fund ownership
In this section, we aim to answer the question of whether firms doing business in countries 
designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism are less held in majority portions by pension and 
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endowment funds than otherwise comparable firms. By constructing our control sample of 
firms, we are certain to have covered the main dimensions that could potentially conflict with 
our aim of trying to isolate the effect of operating in a country designated as a State Sponsor 
of Terrorism. We use multivariate regression analysis in order to optimally control for any 
non-isolated factors that could bias results. To this end, we estimate the following regression 
equation:
(1) PEFODUMit = α + β X   + β Y   + ε  ,
where PEFODUMit is the dummy indicating a pension or endowment fund has a majority 
stake in firm i at time t. Xit is a vector of dummy variables that we use in order to measure the 
impact of a firm’s relatedness to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. In our 
regression estimations, Xit can either include GSRMDUMit or EQUITY_TIEit. GSRMDUMit
equals one if a firm i is from the GSRM sample of firms with a connection to a country des-
ignated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism at time t and zero otherwise. EQUITY_TIEit equals 
one if a firm i has an equity tie to a country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism at 
time t and zero otherwise. We are particularly interested in the coefficient estimate of β
 
, 
measuring the effect of GSRMDUMit and EQUITY_TIEit on PEFODUMit. If pension and 
endowment funds do indeed less often hold a majority stake in a firm if the firm has ties to a 
country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, β 
 
should be negative and significantly 
different from zero.
Y   is a vector of control variables defined in Section 3.2.1. Similar to Hong and Kacper-
czyk (2009), who label this technique “ultra-conservative” (Hong and Kacperczyk; 2009, p. 
24), we estimate regression equation (1) by means of a logistic pooled (panel) regression. In 
this context, Petersen (2009) emphasizes the fact that OLS procedures with White (1980) 
standard errors may lead to incorrect inferences due to the potential dependence of residuals. 
We believe it is highly likely that residuals in our estimation display either cross-sectional 
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correlation, time-series correlation, or even both. In order to accommodate this, Petersen 
(2009) proposes to address one dimension parametrically and to estimate standard errors clus-
tered on the other dimension. We expect residual correlation within industries as do Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009), but we also suspect clustering within countries. Therefore, we have 
to estimate our regression equation in a way that we accommodate residual correlation along 
two cross-sectional dimensions (industry and country). We decide to include industry dum-
mies as well as country dummies and estimate standard errors clustered by time interval. This 
way we should be amply equipped against the danger of drawing false conclusions based on 
biased standard errors.
Table V-5 reports correlations of the independent variables. Since EQUITY_TIE is a sub-
set of GSRMDUM, the two variables display high positive correlation. When taking a look at 
the correlations between GSRMDUM (which effectively partitions into sample and control 
sample) and the other variables, we observe some differences between sample and control 
firms. As witnessed by the positive correlation of 0.17 between GSRMDUM and LN_MV, 
sample firms are on average somewhat larger than control firms. This also becomes obvious 
by looking at the correlations of GSRMDUM with ADR and FTSE, respectively. Since larger 
firms are also more likely to cross-list in the US and to be a member of the FTSE Global 100, 
ADR and FTSE are both positively correlated with GSRMDUM. Another correlation coeffi-
cient that warrants some consideration is the one pertaining to the standard deviation of re-
turns and their idiosyncratic variance. STDEV and IDIOVAR display high positive correla-
tion (0.78). This does not come to our surprise, since a connection between standard devia-
tion of returns and unsystematic risk seems intuitively appealing.
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Table V-5
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In Table V-6, we report the results of estimating two permutations of regression equation 
(1) on the full sample of firms. Regardless of the specification, the coefficient pertaining to 
LN_MV is positive and highly significant. As expected, pension and endowment funds are 
more likely to own a majority stake in larger firms as compared to smaller ones. Moreover, as 
witnessed by the highly negative and statistically significant coefficient belonging to 
LN_MTBV, these investors display a preference for value stocks. While the former finding is 
consistent with our expectation stemming from previous research, the latter one is consistent 
with the strand of research examining US- and US institutional investor behaviour. As in Fer-
reira and Matos (2008), we find past returns not to be related with our ownership measure, 
since the respective coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In our estima-
tions, we include STDEV as well as IDIOVAR. Despite their considerable correlation of 
0.78, the specification (1)/(2) variance inflation factors of 3.16/3.14 for STDEV and 
2.92/2.92 for IDIOVAR are well below conventional thresholds. What surprises us is that 
STDEV and IDIOVAR, despite their high correlation, do apparently not proxy for the same 
type of risk appetite/aversion. While pension and endowment funds prefer holding majority 
stakes in equities with high return variance as measured by the coefficient on STDEV, they 
prefer stocks associated with low idiosyncratic variance as indicated by the coefficient in 
front of IDIOVAR. Hence, pension and endowment funds seek total risk as measured by the 
raw return standard deviation but prefer stocks with low unsystematic risk as proxied by idio-
syncratic return variance. LN_PRINV does not enhance the regression models ability to ex-
plain the cross-sectional, time-series variation in pension and endowment funds’ majority 
holdings. Nevertheless, the corresponding coefficient is negative and therefore of the ex-
pected sign. With respect to the coefficient in front of DY, we had no decided expectation. 
Hence, we are somewhat surprised to observe a negative coefficient with remarkable statisti-
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cal significance. That said, pension and endowment funds display a preference for low divi-
dend-paying firms.
Since institutional investors are assumed to prefer stocks that are cross-listed at a US ex-
change, we anticipated the coefficient belonging to ADR to be positive. In contrast to our 
expectation, the coefficient on ADR is negative and highly statistically significant. Despite 
this apparent contradiction, the result is consistent with what Ferreira and Matos (2008) find 
for domestically investing institutional investors. While the authors provide no explanation 
for this observation, we are at least surprised by the coefficient’s remarkable statistical signif-
icance. The last control variable in the regression is FTSE, which is of no explanatory power 
irrespective of the specification.
As noted above, we are most interested in β 
 
, the coefficient pertaining to GSRMDUM in 
specification (1) and belonging to EQUITY_TIE in specification (2). In specification (1), the 
coefficient in front of GSRMDUM is −0.105 (t = −1.13). Statistically, the coefficient lacks
significance at conventional levels. When we restrict the dummy variable of interest to equal 
one only for those firms that have an equity tie in a country designated as a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism (EQUITY_TIE), we obtain results consistent with our hypothesis that these firms 
are shunned by pension as well as endowment funds. In specification (2), the coefficient in 
front of EQUITY_TIE is negative (−0.281) and significantly different from zero at the 1%-
level of confidence (t = −2.80). Since the coefficients obtained from estimating a logistic re-
gression are also interpretable as odds ratios, we can infer that the odds for a pension or en-
dowment fund to own a majority stake in a firm about 24% lower in case the firm has an eq-
uity tie to a country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Firms with Ties to Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism: a Note on Ownership
160
Table V-6
Pension and endowment fund ownership: full sample
(1) (2)
GSRMDUM −0.105
(−1.13)
EQUITY_TIE −0.281
(−2.80)***
LN_MV 0.374 0.393
(14.88)*** (14.02)***
LN_MTBV −0.537 −0.518
(−6.91)*** (−6.84)***
RET 7.803 7.537
(1.47) (1.41)
STDEV 31.246 31.335
(12.38)*** (12.55)***
IDIOVAR −289.236 −285.480
(−8.53)*** (−8.53)***
LN_PRINV −0.126 −0.086
(−1.26) (−0.90)
DY −5.328 −5.632
(−3.72)*** (−3.84)***
ADR −0.852 −0.865
(−9.73)*** (−10.39)***
FTSE −0.112 −0.115
(−0.36) (−0.36)
Country Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.505 0.506
Observations 27,914 27,914
This table displays results from estimating regression equation (1) for the
combined full sample of GSRM firms and control firms. GSRMDUM is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a firm is from the GSRM sample and zero otherwise.
EQUITY_TIE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an equity tie to a 
country designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism and zero otherwise. LN_MV
is the natural logarithm of firm size as measured in US$ stock market
capitalization. LN_MTBV is the natural logarithm of a firm's market to book
ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of equity, LN_PRINV is the
natural logarithmof 1 + the inverse of the firm's US$ share price, RET is a firm's
US$ stock return over the past year (measured in a rolling window), STDEV is a 
firm's raw return standard deviation of US$ stock returns over the past year
(measured in a rolling window), IDIOVAR is the idiosyncratic variance of a
firm's stock return relative to a domestic market model over the past year
(measured in a rolling window), DY is a firm's per share dividend as a
percentage of the share price, ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a
firm has American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) traded at a US exchange and
zero otherwise, FTSE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is member of
the FTSE Global 100 and zero otherwise. The period of investigation ranges
from 05/2005 to 02/2012. Z-statistics based on standard errors clustered by time 
interval iare in parantheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In Breuer and Felde (2012a), we obtained results consistent with the assertion that positive 
stock price effects upon withdrawal from a country designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism 
are more pronounced for oil and gas firms. This is in line with the general notion of the oil 
and gas industry constituting a key industry in the attempt to weaken the designated coun-
tries’ economies as it is explained in more depth in Breuer and Felde (2012a). We aim to in-
vestigate whether this view is mirrored beyond the abnormal return analysis of Breuer and 
Felde (2012a). Therefore, we repeat the preceding analysis for a sample of oil and gas firms 
and for a sample containing all firms but oil and gas firms.
In Table V-7, we report the results of estimating regression equation (1) for the subsample 
of oil and gas firms (industry sectors labelled Oil & Gas Producers and Oil Equipment, Ser-
vices & Distribution) as well as for the subsample of all firms but oil and gas firms. Results 
for the oil and gas subsample are estimated in specifications (1) to (4). Since the industry 
focus substantially reduces the number of observations, we separately control for country and 
industry effects by including either country or industry dummies. Note that the pseudo R-
squared is substantially lower when we control for industry effects than when we control for 
a country effect. An interpretation consistent with this observation is that pension and en-
dowment funds prefer certain countries over others and try to broadly disperse assets over 
different industries.
In specifications (1) and (2), we first observe that LN_MV is an insignificant determinant 
of pension and endowment fund ownership. Results for LN_MV look different when we dis-
tinguish among industry sectors in specifications (3) and (4). As far as firm size is concerned, 
the two industries combined in our oil and gas sample are quite different. On average, firms 
belonging to the Oil & Gas Producers industry sector are about three times larger than firms 
from the Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution sector. As witnessed by the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on LN_MV in specifications (3) and (4), pension and en-
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dowment funds do prefer larger firms within the respective industry sectors. We observe sim-
ilar patterns for other coefficients, as well. When we control for industry effects in specifica-
tions (3) and (4), coefficients on LN_MTBV, LN_PRINV, DY and ADR substantially change 
in magnitude and/or in statistical significance when compared to coefficients in specifications 
(1) and (2). The coefficient in front of LN_MTBV lends support on the notion of a growth 
stock preference in specifications (1) and (2), but the corresponding coefficient changes di-
rections in specifications (3) and (4). With respect to LN_PRINV, we observe the originally 
expected pattern of a preference for stocks with higher prices in specifications (3) and (4). 
While the corresponding coefficient is also negative in specifications (1) and (2), it lacks sta-
tistical significance in these specifications. Furthermore, the coefficient on DY is positive in 
specifications (1) and (2) but lacks statistical significance in specifications (3) and (4). When 
we control for the industry sector in specifications (3) and (4), we observe no preference re-
garding high dividend paying firms. Regardless of the specification, coefficients on RET are 
positive and significantly different from zero on the 1%-level of confidence. That said, pen-
sion and endowment funds display investment patterns consistent with a momentum strategy 
in the oil and gas industry. In the oil and gas industry regressions, we omit FTSE because no 
oil and gas GSRM sample or control firm that is in the FTSE 100 is also held in majority por-
tions by a pension or endowment fund. The most robust finding with respect to control varia-
bles is pension and endowment funds’ risk appetite as measured in return standard deviation 
and risk aversion as measured in idiosyncratic return variance. This finding is also consistent 
with results for the full sample of firms. Overall coefficients on control variables largely vary 
depending on whether we control for a country or for an industry effect.
When we compare the coefficients pertaining to GSRMDUM and EQUITY_TIE to the 
ones obtained for the full sample, we note that they have substantially gained in magnitude. 
Furthermore, GSRMDUM is negative and significantly different from zero at the 5%-level of 
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confidence. We also note that the coefficient belonging to EQUITY_TIE is highly significant. 
For the oil and gas subsample, the coefficient on EQUITY_TIE is statistically significant at 
the 1%-level of confidence, regardless of the specification. These results cast further evidence 
on the notion that the oil and gas industry plays a special role in the examination of investor 
behaviour regarding firms doing business in the designated countries. Therefore, the results 
are also consistent with prior research from Breuer and Felde (2012a).
In specifications (5) and (6), we report results for the sample of firms excluding oil and 
gas firms. Estimates of coefficients pertaining to the control variables do not display major 
differences to the ones obtained for the whole sample. We therefore do not discuss them here 
and turn our eyes directly to the estimates of the coefficients belonging to GSRMDUM and 
EQUITY_TIE, respectively. As for the full sample of firms, the coefficient in front of 
GSRMDUM lacks statistical significance. The coefficient in front of EQUITY_TIE is signif-
icant on the 10%-level of confidence, although its magnitude (−0.218) does not largely differ 
from the one obtained for the full sample of firms (−0.281).
In light of the results obtained in this section, we conclude that pension and endowment 
funds do not generally shun firms with ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Ter-
rorism. Crucial ownership determinants are whether the respective firm has a more material 
(equity) tie in the country and whether the firm belongs to the oil and gas industry. Pension 
and endowment funds’ aversion towards investing in firms with ties to countries designated 
as State Sponsors of Terrorism is most pronounced for oil and gas firms that have an equity
tie in the respective country.
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Table V-7
Pension and endowment fund ownership: subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GSRMDUM −0.593 −0.522 −0.047
(−2.41)** (−2.58)*** (−0.51)
EQUITY_TIE −1.140 −0.445 −0.218
(−4.91)*** (−2.67)*** (−1.85)*
LN_MV −0.020 0.038 0.154 0.154 0.323 0.335
(−0.15) (0.33) (3.30)*** (3.01)*** (8.31)*** (8.52)***
LN_MTBV 1.034 0.772 −0.123 −0.116 −0.472 −0.435
(4.56)*** (3.84)*** (−0.64) (−0.60) (−4.90)*** (−4.68)***
RET 50.324 56.654 83.526 83.214 0.946 0.668
(3.86)*** (4.47)*** (8.16)*** (8.19)*** (0.14) (0.10)
STDEV 31.917 32.490 70.211 68.765 32.073 32.551
(4.93)*** (5.07)*** (16.68)*** (17.20)*** (11.51)*** (11.64)***
IDIOVAR −631.956 −603.671 −1127.504 −1120.927 −266.436 −265.772
(−5.20)*** (−5.19)*** (−13.27)*** (−13.24)*** (−8.84)*** (−8.91)***
LN_PRINV −0.256 −0.057 −1.498 −1.463 −0.189 −0.171
(−0.36) (−0.10) (−5.12)*** (−5.01)*** (−1.67)* (−1.58)
DY 19.998 22.899 0.593 −0.238 −4.222 −4.310
(3.64)*** (4.92)*** (0.24) (−0.09) (−2.39)** (−2.44)**
ADR −0.207 0.451 0.283 0.303 −2.038 −2.099
(−0.57) (1.16) (1.38) (1.49) (−7.32)*** (−7.30)***
FTSE −0.157 −0.213
(−0.45) (−0.60)
Country Dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.610 0.585 0.222 0.220 0.516 0.516
Observations 5,798 5,798 5,798 5,798 22,116 22,116
Non- oil and gas firms
This table displays results from estimating regression equation (1) for the combined sample of GSRM firms and control firms. Specifications
(1) to (4) are estimations for the subsample of oil and gas firms and specifications (5) and (6) are estimations for all firms excluding oil and gas
firms. GSRMDUM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is from the GSRM sample and zero otherwise. EQUITY_TIE is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm has an equity tie to a country designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism and zero otherwise. LN_MV is the
natural logarithm of firm size as measured in US$ stock market capitalization. LN_MTBV is the natural logarithm of a firm's market to book
ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of equity, LN_PRINV is the natural logarithm of 1 + the inverse of the firm's US$ share
price, RET is a firm's US$ stock return over the past year (measured in a rolling window), STDEV is a firm's raw return standard deviation of
US$ stock returns over the past year (measured in a rolling window), IDIOVAR is the idiosyncratic variance of a firm's stock return relative to
a domestic market model over the past year (measured in a rolling window), DY is a firm's per share dividend as a percentage of the share
price, ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) traded at a US exchange and zero
otherwise, FTSE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is member of the FTSE Global 100 and zero otherwise. The period of
investigation ranges from 05/2005 to 02/2012. Z-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by time interval in
specifications (3) to (6). In specifications (1) and (2), z-statistics are based on normal standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Oil and gas firms
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4.2. US investor ownership
4.2.1. US investor ownership results
After having analysed equity holdings of pension and endowment funds, we now investi-
gate whether firms with ties to State Sponsor of Terrorism countries are less held by US in-
vestors. In contrast to the previous analysis, this analysis is cross-sectional. Because 
US_OWNED displays a distribution pattern that could potentially cause problems in the 
analysis, we transform US_OWNED by logarithmic transformation to obtain 
LN_US_OWNED (LN_US_OWNED = LN(1 + US_OWNED). We analyse the impact of 
ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism on US ownership by means of the 
following regression equation:
(2) LN_US_OWNEDi = α + β X  + β Y  + ε ,
where LN_US_OWNEDi denotes the fraction of equity held by US investors relative to all 
investors. As in regression equation (1), Xi is a vector of dummy variables that we use in or-
der to measure the impact of a firm’s relatedness to countries designated as State Sponsors of 
Terrorism. It can either include GSRMDUMi or EQUITY_TIEi. Y  is a vector of control vari-
ables defined earlier. We are particularly interested in the estimate of β
 
, the coefficient per-
taining to either GSRMDUMi or EQUITY_TIEi. We hypothesise that the fraction of shares 
held by US investors should be smaller for firms with ties to a country designated as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism. That is to say we presume β 
 
to be negative and statistically different 
from zero.
Table V-8 displays correlations of all independent variables included in vectors X  and Y . 
We observe very few unexpected higher correlations. As we saw in the correlations of panel 
variables in Table V-5, IDIOVAR and STDEV display a high positive correlation of 0.82. 
Furthermore, LN_PRINV and IDIOVAR are considerably more correlated in the 2012 cross-
section (0.53) than they are in the panel (0.18).
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Table V-8
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This means that equities with a low price are also associated with high idiosyncratic variance. 
As one would expect, several of the country specific variables also display high correlation. 
Especially COMMON_LAW and ENGLISH are, presumably for historical reasons, highly 
positively correlated. Furthermore, developed countries (DEVELOPED) and countries with 
high financial openness (as measured by KAOPEN) display high positive correlation (0.76), 
indicating that developed markets display higher capital market openness when compared to 
less developed markets.
In Table V-9, we present results from estimating various specifications of regression equa-
tion (2) without including GSRMDUM or EQUITY_TIE. First, we want to find out which 
permutation of control variables best captures the cross-sectional variation in US investors’ 
equity ownership. As opposed to the regression specifications in the pooled (panel) analysis, 
we do not simultaneously include STDEV and IDIOVAR, since the corresponding variance 
inflation factors are considerably higher. Of the firm specific variables (LN_MV to FTSE), 
only LN_MV is of considerable explanatory power. From the positive and statistically signif-
icant estimates of the coefficient belonging to LN_MV, we infer that US investors prefer in-
vesting in large firms. In contrast to our expectation, US investors do not display a preference 
for value stocks. The coefficient estimate for LN_MTBV is close to zero and far from statis-
tical significance. Although US investors seem to demonstrate light risk appetite as witnessed 
by the mostly positive estimates for the coefficient on STDEV, the coefficient is statistically 
significant only in two specifications. The case is similar with respect to LN_PRINV and DY. 
Despite an apparent tendency of US investors to invest in stocks with a higher price and 
stocks that pay low dividends, the corresponding coefficients lack statistical significance in
most of the specifications. A finding that strikes us is the fact that ADR is of no explanatory 
power in neither of the specifications we estimated. 
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Table V-9
US investor ownership: full sample determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LN_MV 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.020
(2.91)*** (2.69)*** (2.95)*** (2.97)*** (3.49)***
LN_MTBV 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.010
(1.03) (0.92) (0.42) (0.81) (0.76)
RET −1.082 −1.353 −0.679 −0.621 0.573
(−0.74) (−0.91) (−0.48) (−0.39) (0.34)
STDEV 0.772 0.779 0.732 0.812
(1.65)* (1.80)* (1.38) (1.50)
IDIOVAR 0.166
(0.07)
LN_PRINV −0.010 −0.004 −0.010 −0.018 −0.014
(−1.29) (−0.55) (−1.48) (−2.31)** (−1.75)*
DY −0.257 −0.395 −0.128 −0.286 −0.327
(−1.11) (−1.82)* (−0.56) (−1.02) (−1.15)
ADR 0.043 0.047 0.036 −0.041 −0.038
(1.37) (1.53) (1.14) (−1.09) (−1.05)
FTSE −0.025 −0.030 −0.021 0.075 0.094
(−1.41) (−1.72)* (−1.24) (0.67) (0.84)
USA 0.498 0.503 0.498
(25.08)*** (24.71)*** (25.18)***
ENGLISH 0.172
(4.43)***
COMMONLAW 0.132
(4.22)***
DEVELOPED 0.042
(2.31)**
KAOPEN 0.018 0.021 0.020 0.031
(2.63)*** (3.02)*** (2.73)*** (3.93)***
Adj. R-squared 0.512 0.504 0.505 0.287 0.267
Observations 260 260 260 260 260
This table displays results from estimating regression equation (2) with control variables
exclusively. The sample is the combined sample of GSRM firms and control firms . LN_MV is the
natural logarithm of firm size as measured in US$ stock market capitalization. LN_MTBV is the
natural logarithm of a firm's market to book ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of
equity, LN_PRINVis the natural logarithm of 1 + the inverse of the firm's US$ share price, RET is a
firm's US$ stock return over the past year (measured in a rolling window), STDEV is a firm's raw
return standard deviation of US$ stock returns over the past year (measured in a rolling window),
IDIOVAR is the idiosyncratic variance of a firm's stock return relative to a domestic market model
over the past year (measured in a rolling window), DYis a firm's per share dividend as a percentage
of the share price, ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) traded at a US exchange and zero otherwise, FTSE is a dummy variable that
equals one if a firm is member of the FTSE Global 100 and zero otherwise, USA is a dummy variable
that equals one if a firm is domiciled in the USA and zero otherwise, COMMONLAW is a dummy
variable that equals one if the firm is domiciled in a common law country and zero otherwise,
ENGLISH is a dummy variable if english is an official language in the firm's domicile country,
DEVELOPED is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's domicile country is classified as
developed and zero otherwise, KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito financial openness measure. Data is cross-
sectional as of 02/2012. t-statistics based on robust White (1980) standard errors are in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Recall from Section 3.2.1. that numerous studies found this factor to be a key determinant of 
US investor ownership. We can only speculate that the preference of US investors regarding 
the availability of a security on the US market has shifted over time. Other studies are some-
what older and potentially do not cover recent trends in investors’ preferences. At least on the 
firm side, it seems that the assessment of ADR importance has decreased. In a study on the 
disposition of foreign firms to list at US stock indices, Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) find that 
the number of foreign firms cross-listing at NYSE or NASDAQ has declined in the period 
between 2004 and 2008. If US investors intend keeping up the same level of international 
diversification (which they should do, as classical finance theory suggests), they have to 
make use of ways other than purchasing ADRs, thereby reducing the ADRs’ relative overall 
importance. The last firm specific control variable considered is FTSE, which is of low ex-
planatory power, as well.
The most important variable when explaining the cross-sectional variation in US investor 
ownership is US domicile, as indicated by the highly positive and statistically significant co-
efficient on the USA dummy. Dropping this variable as we do in specifications (4) and (5) 
substantially diminishes the model’s explanatory power. Not including USA means at least a 
21.7%-points drop in explanatory power as measured by the difference in adjusted R-squared. 
Although all other coefficients pertaining to country specific variables are of considerable 
statistical significance, they cannot make up for what is lost when omitting USA. This result 
is in line with the entire strand of finance literature examining the disposition of investors 
around the world to primarily invest in domestic assets (see e.g. Lau et al., 2010). Within the 
context of our study, this result has yet another implication: in the subsequent analysis of US 
investors’ holdings, we will analyse the entire sample of firms but also a subsample of non-
US firms. It is well possible that once we analyse non-US equities, other determinants of US 
ownership gain importance. Before doing so, we briefly discuss the remaining country specif-
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ic independent variables. As expected, the English language dummy (ENGLISH) and 
COMMONLAW (common law is practiced in the USA) are positive predictors of US owner-
ship. As formulated in Section 3.2.2., we expected DEVELOPED and KAOPEN to be posi-
tive predictors of LN_US_OWNED. These suppositions are confirmed by the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on those two variables.
As mentioned above, we are curious to see whether determinants of US investor owner-
ship are the same once we run our analysis for a subsample excluding US firms. Results from 
estimating regression equation (2) without the variables of contextual interest (vector X ) for 
non-US firms are displayed in Table V-10. Over all specifications, the adjusted R-squared is 
quite low. Depending on the variables used, it ranges between 0.11 and 0.13. The variables 
that explain the cross-section of US equity ownership best are LN_MV and KAOPEN. Over-
all, the variables that have proven to explain US ownership for the whole sample are the same 
variables that are of explanatory power for the sample excluding US firms. The key differ-
ence is a loss in overall model fit due to the absence of a variable like USA.
Results from estimating the complete regression equation (2) for the full sample and the 
sample excluding US firms are displayed in Table V-11. We only display specifications that 
have superior explanatory power when compared to alternate specifications. In addition to the 
adjusted R-squared, we also report the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) as developed in 
Akaike (1974). This criterion measures the goodness of fit as the adjusted R-squared does. Its 
advantage lies in its ability to assess the relative goodness of fit when two alternative regres-
sion estimations, of which one is estimated with a technique not supporting the calculation of 
an adjusted R-squared, are compared to each other. For the alternate estimation technique we 
use in the next section, determination of an adjusted R-squared is not possible, which is why 
we rely on AIC.
Firms with Ties to Countries Designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism: a Note on Ownership
172
Table V-10
US investor ownership: non-US sample determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LN_MV 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017
(2.95)*** (2.82)*** (3.01)*** (3.05)***
LN_MTBV 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.68) (0.54) (0.11) (0.11)
RET −1.089 −1.054 −0.707 −0.488
(−0.73) (−0.67) (−0.50) (−0.33)
STDEV 0.704 0.731 0.755
(1.48) (1.65) (1.70)*
IDIOVAR −0.133
(−0.06)
LN_PRINV −0.011 −0.004 −0.012 −0.010
(−1.46) (−0.53) (−1.78)* (−1.54)
DY −0.260 −0.401 −0.146 −0.149
(−1.08) (−1.76)* (−0.61) (−0.62)
ADR 0.031 0.036 0.025 0.029
(0.91) (1.07) (0.75) (0.85)
FTSE −0.053 −0.047 −0.045 −0.032
(−1.78)* (−1.66)* (−1.55) (−1.19)
ENGLISH 0.041 0.040
(1.49) (1.43)
COMMONLAW 0.032 0.019
(1.44) (0.83)
DEVELOPED 0.034 0.040
(1.80)* (2.21)**
KAOPEN 0.017 0.021
(2.32)** (3.05)***
Adj. R-squared 0.132 0.118 0.119 0.114
Observations 246 246 246 246
This table displays results from estimating regression equation (2) with control
variables exclusively. The sample is the combined sample of GSRM firms and
control firms excluding US firms. LN_MV is the natural logarithm of firm size as
measured in US$ stock market capitalization. LN_MTBV is the natural logarithm of a
firm's market to book ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of equity,
LN_PRINV is the natural logarithm of 1 + the inverse of the firm's US$ share price,
RET is a firm's US$ stock return over the past year (measured in a rolling window),
STDEV is a firm's raw return standard deviation of US$ stock returns over the past
year (measured in a rolling window), IDIOVAR is the idiosyncratic variance of a
firm's stock return relative to a domestic market model over the past year (measured
in a rolling window), DY is a firm's per share dividend as a percentage of the share
price, ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) traded at a US exchange and zero otherwise, FTSE is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm is member of the FTSE Global 100 and zero
otherwise, USA is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is domiciled in the
USA and zero otherwise, COMMONLAW is a dummy variable that equals one if
the firm is domiciled in a common law country and zero otherwise, ENGLISH is a
dummy variable if english is an official language in the firm's domicile country,
DEVELOPED is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm's domicile country is
classified as developed and zero otherwise, KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito financial
openness measure. Data is cross-sectional as of 02/2012. t-statistics based on
robust White (1980) standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table V-11
US investor ownership: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GSRMDUM 0.001 0.000
(0.06) (0.00)
EQUITY_TIE 0.006 0.006
(0.37) (0.33)
LN_MV 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016
(2.90)*** (2.90)*** (3.00)*** (3.00)***
LN_MTBV 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009
(1.00) (1.03) (0.84) (0.87)
RET −1.084 −1.098 −1.056 −1.070
(−0.74) (−0.75) (−0.71) (−0.72)
STDEV 0.770 0.757 0.762 0.747
(1.63) (1.63) (1.58) (1.57)
LN_PRINV −0.010 −0.010 −0.009 −0.009
(−1.28) (−1.29) (−1.24) (−1.24)
DY −0.258 −0.262 −0.300 −0.305
(−1.15) (−1.15) (−1.29) (−1.29)
ADR 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.041
(1.36) (1.38) (1.24) (1.26)
FTSE −0.025 −0.025 −0.029 −0.027
(−1.39) (−1.46) (−1.11) (−1.03)
USA 0.498 0.499
(25.07)*** (24.92)***
KAOPEN 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019
(2.65)*** (2.69)*** (2.65)*** (2.69)***
Adj. R-squared 0.510 0.510 0.124 0.124
AIC −333 −333 −304 −304
Observations 260 260 246 246
Full Sample Sample excl. US firms
This table displays results from estimating regression equation (2) for the combined full sample of GSRM
firms and control firms. GSRMDUM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is from the GSRM sample
and zero otherwise. EQUITY_TIE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an equity tie to a
country designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism and zero otherwise. LN_MVis the natural logarithm of
firm size as measured in US$ stock market capitalization. LN_MTBV is the natural logarithm of a firm's
market to book ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of equity, LN_PRINV is the natural
logarithm of 1 + the inverse of the firm's US$ share price, RET is a firm's US$ stock return over the past
year (measured in a rolling window), STDEVis a firm's raw return standard deviation of US$ stock returns
over the past year (measured in a rolling window), IDIOVAR is the idiosyncratic variance of a firm's stock
return relative to a domestic market model over the past year (measured in a rolling window), DY is a firm's
per share dividend as a percentage of the share price, ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm
has American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) traded at a US exchange and zero otherwise, FTSE is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm is member of the FTSE Global 100 and zero otherwise, USA is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm is domiciled in the USA and zero otherwise, COMMONLAW is a dummy
variable that equals one if the firm is domiciled in a common law country and zero otherwise, ENGLISH is a 
dummy variable if english is an official language in the firm's domicile country, DEVELOPED is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm's domicile country is classified as developed and zero otherwise,
KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito financial openness measure. Data is cross-sectional as of 02/2012. AIC is the
Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974). t-statistics based on robust White (1980) standard errors are
in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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From the coefficient estimates belonging to our main variables of interest (GSRMDUM and 
EQUITY_TIE), we infer that US investors do not particularly shun stocks of firms with ties 
to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. All coefficient estimates are near zero 
and are associated with low corresponding t-statistics. In this respect, it does also not matter 
whether the involvement of the respective firm in a designated country is material or not.
Furthermore, there is no difference in investor preference between the full sample of 
stocks and the sample excluding US stocks. Overall, we cannot detect a discrepancy in US 
investor holdings between stocks of firms that have ties to the designated countries and firms 
refraining from engaging in such controversial business activities.
4.2.2. US investor ownership robustness check
One potential caveat not addressed so far is the misinterpretation of significance levels due 
to misspecified standard errors. Looking at the residuals of regression equation (2) casts 
doubt on the notion that a conventional OLS regression assuming normally distributed resid-
uals is the appropriate methodology for the statistical analysis. As noted by Ferrari and Criba-
ri-Neto (2004, p. 799), “measures of proportions typically display asymmetry, and hence in-
ference based on the normality assumption can be misleading”. In such cases, the authors 
advocate the use of a beta distribution, estimated by means of maximum-likelihood. The ad-
vantage of the beta distribution is its flexibility, “since its density can have different shapes 
depending on the values of the two parameters that index the distribution” (Ferrari and Criba-
ri-Neto; 2004, p. 800). By varying these two parameters, the resulting beta distribution can 
have a wide range of densities. For illustrative purposes, Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004, p. 
802) display “J-shapes”, inverted “J-shapes” and also “U-shapes”. Furthermore, when the two 
parameters are set accordingly, the standard normal distribution can be modelled as well.
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Before estimating regression equation (2) by means of a beta distribution, we first have to 
linearly transform the dependent variable LN_US_OWNED to lie in the interval (0;1). The 
formula proposed by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006, p. 55) is
(3) y´	=	[y(N-1)	+	½]/N,
where y is the dependent variable’s original value and N stands for the sample size. In the
context of our data, this means we effectively transform LN_US_OWNED to lie in the inter-
val [0.00192; 0.99808].
Results of estimating regression equation (2) by means of a maximum likelihood fitted be-
ta distribution are displayed in Table V-12. As in Table V-11, we provide the estimations’ 
corresponding AICs. When choosing between alternative model estimations, the one with the 
smaller AIC is preferred over the other (Akaike, 1974). In this context, it is worth noting that 
the model estimations by means of the OLS technique displayed in Table V-11 have higher 
AICs than the estimations by means of the maximum likelihood fitted beta distribution. 
Hence, the latter model is to be preferred over the one estimated with OLS. Interestingly, 
most control variables gain statistical significance. This also counts for ADR, which had so 
far not proven to be of explanatory power. It is now statistically significant, although merely 
on the 10%-level of confidence in three out of four specifications. LN_PRINV is now associ-
ated with the expected negative coefficient, which denotes US investors’ preference for 
stocks with a higher price. What remains is the lack of significance for the coefficients be-
longing to GSRMDUM and EQUITY_TIE, respectively. As in the case of the OLS estima-
tion displayed in Table V-11, all four coefficient estimates are not statistically different from 
zero. Therefore, estimating regression equation (2) by means of a beta distribution does not 
lead to a change in our overall interpretation of the results. US investors do not hold fewer 
shares in firms that operate in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism than they 
hold shares in otherwise comparable firms.
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Table V-12
US investor ownership: Beta estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GSRMDUM 0.023 0.017
(0.23) (0.16)
EQUITY_TIE 0.000 0.006
(0.00) (0.05)
LN_MV 0.150 0.150 0.154 0.154
(4.76)*** (4.75)*** (4.83)*** (4.81)***
LN_MTBV 0.078 0.075 0.064 0.062
(1.12) (1.11) (0.89) (0.89)
RET −13.872 −13.851 −13.091 −13.077
(−1.61) (−1.60) (−1.52) (−1.52)
STDEV 4.682 4.724 4.452 4.473
(1.72)* (1.74)* (1.63) (1.64)
LN_PRINV −0.093 −0.093 −0.087 −0.088
(−2.25)** (−2.28)** (−2.15)** (−2.18)**
DY −1.880 −1.871 −2.080 −2.077
(−1.45) (−1.44) (−1.56) (−1.56)
ADR 0.378 0.383 0.341 0.345
(1.95)* (2.00)** (1.71)* (1.76)*
FTSE −0.173 −0.166 −0.014 −0.015
(−1.30) (−1.31) (−0.08) (−0.09)
USA 2.413 2.413
(16.21)*** (16.11)***
KAOPEN 0.224 0.223 0.217 0.216
(4.83)*** (4.86)*** (4.73)*** (4.77)***
AIC −889 −889 −872 −872
Observations 260 260 246 246
Full Sample Sample excl. US firms
This table displays results from estimating regression equation (2) for the combined full sample of GSRM
firms and control firms. GSRMDUM is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is from the GSRM sample
and zero otherwise. EQUITY_TIE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has an equity tie to a
country designated as State Sponsor of Terrorism and zero otherwise. LN_MVis the natural logarithm of
firm size as measured in US$ stock market capitalization. LN_MTBV is the natural logarithm of a firm's
market to book ratio (market value of equity divided by book value of equity, LN_PRINV is the natural
logarithm of 1 + the inverse of the firm's US$ share price, RET is a firm's US$ stock return over the past
year (measured in a rolling window), STDEVis a firm's raw return standard deviation of US$ stock returns
over the past year (measured in a rolling window), IDIOVAR is the idiosyncratic variance of a firm's stock
return relative to a domestic market model over the past year (measured in a rolling window), DY is a firm's
per share dividend as a percentage of the share price, ADR is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm
has American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) traded at a US exchange and zero otherwise, FTSE is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm is member of the FTSE Global 100 and zero otherwise, USA is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm is domiciled in the USA and zero otherwise, COMMONLAW is a dummy
variable that equals one if the firm is domiciled in a common law country and zero otherwise, ENGLISH is a 
dummy variable if english is an official language in the firm's domicile country, DEVELOPED is a dummy
variable that equals one if a firm's domicile country is classified as developed and zero otherwise,
KAOPEN is the Chinn-Ito financial openness measure. Data is cross-sectional as of 02/2012. AIC is the
Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974). t-statistics based on robust White (1980) standard errors are
in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In a similar vein as it is assumed in the theoretical model of Merton (1987), we hypothe-
sise that some firms are facing a segmented equity market caused by the disregard of certain 
investors. In Merton’s (1987) framework, neglect is caused by the fact that investors only 
know about a subset of the securities available in the market place. By way of contrast, we 
seize a suggestion of socially responsible investing (SRI) in assuming that certain norm con-
scious investors might deliberately decide not to invest in certain stocks. The stocks we hy-
pothesise to be neglected are those of firms with ties to countries designated as State Spon-
sors of Terrorism and the investors supposedly shunning them are (i) pension and endowment 
funds as well as (ii) US investors in general. Regarding the issue of firms doing business in 
countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism, we believe those two investor types are 
particularly norm sensitive.
We investigate a comprehensive sample of firms with ties to State Sponsor of Terrorism 
countries using a time period of almost seven years (05/2005 – 02/2012) in order to analyse 
majority holdings (5% of shares or more) by pension and endowment funds. Results indicate 
that pension and endowment funds do not generally shun firms with ties to countries desig-
nated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. First, the type of engagement in the designated country 
is a determinant of ownership. Pension and endowment funds are less likely to own a majori-
ty stake in a firm with an equity tie (the firm has employees or facilities in the respective 
country) in one of the designated countries than they are to own a majority stake in otherwise 
comparable firms. Second, industry affiliation matters as well. Pension and endowment funds 
are less likely to own a majority stake in oil and gas firms that have ties to State Sponsor of 
Terrorism Countries than they are to own majority stakes in oil and gas firms refraining from 
such activities. The latter result strengthens and reaffirms one of the key findings of Breuer 
and Felde (2012a). Abnormal stock returns upon announcement of withdrawal from a country 
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designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism were found to be more pronounced in case the 
withdrawing firm is an oil and gas firm. This does once again substantiate the notion that the 
oil and gas sector is not only key to many of the designated countries but is also particularly 
present in the perception of norm conscious investors. 
Another aspect that is even better explained by combining findings of Breuer and Felde 
(2012a) and this paper is that of causality. While an ownership stake of 5% or more is a stra-
tegic one, the investor most often has the intent and the ability to influence corporate policy. 
This raises the question whether pension and endowment funds use their strategic stakes in 
order to convince the respective firm not to operate in countries designated as a State Sponsor 
of Terrorism. The fact that firms with ties to the designated countries are less often held in 
majority portions by pension and endowment funds would then be a consequence of the 
funds’ influence on the firms’ decisions rather than pension and endowment funds reacting to 
corporate decisions by means of investments or divestments. What helps us in identifying the 
correct causality is the fact that withdrawal from the designated countries is associated with a 
positive stock price reaction (Breuer and Felde, 2012a). This effect is only likely to occur if 
the corporate decision to divest from the designated countries causes pension and endowment 
funds to react by means of a corresponding investment decision.
With respect to US ownership, we investigate a cross-section of firms with ties to the des-
ignated countries in 2012. Results indicate that association with one or more of the countries 
is no determinant of US investors’ equity ownership. Hence, US investors do not hold fewer 
shares in firms that have ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism than they 
hold shares in otherwise comparable firms. Nevertheless, this latter cross-sectional analysis is 
limited by the fact that it covers only one 2012 snapshot. Therefore, the corresponding results 
should be interpreted with care.
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Evidence presented in this paper lends further support on the notion that at least a fraction 
of investors incorporates non-pecuniary motives into the investment decision. Moreover, we 
shed light on an unanswered aspect of our previous research. In Breuer and Felde (2012a), we 
speculated that the increase in the stock price of a firm withdrawing from a country designat-
ed as State Sponsor of Terrorism might have been due to the sudden conquest of a broader 
investor base upon withdrawal. As we discover in this paper, the broadened investor base 
might, amongst others, consist of pension and endowment funds.
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VI. FINAL CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, the financial consequences of firm operations in countries designated 
as State Sponsors of Terrorism are analysed. Included are analyses on short-term impact, 
long-term effects, and ownership.
The first paper investigates the implication of firm decisions to withdraw from the desig-
nated countries. Principally, such withdrawals can have positive as well as negative conse-
quences on a firm’s stock price. On the one hand, withdrawing signals morally favourable 
behaviour. By abandoning operations in countries that are perceived as controversial, the re-
spective firm displays superior moral conduct. Such behaviour may either directly or indirect-
ly affect a firm’s stock price. Directly, as investors previously shunning the stock are adding 
it to their universe of assets considered for investing. Indirectly, because the withdrawing 
firm’s favourable moral conduct may positively affect consumers’ preferences towards the 
firm’s products on the goods market. This, in turn, positively affects a firm’s cash flows and 
lets its share price rise. On the other hand, a firm foregoes valuable revenues and also profit 
once it withdraws from a geographic market. This negatively affects cash flows and, all else 
equal, drives down the firm’s share price. Evidence obtained in the paper indicates investors 
reward withdrawing firms for abiding to higher moral standards. Upon withdrawal, firms 
leaving morally controversial markets are rewarded by a substantial, non-transitory increase 
in share price. Due to the noisy nature of upfront debate about such withdrawals, information 
is priced early. Abnormally positive returns are detected during the period prior to the an-
nouncement. Consistent with the notion that the oil and gas- as well as the bank and financial 
trading industry play a pivotal role in the effort to isolate the designated economies, firms of 
such industries are rewarded even more once they withdraw. An analysis of the long-term 
impact on performance reveals no measurable return differential for the portfolio of with-
drawing firms.
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The second paper poses the question if investors expressed their discontent about firms 
operating in the designated countries when information on such activities was released by 
means of an online tool, launched by the SEC in summer 2007. Evidence suggests investors’ 
concern about their investments found expression in them selling stocks of firms being men-
tioned in the online tool. Contrary to what one would expect, negative stock price reactions 
are not identified for the dates when the tool was launched, but for the period after it went 
online. This finding is likely to be attributable to a phenomenon discovered in the field of 
behavioural finance. The “disposition effect”, as it has been entitled by in the literature, de-
notes investors’ tendency for deferred selling in reaction to negative information. Further-
more, faint evidence for long-term abnormal returns of firms mentioned in the online-tool is 
detected. Consistent with those firms being shunned by norm conscious investors, they deliv-
er higher returns than two control portfolios. However, the performance differential as meas-
ured by alpha lacks statistical significance.
The first and second paper are complementary in the sense that they investigate dwindling 
and emergence of perceived immorality. They are different to the extent that in paper one the 
event is accompanied by real economy related incidents. Processes such as selling of physical 
assets or termination of distribution contracts are inextricably linked to the withdrawal deci-
sion. Such ambient noise is absent in the case of information released by means of the online-
tool. In this sense, paper two isolates the bare informational content of emerging moral stig-
matisation. In connection with the abovementioned tendency of investors’ to defer selling 
decisions, one would expect the short-term stock price reaction to be less pronounced in the 
case of paper two, which is exactly what is found.
What is left open in papers one and two is the specific reason for the observed short-term 
price reactions. Principally, the above stated considerations for the withdrawal case are vice 
versa valid for the case of being mentioned in the online-tool. On the one hand, direct de-
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mand effects on the investor side could have induced investors to create excess demand in the 
withdrawal case and a demand shortage in the case of stigmatisation by means of the online 
tool. On the other hand, increased attractiveness on the goods and labour market might posi-
tively affect cash flows in the withdrawal case while decreased attractiveness on the goods 
and labour market might negatively affect cash flows in the online-tool stigmatisation case.
The third paper aims at disentangling these two explanations by analysing shareholdings 
in firms with business ties to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. If a norm 
conscious subset of the investor base displayed the tendency to avoid holding stocks of firms 
active in the designated countries, this would be consistent with the excess demand / demand 
shortage based explanation of the short-term effects discovered in papers one and two. In this 
context, two investor clienteles are hypothesised to display an aversion to holding stocks of 
firms with operations in the designated countries: pension and endowment funds as well as 
US investors. Both investor clienteles have expressed preferences for so-called terror-free 
investing. Hence, they are believed to hold stocks of firms active in the designated countries 
in lower proportions than stocks not active in these countries. Consistent with such stocks 
being shunned by pension and endowment funds, we find this investor clientele to be less 
likely to hold a majority stake in a firm if the firm is active in a country designated as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism. The effect is more pronounced if the firm has employees or facilities in 
the respective country. Furthermore, the effect is of augmented magnitude for firms active in 
the oil and gas sector. Contrary to what one would expect, US investors do not hold such 
firms in lower proportions than they hold shares in otherwise comparable firms.
Evidence presented in paper three supports the notion of firms overcoming a Merton 
(1987) type neglect upon withdrawal. While firms suffer from moral controversy as long as 
they are active in the designated countries, they lose the controversial characteristic upon 
withdrawal. As shares of such firms were shunned by norm conscious investors before with-
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drawal, they are instantaneously receiving attention upon withdrawal. This way, firms over-
come a segmented equity market and profit through an increase in share price. By the same 
token, firms being stigmatised by means of the online-tool enter a Merton (1987) type neglect 
status and are therefore shunned by norm conscious investors.
This dissertation broadens the understanding of how social norms affect financial markets. 
It is shown that for a firm, there are pecuniary incentives for conforming to moral standards 
by not engaging in business in countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism.
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